Collective agreements : a comparative study between Belgium and South Africa by Vauthier, Sandrine Anne
r 
r COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN BELGIUM AND SOUTH AFRICA 
By 
Sandrine Anne Vauthier 
submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF LAWS 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
Supervisor: Professor P .A.K. LE ROUX 
November 1998 
The thought 
must never be subject 
to a dogma, 
nor to a party, 
nor to a passion, 
nor to an interest, 
nor to a preconceived idea, 
nor to anything else, 
except to the facts themselves, 
because for it, 
to be subject 
would be to cease being. 
Henri Poincare 
Thank you to those whose assistance and support in the production of this 
dissertation proved to be indispensable, and more particularly to De Bandt, 
van Hecke & Lagae attorneys for their financial support, Rob Perrott for the 
morning sessions of argumentation on South African law, Julius Oosthuizen 
and Kate Greenberg for proof-reading this document. 
2 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation analyses, in a comparative perspective collective agreements 
entered into in Belgium and in South Africa in the private sector. It is divided into 
three parts: Belgian law, South African law and a comparative perspective. Each 
part adopts the same format: it comprises a historical survey, a description of the 
parties to collective agreements, the forums in which collective bargaining takes 
place and an analysis of collective agreements, focusing on the nature of their 
binding force. 
Because Belgian law prohibits agency shop and closed shop agreements, on the 
basis of the freedom of association, no reference has been made to these 
agreements, even though they are permitted in South Africa and are regarded as 
collective agreements. 
This dissertation does not deal with collective agreements entered into to regulate 
terms and conditions of employment in the public sector as state employees in 
Belgium are excluded from the scope of labour law and have their employment 
relationship governed by administrative law. 
Key words: collective agreements; collective bargaining; parties; non-parties; 
bargaining forum; binding force; extension; mandate of representatives; terms and 
conditions of employment; levels of collective bargaining 
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INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this dissertation was chosen shortly after the writer's arrival in South 
Africa, in early 1996. The reading of a decision of the Industrial Court on the 
protection of maternity happened to awake the writer's interest in making a 
comparative study of collective agreements entered into in Belgium and South 
Africa. 
This decision, Collins v Vo/kskas Bank, (1994) ILJ 1398 (IC), made reference to the 
fact that conditions of employment negotiated through collective bargaining were 
binding and enforceable against individual employees through the common-law 
principles of agency or stipulatio alteri. 
This decision, analysed in the light of the writer's Belgian law background which 
tends to acknowledge that labour law constitutes a branch of law independent from 
the traditional division between civil and public law, dictated the choice of collective 
agreements as the object of a comparative study. 
As the binding force of collective agreements has been the topic of lengthy articles, 
books, and even theses in Belgium, at least until the enactment of the 1968 Act 
regulating collective agreements, it was assumed that this would be an "easy'' topic. 
South Africa had probably been facing the same difficulties in enforcing collective 
agreements, and if reference was still being made to the law of agency and 
stipulatio alteri, a comparative study with the Belgian system could surely contribute 
to the development of South African law. 
This dissertation has been divided into three parts: Belgian law, South African law 
and a comparative perspective. Each part adopts the same format: it comprises a 
historical survey, a description of the parties to collective agreements, the forums in 
which collective bargaining takes place and an analysis of collective agreements, 
focusing on the nature of their binding force. 
Because Belgian law prohibits agency shop and closed shop agreements, on the 
basis of the freedom of association, no reference has been made to these 
agreements in this dissertation, even though they are permitted in South Africa and 
are regarded as collective agreements. 
8 
No reference will be made either to the situation applicable in the Public Service, 
since all employees of the Belgian State are excluded from the scope of labour law, 





CHAPTER I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The first known collective agreement regulating working conditions was negotiated 
in 1906 in order to end a lock-out which took place in the textile industry. After the 
conclusion of this agreement, the idea that employers' and workers' organisations 
could negotiate working conditions in lieu of individual workers and employers in a 
specific professional sector developed, and more and more collective agreements 
were concluded1. 
From the outset these agreements were aimed at ensuring social peace in 
enterprises. 
Although they were not legally enforceable, their success and expansion can be 
explained by the following: trade unions were enabled to negotiate working 
conditions collectively; employers were willing to institute a social climate favourable 
to production; and competition resulting from different wage levels between 
companies within the same industry was avoided. The first collective agreements 
therefore arose mainly at sectoral level, through committees established on an ad 
hoc basis and composed of representatives of employers' organisations and trade 
unions. 
The main problem that these collective agreements faced was that they were not 
legally binding: their infringement could not lead to any legal action. Furthermore, 
they were concluded by organisations which lacked legal personality2 (and still do 
today). Various theories were therefore utilised to confer validity on them, amongst 
which were theories of civil law relating to contracts, due to the contractual elements 
present in collective agreements. 
None of these theories could, however, satisfactorily explain the binding force of 
1 V. Vannes, "Le lock-out: conditions de legitimite", in Cent ans de droit social, Bruxelles, Bruylant 
1986, 371; P. Van der Vorst, Introduction au droit social, PUB, Vol I, 7th ed., 1990, 90. 
2 Belgian trade unions have no legal status or corporate capacity, and there is no legislation regulating 
the administration or functioning of trade unions. This situation suits the unions as it means that they 
do not suffer any disadvantages attached to legal personality (such as being sued) and at the same time 
have been given limited legal personality to defend and represent their members' rights. See C.T. 
Bruxelles, 21 April 1988, J. T. T., 1990, 117, where it was held that trade unions lack legal personality; 
therefore, they do not have capacity to sue and to be sued, except in the cases where the legislation 
expressly gives them limited legal personality. 
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these agreements on persons who did not negotiate them. 
Three theories of civil law can be pointed out. 
• Agency 
The mandate, or agency, is an agreement in the terms of which one person, 
the principal, instructs another person, the representative, to act on his 
behalf. This implies that all the rights acquired by the representative, when 
undertaking his mandate, and all the obligations that result therefrom, accrue 
to the principal. 
The binding effect of collective agreements was therefore seen as the result 
of a mandate given by the union members to their union representatives to 
negotiate working conditions, in the capacity of an agent4. 
This theory only partially explains the effects of a collective agreement. It 
provides a basis for arguing why a collective agreement is bindif)Q on union 
l> ~ 
members, who are presumed to have authorised the union to act,, cm their 
behalf. But it cannot explain the effect of a collective agreement on non-
union members and employers who were not represented during collective 
negotiations5 . 
Moreover, this theory ignores the main feature of agency, which implies that 
the trade union can only act in the capacity of a representative. To represent 
means to act on behalf of a principal. With regard to the conclusion of a 
collective agreement, however, the trade union is also a principal party to the 
agreement; it intervenes both in its own right and in the capacity of a 
representative, although a contract of mandate excludes the instance of the 
representative being part of the rights and obligations thereof, especially 
where Belgian trade unions lack legal personality. 
3 Article 1984 Civil Code; See also H. De Page, Traite e/ementaire de droit civil beige, t. V, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 4th ed., 1975, n° 355 onwards. 
4 M. Magrez, Droit collectif du travail, P.U.B., 1986-87. 
5 M. Magrez, "Le statut des conventions collectives de travail", J.T., 1969, 201; V. Vannes, Droit 
paraetatique, P.U.B., 1994, 13. 
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• The negotiorum gestio 
The negotiorum gestio occurs in circumstances where a person voluntarily 
acts in the interests of somebody else, in their absence and in order to 
advance their interests. The basis of negotiorum gestio is altruism, and it is 
characterised by the initiative of the gestor, whose will is to intervene on 
behalf of a third party, with the intention of being reimbursed. The negotiorum 
gestio is excluded where the gestor acts in furtherance of his own interests, 
or where the gestor acts without the intention of being reimbursed6 . 
The negotiorum gestio reflects the fact that trade unions and employers' 
organisations look after workers' and employers' interests, as the gestor. 
However, this theory does not satisfactorily explain the binding effects of a 
collective agreement since a gestor is supposed to stop acting once the 
person whose interests are being managed requests this, and further 
because the gestor, is supposed to act on behalf of the third party and 
without furtherance of his own interests, which is clearly not the case when a 
trade union concludes a collective agreement. Furthermore, the same 
criticisms of the agency theory are applicable in this instance: since trade 
unions lack legal personality, they can hardly be the bearer of rights or 
obligations. 
• The stipulatio alteri 
The stipu/atio alteri is a contract in terms of which one party, the promittens, 
agrees with another, the stipu/ans, to perform something for the benefit of a 
third person, the beneficiary. Although the stipu/ans acts for the benefit of the 
beneficiary, he acts in his own name and not in the name of the beneficiary7 . 
The right of the beneficiary does not vest immediately on conclusion of the 
contract in his favour, but vests only after he has accepted the benefits 
arising from the contract. Prior to his acceptance the promittens is regarded 
as contractually bound only to the stipulans in respect of the undertaking to 
6 H. De Page, Traite elementaire de droit civil beige, t. II, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 3th ed., 1964, n° 1068 
onwards; V. Vannes, Droit paraetatique, P.U.B., 1994, 14. 
7 H. De Page, ibidem, n° 694 onwards; V. Vannes, ibidem, 15. 
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benefit the third party. 
This theory explains that the trade union, acting as a stipulans, concludes an 
agreement for the benefit of union members. It does not explain the binding 
effects of the agreement on non-parties. Furthermore, the stipu/atio alteri can 
only create rights, but no obligations, for the beneficiary. Moreover, the 
beneficiary is not obliged to accept the stipulatio. The theory also fails to 
explain how representative organisations, lacking legal personality, can be 
bound by the obligations contained in the agreement. 
As a result of the increasing number of collective agreements, the legislator enacted 
a Decree in 1945 acknowledging joint committees and their right to negotiate 
collective agreements8 . This decree constituted the very first legal basis for collective 
bargaining to take place at a sectoral level9 • 
According to Article 10 of this Decree, joint committees had jurisdiction to establish 
general levels of remuneration and to negotiate general working conditions10• 
The agreements reached by these committees 11 could be declared generally binding 
at the request of the joint committee itself, or of at least one representative 
organisation which took part in the negotiations. The binding force was conferred by 
Royal Decree. 
The Decree of 1945 did not regulate the legal status of agreements which had been 
negotiated in these committees, but which were not declared generally binding by 
Royal Decree. As a result, these agreements, as well as agreements concluded 
outside joint committees, had no legal effect. The Gour de Cassation 12 held that they 
8 Arrete - Loi 9 June 1945 "portant creation des commissions paritaires", M.B. 15 June 1945; R. 
Blanpain and C. Engels in International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
Kluwer, 1990, "Belgium", 335 explain that "the joint committees were endowed with legal status with 
the decree of9 June 1945. The decree was not intended to innovate, but only to confirm the de facto 
exercise of power and the authority of existing institutions, by conferring legal status upon them."; see 
also G. De Broeck, "De paritaire comites" in Arbeidsrecht C.A.D., Bruges, La Charte, 1987, III-II-5. 
9 P. Van der Vorst, Introduction au droit social, Vol II, P.U.B., 5th ed., 1990-1991, 148. 
10 Ibidem, 170. 
11 These committees were composed of delegates of all the organisations representative of the sector 
for which they were competent - See L. Franc;ois, Theories des Relations Collectives du Travail en 
Droit Beige, Brussels, Bruylant, 1980, 301. 
12 The Cour de Cassation or Supreme Court is the highest Belgian court. It is not competent to decide 
on the merits of the matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is limited to matters which have been tried in 
14 
had the status of a gentlemen's agreement only13. In 1953, it held that they only 
generated a moral engagement for the signatory parties14 . 
In March 1954 two Acts of Parliament15 were enacted. According to the 1954 Acts, 
agreements concluded in joint committees that were not declared generally binding 
by Royal Decree were said to compensate for the silence of parties. In other words, 
issues which had not been expressly regulated by the parties to a contract of 
employment were regulated by the collective agreement. Therefore, collective 
agreements not extended by Royal Decree had a supplementary character in the 
hierarchy of sources of obligations. They had the value of custom. 
Because the civil theories referred to above could not adequately account for the 
effects of collective bargaining, certain authors then referred to public law concepts. 
According to these authors, a collective agreement is not a contract but a statutory 
act because: 
• collective agreements not only contain compulsory provisions, but are also 
concluded by representative organisations, and have a law-making function; 
• it is not possible to depart from collective agreements which have been declared 
generally binding by Royal Decree. 
The main objection to this theory is that it does not take into account that a collective 
agreement results from free and voluntary negotiation by groupings whose activities 
are primarily regulated by private law, and not public law. 
As a result of these difficulties, the legislator on 5 December 1968 adopted "the Act 
regulating joint committees and collective agreements"16 (the 1968 Act)17• 
last resort, i.e. after exhaustion of all other recourse. An appeal to the Cour de Cassation must be based 
either on the ground that the judge violated the law or did not comply with formalities prescribed on 
pain of absolute nullification. 
13 Cass. 20 December 1950, Pas., 1951, I, 267. 
14 Cass. 22 January 1953, Pas., 1953, I, 362. 
15 Acts of 4 and 11 March 1954 amending the Act regulating employment contract, M.B. 1954. 
16 M.B. 15 January 1969. 
17 See M. Magrez, quoted by V. Vannes in Questions approfondies de droit collectif du travail, Vol II, 
P.U.B., 2nd ed., 1994-1995, 437; and B. Haubert, "La nature des conventions collectives et des 
commissions paritaires", J.T.T., 1992, 85; G. De Broeck, op cit., III-11-17. 
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The 1968 Act confirmed the then existing practice by stating that a collective 
agreement is an agreement voluntarily concluded between parties that are 
exclusively18 , on the one hand, the most representative workers' organisations, and 
on the other, the largest employers' organisations (or an individual employer in the 
case of collective agreement concluded at plant level)19• 
By virtue of the 1968 Act, all employers who are members of an employers' 
organisation that has concluded a collective agreement at national or sectoral leve120 , 
or who have themselves concluded a collective agreement, are bound by such 
agreement. The essence of Belgian law on collective agreements is that as soon as 
an employer is bound by a collective agreement, the employer's entire workforce 
becomes bound21 . In other words, a collective agreement binds the employees 
merely by virtue of the fact that they work for an employer who is bound by an 
agreement. Consequently, workers who do not belong to a signatory organisation 
(i.e. a trade union party to a collective agreement), but who are employed by an 
employer member of a signatory organisation, are bound by the agreement. This 
corresponds with the notion that a trade union negotiates on behalf of all the workers 
of a particular economic sector. 
Furthermore, when these agreements are concluded at national or sectoral level, 
18 Ibidem, 437: "Experience largely showed that only organisations that are well structured, enjoying a 
long tradition and benefiting from a broad membership are able to make sure that important 
agreements are complied with, therefore creating a real climate for social peace." 
19 On the concept of "representative" organisation, see Chapter II, infra. 
20 The distinction between national and sectoral level refers to whether a collective agreement has been 
concluded in the National Labour Council (N.L.C.) or in a joint committee. A collective agreement 
concluded in the N.L.C. is normally applicable throughout the entire country and covers all the sectors 
of activity. Such agreements regulate for example early retirement, guaranteed monthly income, 
outplacement etc. A collective agreement concluded in a joint committee will be applicable in the 
sector of activity for which a joint committee has been established. Examples of joint committees are 
the joint committee for the chemical industry, joint committee for the textile industry etc. 
Collective agreements negotiated in the N.L.C. and in joint (sub)committees are referred to as 
collective agreements concluded in "a joint body" insofar as they are bodies established by the State 
and operate outside a particular enterprise. 
For further developments, see infra, Chapter IV, Section VI. 
21 W. Rauws, "Binding van de normatieve bepalingen" in Actuele problemen van het Arbeidsrecht, t. 
III, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1990, 37 held that "De stelling dat de leden ven een organisatie instemmen 
met de inhoud van een C.A.O. via het lidmaatschap, is eerder fictie. De grenzen van de 
civielrechtelijke uitwerking inter partes van een overeenkomst worden dudelikkst overschreden bij de 
binding van alle werknemers van een gebonden werkgever: deze regel is, blijkens de parlementaire 
voorbereiding, ingegeven door twee motieven. In eerste orde is er het gegeven dat de representatieve 
vakbonden traditioneel onderhandelen namens alle werknemers. Bovendien wenste de wetgever 
blijkbaar te voorkomen dat de werkgever zich aan de toepassing van een C.A.O. zou onttrekken door 
zoveel mogelijk ongeorganiseerde werknemers in dienst te nemen." 
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they can be declared binding erga omnes and acquire an "imperative" nature22 • The 
Gour de Cassation held that they constitute an "Act" in the meaning of Article 608 of 
the Judicial Code23 • 
The 1968 Act also establishes a strict hierarchy of the sources of law governing the 
employment relationship, whether they are statutory or originate through an 
agreement. 
Furthermore, the 1968 Act conferred "a restricted legal personality" on trade unions 
and employers' organisations by allowing them to sue and to be sued on certain 
issues. 
Finally, the State is given an essential mission in the context of collective bargaining: 
it is the "guardian of the general interesf'24 : it creates joint committees; it appoints 
their members; it makes sure that collective agreements comply with the legal 
requirements set up in the 1968 Act, and is responsible for the extension of collective 
agreements. 
Flowing from the 1968 Act, different types of collective agreements can be 
distinguished, namely: 
• Collective agreements concluded within the National Labour Council and joint 
committees - referred to as 'joint bodies'25 and declared generally binding by 
Royal Decrees. These collective agreements regulate, without the possibility of 
deviation, individual relations in all enterprises either throughout the entire 
22 R. Blanpain and C. Engels, op cit. 23 define "imperative nature" as meaning that parties cannot 
deviate from the law either by individual or collective agreement, except when the law sets only 
minimum standards which can be improved upon. The imperative character of an act means that the 
non-compliance of the act is relatively null: in other words, the nullity can only be invoked by the 
party in whose favour this provision has been inserted, and only within a period of ten years. 
23 Cass. 14 April 1980 and conclusions Lenaerts, J. T. T., 1980, 289. Article 608 of the Judicial Code 
provides that: "The Cour de Cassation is competent to hear matters in the last instance where the 
reason for appeal is the non-compliance with an act of legislature or the non-compliance with 
procedures for which compliance is deemed either substantial or "prescribed on pain of nullification"; 
and Cass. 5 November 1994, J.T.T., 1995, 7 where the Cour de Cassation refused to hear the matter as 
the collective agreement which had been infringed, had not been extended; such a collective agreement 
does consequently not constitute an act of parliament within the meaning of Article 608 of the Judicial 
Code; Cass. 29 April 1996, J. T. T., 1996, 367. 
24 M. Magrez, quoted by V. Vannes, op cit., 438. 
25
"Joint body" (organe paritaire in French) is defined in Article 1 al. 3 as "the National Labour 
Council, joint committees and joint sub-committees". See also footnote 20 supra. 
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country26 or falling within the scope of the joint committee. The infringement of 
these collective agreements gives rise to penal sanctions; 
• Collective agreements concluded within the National Labour Council or joint 
committees but not declared generally binding by Royal Decree. They bind 
employers who are members of a signatory organisation and therefore all their 
employees. Employers who are not members of an organisation which concluded 
the collective agreement, but who fall within the sector covered by the 
agreement, are bound in a "supplementary" way, i.e. the provisions regulating 
individual labour relations will be binding on an employer and the employees in 
his service, unless the parties agree in the contract of employment to deviate 
from the application of these provisions; 
• Collective agreements concluded outside the National Labour Council and joint 
committees. These agreements are mainly concluded at plant or company level, 
and are binding on the employer who concluded them and all the employees in 
his service, provided that the agreement has been deposited27 with the Ministry 
of Labour. A collective agreement which has not been deposited is only binding 
on the signatory parties, i.e. those who signed it 28 • 
• Collective agreements concluded outside the scope of the 1968 Act. These 
agreements are not collective agreements within the meaning of the 1968 Act29 , 
and are considered as gentlemen's agreements only. 
26 Collective agreements concluded in the National Labour Council. 
27 To be deposited with the Ministry of Labour, the collective agreement must comply with certain 
requirements defined in Articles 16 of the 1968 Act. If those requirements are met, the deposition must 
be accepted. See also infra, Chapter IV, section IV. 
28 Cass. 30 May 1988, J.T.T., 1988, 352 and note C. Wantiez; See also infra Section IV. 
29 Example of such collective agreements would be agreements concluded between organisations 
which are not representative within the meaning of the 1968 Act. 
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CHAPTER II PARTIES TO COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
In terms of the 1968 Act, the right to bargain and to conclude collective agreements 
belongs exclusively to the most representative organisations30. The expression 
"organisation" is used as a generic term for federations of employers' organisations, 
individual employers' organisations, federations of trade unions and individual trade 
unions. 
Generally speaking, an organisation means (i) a grouping of persons having 
common professional interests, (ii) set up in a permanent and structured way and 
(iii) having as their object the defence of common professional interests. 
These three characteristics are, however, not sufficient to entitle an organisation to 
negotiate collective agreements within the meaning of the 1968 Act. This privilege is 
reserved for the most representative organisations. The travaux preparatoires of the 
1968 Act state that on the workers' side, "an organisation is recognised as 
representative if it proves that it is stable, has authority, and commands respect. If 
the organisation does not comply with these requirements, it cannot guarantee the 
compliance of the obligations it contracted in a collective agreement and it will not 
be able to assume its responsibilities."31 In addition, the organisations must be 
recognised as representative by the Crown. The representivity requirements for the 
30 The meaning of the term "representative organisation" varies according to the rights the 
organisation is seeking to exercise. For example, to be represented in works councils, the 1948 Act "to 
make provision for the organisation of the economic life of the country" provides that the following 
trade unions shall be deemed representative: 
a) [an] inter-professional workers' organisation established at national level, represented at the 
Central Economic Council and the National Labour Council and having at least 50.000 members; 
[or] 
b) a professional or inter-professional organisation that [is] affiliated to or a part of the inter-
professional organisations referred to in a). 
In 1986, the notion of representative workers' organisation was extended to enable the executive staff 
personnel (cadres) to participate in collective bargaining. Executive staff personnel are defined by the 
1985 Social Recovery Act as employees who perform a higher function normally reserved for holders 
of a diploma of a level to be decided, or who have equivalent job experience. 
Article 14.5 of the 1948 Act defines executive staff personnel organisations as 
inter-professional staff organisations, established at national level, having at least ten thousand 
members. These shall be recognised by the Crown as representative organisations following the 
procedure and in the manner specified by the Crown. The advice of the National Labour Council 
shall be taken on the recognition procedure. 
Only one organisation complies with those conditions : La Confederation Nationale des Cadres 
(C.N.C.). This organisation has no right to conclude collective agreements as it is not represented at 
the National Labour Council. 
31 Doc. Parl., Sen., session 1967-1968, n° 78, 36. 
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purpose of concluding collective agreements are laid down in the 1968 Act and in 
the 1952 Act establishing the National Labour Council32 and differ, depending on 
whether the organisation is an employers' organisation or a workers' organisation, 
as well as on the institution where the representative organisation wishes to sit. 
WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS 
1.1 At the National Labour Council 
In terms of Article 2 of the 1952 Act establishing the National Labour Council, a 
workers' organisation must be inter-professional33 and established at national level 
to be represented at the National Labour Council. 
In addition, to these two objective criteria (inter-professional and established at 
national level), the 1952 Act gives the Crown the task of selecting the organisations 
which will be represented at the National Labour Council. 
Three representative workers' organisations are currently represented at the 
National Labour Council: the Federation Generale du Travail de Belgique (F.G.T.B. -
linked to the Socialist party), the Confederation des Syndicats Chretiens (C.S.C. -
linked to the Catholic party) and the Centrale Generate des Syndicats Liberaux de 
Belgique (C.G.S.L.B. - linked to the Liberal party)34• Analysing the issue of 
recognition at the National Labour Council, L. Franc;ois stated that "to be recognised 
32 See infra Chapter III, Section I. 
33 
"interprofessionnelles" in French. This means that the scope of activity of the trade union extends to 
various sectors of activity. R. Blanpain and C. Engels, op cit., 151 use the term "inter-industrywide". 
34 About 60% of Belgian workers are unionised The C.S.C. has 1.5 million members, the F.G.T.B. 
has around 1 million members and the C.G.S.L.B. has 240 000 members. These federations are 
composed of trade and regional unions. Belgian trade unions are not organised on a craft or 
occupational basis, and industrial unions prevail. Both the socialist and the Christian unions have 
separate divisions for white-collar workers, regardless of the sector of industry to which they may 
belong. The F.G.T.B. is based on principles of democratic socialism corresponding with those of the 
Belgian Socialist party. Its declared goal is a system of social and economic democracy under which 
the means of production will be at the service of the whole community. Different national unions are 
affiliated to the F.G.T.B. Each union is an independent organisation with its own structure, governing 
body, and statutory rules. To become affiliated, the union must give an assurance that it will accept 
the basic principles of the F.G.T.B., and that it will carry out all the decisions made by the governing 
body of the F.G.T.B. The C.S.C. defends the interests of its members in accordance with Christian 
social doctrine and the principles of democracy. It has, in the main, the same structure as the 
F.G.T.B.: it is composed of 18 industry-based national unions, which are decentralised at regional and 
local level. The C.S.C. and the F.G.T.B. have essentially the same structure; both are federations of 
national trade unions organised - as a general rule - per sector of the industry. White-collar 
employees are important exceptions. The C.G.S.L.B. has a unified structure. See R. Blanpain and C. 
Engels in International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Kluwer, 1990, 
"Belgium", 161-171. 
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as representative, trade unions must belong, through one of these large federations, 
to one of these political 'families' which hold power in Belgium."35 
1.2 At Joint Committee and at plant level 
At joint committee and plant level, the notion of a representative trade union is 
defined by Article 3 of the 1968 Act. 
This Article provides that36 : 
"For the purpose of the application of this Act, the following shall be deemed to be 
trade unions: 
1. inter-professional organisations37 of workers [ ... ] established at national 
level and represented on the Central Economic Counci/38 and the National 
Labour Council; the worker's organisations shall furthermore have at least 
50.000 members; [or] 
2. the professional organisations affiliated to, or forming part of, an inter-
professional organisation referred to in paragraph 1; ( .. .)" 
Furthermore, to be represented in a joint committee, the trade union must have been 
designated by the Minister39 • This means that the fulfilment of the requirements 
prescribed in Article 3 above are not sufficient to entitle a trade union to be 
represented in a joint committee. The travaux preparatoires indicate that "trade 
unions must also be representative of the sector to be entitled to representation in a 
joint committee"40 • It must be noted that often the Confederation Generale des 
Syndicats Liberaux de Belgique is not represented in joint committees41 • 
35 L. Fran9ois, op cit., 215. 
36 All the translation of the articles of the 1968 Act quoted in this dissertation are directly taken from 
International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, "Legislation - Belgium", 
Kluwer, 1991, 119-142. 
37 Inter-professional organisations are in practice the three federations, F.G.T.B., C.S.C. and 
C.G.S.L.B. The professional organisations affiliated are the trade unions organised by industry. 
38 The Central Economic Council is composed ofrepresentative organisations in industry, agriculture, 
commerce and handicrafts and of workers, as well as a number of experts, with the duty of submitting 
opinions or proposals to Ministers or to the legislature with regard to problems relating to the national 
economy (either on its own initiative or at the request of the said authorities) in the form ofreports 
setting out the various points of view expressed by its members. There are no specific legal 
requirements to be complied with, in order to be represented at this council. 
39 Article 42 of the 1968 Act. For further details on joint committees, see Section III.11.2 below. 
40 Doc. Parl., Sen., session 1967-1968, n° 176/2, 25. 
41 Whilst the C.S.C. and F.G.T.B. have a seat on each joint committee in Belgium. 
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At plant level, collective agreements are negotiated by the union delegation, which 
can be defined as the representation of the unionised employees in the enterprise. 
The collective agreement is concluded, however, by the trade union itself (see 
Section VIII infra). It must be noted that only the three federations of trade unions 
represented at the National Labour Council have the right to request the 
establishment of a union delegation. 
II EMPLOYERS' REPRESENTATIVE ORGANISATIONS 
11.1 At the National Labour Council 
In terms of Article 2 of the 1952 Act, only the most representative employers' 
organisations of the industrial sector, agriculture, commerce and handicraft may be 
represented at the National Labour Council. Special provision must also be made 
for the representation of small and medium enterprises. 
The 1952 Act gives the Crown the task of selecting the employers' organisations42 
which will be represented at the National Labour Council. 
11.2 At Joint Committee level 
In contrast to trade unions, the law does not require an employers' organisation to 
have any minimum number of employers as members to be considered 
representative. 
According to Article 3 of the 1968 Act: 
"For the purpose of the application of this Act, the following shall be deemed to be 
Employers' representative organisations: 
1. inter-professional organisations of employers established at national level 
and represented on the Central Economic Council and the National 
Labour Council; [or] 
2. the professional organisations affiliated to, or forming part of, an inter-
professional organisation referred to in paragraph 143; [or] 
3. the employers' professional organisations which, in any given branch of 
42 There are 3 organisations present at national level: the Federation des Entreprises Beiges (F.E.B), 
the Conseil Superieur des Classes Moyennes and the Belgische Boerenbond. 
43 Those are professional organisations amongst which 85 % are affiliated to the F.E.B. 
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activity, are declared representative by the Crown on the advice of the 
National Labour Councit4; [or] 
4. The national inter-professional and professional organisations approved 
under the Act of March 6 1964, to provide for the institutional structure of 
the middle classes which are representative of heads of handicraft 
undertakings, small and medium trades and small-scale industry and self-
employed persons carrying out a liberal profession or other professional 
type of work shall also be deemed to be representative employers' 
organisations45". 
When an employers' organisation is not inter-professional, established at national 
level and represented at the National Labour Council and at the Central Economic 
Council, the Ministry of Labour may determine whether an employers' organisation 
may be considered as representative of the professional interests of employers. 
The Minister does not have discretionary power. He must inquire about the 
representivity and the power in numbers of the concerned organisation. 
Furthermore, its decision must take the advice of the National Labour Council into 
account. 
44 There are more or less 60 organisations which are not affiliated to the F.E.B. and covered by this 
provision. For example, in the health care industry, the Union francophone des laboratoires dentaires 
de Belgique, the Union des industries de techniques dentaires; in the cinema industry, the Union des 
producteurs de films francophone, the Vlaamse filmproducentenbond, etc. 
45 Those are Union nationale chretienne des classes moyennes, Union syndicale des classes moyennes 
du Boerenbond belge, Alliance agricole belge and the Federation royale des notaires belges. 
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CHAPTER Ill FORUMS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Collective bargaining can take place at three levels: at national inter-industry-wide 
level, through the National Labour Council; at sectoral level through joint committees 
and joint subcommittees; and at plant level through the union delegation. 
THE NATIONAL LABOUR COUNCIL 
1.1 Origin of the National Labour Council 
Although it has existed in its current form since the 1952 Act, the National Labour 
Council is the result of a long evolution which started in 1892 with the creation of the 
Supreme Council of Labour (Conseil Superieur du Travail}46 . This first tripartite body 
was constituted at national level and consisted of representatives of management 
and labour and specialists competent in industrial relations. It had to give its opinion 
about all matters which were submitted to it by the government. Taking into account 
the growing importance of the trade unions, the Council was replaced in 1935 by the 
Supreme Council of Labour and Social Prevention (Conseil Superieur du Travail et 
de la Prevention Socia le), which was more involved in the formulation of social and 
economic policies. Negotiations about wages, annual vacations, working time, etc. 
also took place. In 194447 , trade unions and employers' organisations created the 
General Parity Council (Conseil Paritaire General) which was a bilateral body 
consisting of representatives of mariagement and labour, and competent to give 
opinions, make proposals and conciliate industrial disputes48• The public body which 
is now called the National Labour Council emerged from the General Parity Council 
in 1952. 
1.2 Composition of the National Labour Council 
The National Labour Council consists of 49 members: 
• one chairperson, appointed by the Crown for a renewable period of 6 years, 
46 For a more detailed historical background, see G. De Broeck, "De Nationale Arbeidsraad" in 
Arbeidsrecht C.A.D., Bruges, La Charte, III-12-5 to III-12-10. 
47 It must be noted that from 1936 to 1939 and from 1944 to 1948, National Labour Conferences were 
· also held. These conferences were set up by the government, and trade unions and employers' 
organisations were invited to make representations on important socio-economic matters. These 
conferences were usually called when major industrial actions were taking place in a sector of the 
economy. The last conference was held in 1948. 
48 The creation of this body was already mentioned in the Pact of Social Solidarity. 
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and nominated for his/her independence from both employers' and workers' 
organisations and his/her skills in social and economic matters; 
• a maximum of 12 representatives and an equal number of substitutes, 
representing the most representative employers' organisations, appointed by 
the Crown for a renewable period of 4 years, from a list submitted by the 
representative organisations containing two candidates for each seat; 
• a maximum of 12 representatives and an equal number of substitutes, 
representing the most representative workers' organisations, appointed by 
the Crown for a renewable period of 4 years, from a list submitted by the 
representative organisations containing two candidates for each seat. 
1.3 Functions of the National Labour Council 
The functions of the National Labour Council are governed by the 1952 and other 
Acts. 
It has two types of functions: to give advice and to conclude collective agreements. 
1.3. 1 Advisory function 
The advisory function is divided into two categories: namely those that it may 
perform and those that it is obliged to perform. 
• advisory functions that it may perform: the National Labour Council is 
competent to give advice or to make any proposals to the Executive or to the 
legislature, either on its own initiative or on request, about general social 
problems concerning employers and workers49 • It can also give its advice 
about conflicts of jurisdiction that could arise between joint committees; 
• advisory functions that it is obliged to perform: various Acts oblige the 
National Labour Council to advise the Ministry of Labour about such topics as 
Sunday rest, working hours, children and women's labour, public holidays, 
annual vacation etc. When an Act requires the Crown to consult the National 
Labour Council, the Council must communicate its advice within two months. 
49 The National Labour Council has become so influential through this advisory function that P. Van 
der Vorst, op cit., 163, holds that it is a "workshop oflabour law'', and that the National Labour 
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1.3.2 Conclusion of collective agreements 
The 1968 Act gives the National Labour Council the status of a joint body50 . 
According to Article 7 of this Act: 
"The scope of an agreement concluded in the National Labour Council shall cover 
different branches of activity throughout the entire country. 
Provided that an agreement may be concluded in the National Labour Council for a 
branch of activity which is not within the competence of an established joint 
committee or where an established joint committee does not function." 
If the National Labour Council wishes to conclude a valid collective agreement, at 
least half of the employers' representatives and half of the trade unions' 
representatives must be present at the meeting. All decisions must be taken by a 
unanimous vote of the present members. 
II JOINT COMMITTEES 
11.1 Origin of joint committees 
The first joint committee, which was called the "Study Commission for the reduction 
of working time in the coal-mining industry" (Commission d'etudes pour la reduction 
du temps de travail dans les mines siderurgiques) was established in Belgium in 
1919 in order to resolve a dispute which arose in the industry51 • It was formed by the 
then Prime Minister at national level, and was composed of trade unions and 
employers' organisations. Its mission was to conduct research regarding working 
hours. This was followed by the establishment of other similar committees. 
Due to the success of these bodies52 established at sectoral level and composed of 
labour and employers' representatives, their number and their competence53 
increased progressively and they were finally called "joint committees" (Commission 
Paritaire )54• 
Council is a "pre-legislator" of labour law. 
50 See footnote 20 supra. 
51 See G. De Broeck, op cit., III-11-5. 
52 In 1919, there were 7 joint committees, 127 in 1936 and 172 in 1940; see V. Vannes, Questions 
approfondies de droit collectif du travail, Vol. I, PUB, 1994-1995, 66. 
53 Being originally study commissions, their competence extended thereafter to conciliation, arbitration 
and finally to negotiation and conclusion of collective agreements. 
54 See Chapter I - Historical Background, for more details. 
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The main problem with these bodies was that the agreements they concluded had 
no legal effect. Jurisprudence considered that these agreements only had the status 
of custom55. 
During World War II, joint committees were banned by the occupying forces. 
At the end of World War II, a Pact of Social Solidarity56 was concluded between 
employers' and workers' organisations which aimed at restoring the institution and 
giving them legal recognition. 
The Decree of 9 June 1945 confirmed the terms of the Pact of Social Solidarity and 
conferred legal status on joint committees. Moreover, it provided that agreements 
concluded by joint committees could be declared to be generally binding by Royal 
Decree. In each branch of industry, trade or agriculture, a national joint committee 
was created by Royal Decree. These committees were competent for a particular 
sector throughout the entire country. 
This Royal Decree was repealed by the 1968 Act. However, the 1968 Act retained 
the same collective bargaining structures and only amended minor points. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the notion of joint committees has received statutory 
recognition since 1945, it has never been defined by the legislator. In practice, a 
joint committee can be defined as an institution within a sector which bargains 
collective agreements at sectoral level, which prevents and conciliates disputes 
between employers and employees, and which gives advice to the government, to 
the Central Economic Council and to the National Labour Council. 
The main purpose of a joint committee is, however, the negotiation of collective 
agreements: they are organs of "social dialogue". There are currently 97 joint 
committees in Belgium. 
55 See Cass. 22 January 1953, Pas., 1953, I, 362 and Chapter I - Historical Background 
56 In this Pact, the representatives of the employers and the trade unions representatives expressed the 
intention to conduct their relations on a basis of mutual respect and reciprocal recognition of each 
other's rights and duties. 
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11.2 Establishment of joint committees 
Articles 35 and 36 of the 1968 Act regulate the establishment, competence and 
territorial scope of application of joint committees. These Articles provide that: 
"35. The Crown may, on its own initiative or on request of one or more organisations, 
establish joint committees of employers and workers. It shall specify the persons, the 
economic sector or the undertakings to which these committees shall apply and the 
territorial scope of each committee. 
36. Whenever the Minister considers recommending to the Crown to establish a joint 
committee or to alter the scope of an existing committee, he shall inform the relevant 
organisations by notice published in the Moniteur Beige." 
In the circumstances where the Crown57 is acting on its own initiative, consultation 
must take place with the representative organisations58 . 
Moreover, Article 37 provides that: 
''At the request of a joint committee, the Crown may establish one or more joint 
subcommittees. After consulting the affected joint committee, the Crown shall specify 
the persons and territory falling within the scope of the said subcommittees." 
The travaux preparatoires of the 1968 Act indicate that joint subcommittees may be 
established in respect of a specific region or a specific sub-sector of the economy59 • 
This means that a joint subcommittee could be established for a particular area of 
the country60 or for a particular activity within a specific sector61. 
The Crown cannot take the initiative in the establishment of a joint subcommittee. 
The joint committee must request this from the Crown, which, after consulting the 
joint committee, shall specify the persons and territory falling within the scope of the 
57 i.e. the King acting on the advice of his Ministers. 
58 C.E., 13 July 1953, R.J.D.A., 1953, 290; C.E. 30 April 1996, J.T.T., 1996, 370 and rapport B. 
Haubert. 
59 Doc. Pad., Sen., session 1966-1967, n° 148 (expose des motifs), 47. 
6° For example, in the ceramic industry there is a joint subcommittee competent for the manufacturing 
of tiles in the region ofTournai. 
61 In the ceramic industry, for example there is a joint subcommittee for porcelain manufacturing. 
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said subcommittees. 
11.3 Composition of joint committees 
The composition of joint committees and joint subcommittees is regulated by Articles 
39 to 46 of the 1968 Act62• Their composition is as follows: 
• one chairperson and one vice-chairperson; the chairperson is appointed by 
the Crown, for a renewable period of 4 years, from amongst persons 
competent in social affairs, but not involved in interests with which the joint 
committee or subcommittee may be concerned. In practice, the role of a 
chairperson is filled by a mediator from the Ministry of Employment and 
Labour; 
• an equal number of representatives of employers' and workers' organisations, 
nominated by the Crown. The organisations concerned are requested, by 
notice published in the Moniteur Beige, to state whether they wish to be 
represented and, if so, to furnish evidence of their own representative 
nature63 . The Minister must then designate the organisations which are to be 
represented and determine the number of seats to be granted to each of 
them. Seats are allocated by taking into account the support obtained by 
trade unions in works council elections and the elections of committees for 
safety, health and enhancement of the workplace64 • The Minister's decision 
62 See also J. Rombouts, "Prise de decision et decisions des commissions paritaires", R.T, 1992, 5-27. 
63 To be authorised to be represented in a joint committee, a trade union or employers' organisation 
must (as noted above) first comply with the requirement of being a representative organisation within 
the meaning of Article 3 of the 1968 Act. Furthermore, it must be considered by the Crown as 
representative within the sector. If there is no representative organisation within a sector, a joint 
committee cannot be established and the National Labour Council would then perform the functions of 
the joint committee. 
64 See R. Blanpain and C. Engels, op cit., 172.: "At the level of enterprise or establishment three 
different bodies may operate which represent respectively the employers and the employees or the 
trade unions: the union delegation, the works council, and the committee for safety, health and 
enhancement of the workplace.( ... ) This triad is the result of a post-war compromise towards the 
rivalling attitudes of the major unions. At that time the Christian unions favoured the idea of 
collaboration between workers and management through the works council, while the Socialist trade 
unions emphasised the strife between labour and capital through the union delegation. A typically 
Belgian solution to the problem was arrived at: not two but three organs were created, where many 
agreed that one could do the job. It follows that in practice there is a great deal of overlapping with 
regard to both the jurisdiction and composition of the different bodies." 
A Works Council has to be established in every enterprise usually employing a minimum of 100 
employees. It is composed, on the one hand, of the employer and one or more representatives and 
substitutes from the employers' organisations indicated by him; and on the other hand of a number of 
employees' representatives whose numbers may vary from two to twenty-five (depending on the size 
of the enterprise). The employees' representatives are elected by secret ballot every four years from 
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must be notified to all organisations which have asked to be represented. The 
designated organisations are required to submit within one month the names 
of two candidates for each seat allocated to them, and 
• two or more secretaries, appointed by the Minister of Employment and 
Labour. 
The members of a joint committee or a joint subcommittee may be assisted by 
technical advisors, the numbers of whom shall be determined by procedural rules 
agreed to by the parties. The Minister may also, on his own initiative, designate one 
or more civil servants as advisors. 
11.4 Functions of joint committees 
According to Article 38 of the 1968 Act, joint committees and joint subcommittees are 
competent to: 
• collaborate in the drafting of collective agreements; 
• promote the conciliation of disputes between employers and workers; 
• advise the government, the National Labour Council and the Central Economic 
Council on matters falling within their competence, at the latter's request or on 
their own initiative, and 
• to carry out any other task imposed on them by law or by virtue of the law65• 
lists of candidates submitted by the most representative unions. All employees, except the managerial 
personnel, have the right to vote, whether or not they are members of a union. The purpose of the 
works council is to promote collaboration between employers and employees. Its competence is largely 
of an informative and advisory nature, while the employer retains the decision-making power. For 
further details, see R. Blanpain and C. Engels, op cit., 182-211. 
A Committee for safety, health and enhancement of the workplace has to be established in every 
enterprise usually employing on average 50 or more employees. The Committee is composed of an 
equal number of delegates and substitutes representing the employees and the employer. As with the 
works council, the representatives are elected by secret ballot from lists of candidates nominated by the 
most representative unions. The essential task of the committee is to promote safety, health and 
enhancement of the enterprise. For further details, ibidem, 212-217. 
65 For example, the Act of 19 March 1991 provides that when an employer wishes to dismiss for 
operational requirements an employee who is a member of the works council, the committee for 
security, health and enhancement of the workplace or union delegation, the joint committees must first 
accept the existence of an operational requirement. 
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Once a joint committee is established, its jurisdiction is limited by three factors: the 
sector of the economy in which it operates, the persons subject to its jurisdiction and 
the area in which it operates. 
In respect of the persons active in the economic sector, the jurisdiction of a joint 
committee is determined by the main activity of the undertaking, and not by the 
profession of the workers, their work or the functions they exercise within the 
undertaking66 . When the undertaking exercises one main activity and subsidiary 
activities, its competence will be determined by the main activity. This principle can 
however be subject to exceptions: it may happen that two joint committees are 
established for one sector, each joint committee then having jurisdiction for blue-
collar employees and for white-collars employee respectively67• If an enterprise 
exercises various activities which are not linked in any way, it can also fall within the 
scope of two different joint committees68• 
In respect of the area in which it operates, the jurisdiction of a joint committee is 
usually the entire country. It is also possible for the Crown to establish a joint 
committee only for a specified region of the country69 • 
The general functioning of each joint committee and subcommittee is regulated by 
Royal Decree. Furthermore, each committee draws up its own standing orders. In 
terms of the 1968 Act, collective agreements are validly concluded if at least half of 
the representatives or substitute members representing the employers and half of 
the representatives or substitute members representing the workers are present, and 
the decision is taken by a unanimous vote of the members present, unless there is 
specific provision to the contrary in the constitution70• 
66 Expose des Motifs, Doc. Parl., Sen., 1966-1967, n° 148, 45; B. Haubert, "Rapport Min. Puhl." sous 
C.E. 30 April 1996, J. TT, 1996, 3 70; N. Lepoivre, "Du ressort des commissions paritaires", C.D.S., 
1989, 161-178; Cass. 24 December 1990, C.D.S., 1991, 244; Cass. 9 September 1991, J.TT, 1992, 
398; C.T. Liege 16October1981,J.L., 1982, 161; See also Cass. 14 February 1983, R.W., 1983-1984, 
2104 which took into account the activity "usually" exercised; C.T. Gand, 8 November 1989, J. TT, 
1990, 116; C.T. Liege, l March 1989,J.TT, 1990, 430; Cass. 17June1996,J.T.T., 1996, 365; Cass. 
28 June 1995, J.T.T., 1995, 441. 
67 This is the case for example in the food manufacturing industry. 
68 This would be the case for example where the company manufactures a product and distributes it. 
See T.T. Bruxelles, 27 June 1972, J.T.T, 1972, 278. 
69 C.E., 5 June 1959, n° 7122, J.T., 1959, 52. 
70 Article 47 of the 1968 Act. 
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Ill THE UNION DELEGATION 
111.1 Origin of union delegations 
The Pact of Social Solidarity negotiated towards the end of World War II between 
employers' representatives and trade unions was the first act of recognition by 
employers of union delegations within undertakings. 
In 1947, a national inter-sectoral agreement was concluded between employers' 
organisations and trade unions, recognising the legal authority of the employer and 
the indisputable existence of trade unionism. This agreement also formulated 
principles concerning the establishment of union delegations. Each joint committee 
was asked to adapt these principles to the specific situation in their own sector. 
This agreement had no legal standing as it was concluded between organisations 
that did not have legal status. Nevertheless, the agreement was very influential in 
that it formed the basis for employers to recognise union delegations within an 
enterprise; although it imposed no obligation, it was in practice widely applied71 . 
After the 194 7 national agreement, many collective agreements regulating the status 
of union delegations in undertakings were concluded in joint committees and at plant 
level. 
On 24 May 1971, the national agreement was replaced by the collective agreement 
N° 5 "regulating the status of union delegations representing employees in 
undertakings" (Collective Agreement N° 5), concluded within the National Labour 
Council72• Collective Agreement N° 5 lays down only the leading principles for the 
establishment of union delegations. This collective agreement has not been 
extended to non-parties by Royal Decree. 
Article 1 of Collective Agreement N° 5 provides that: 
"The manner in which the principles laid down by this collective agreement will be 
applied shall be specified by collective agreements concluded in joint committees or 
joint subcommittees. In the absence of such collective agreements, it shall be 
71 0. Vanachter, "Syndicale afvaarding" in Arbeidsrecht C.A.D., Bruges, La Charte, 1985, III-8-3. 
72 M.B., 1st July 1971. 
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specified at plant level. The parties will therefore be able to take into account, 
situations specific to various sectors and enterprises as appropriately as possible." 
111.2 Establishment of the union delegation 
Article 7 of Collective Agreement N° 5 states: 
·~ trade union delegation shall be set up in accordance with the rules set out below 
when one or more of the trade union signatory parties to this agreement request the 
head of the undertaking to do so. 
In enterprises covered by a joint committee where these organisations are 
represented, these organisations have the right to present candidates for the 
designation or the election of the union delegation. 
A trade union which is a signatory party to this agreement but which is not 
represented in a joint committee that has concluded a collective agreement on the 
status of the union delegation, has the right to participate in the appointment of the 
union delegation or in the designation of candidates to be elected, provided it can 
prove its representivity. Such proof is afforded where the said organisation has 
obtained at least one seat at the last elections for the establishment of the 
Committee for health, safety and enhancement of the workplace. In enterprises 
where no such election took place, the trade union must prove that its members 
account for at least 10 % of the unionised workers of the enterprise." 
Various comments must be made: 
• Union delegations are therefore established at the request of trade unions and not 
on the initiative of an employer; 
• The trade unions party to Collective Agreement N° 5 committed themselves to 
appointing a "joint" union delegation should there be more than one trade union 
requesting the establishment of a union delegation. In other words, trade unions 
must attempt to avoid the proliferation of union delegations within a single 
enterprise by reaching an agreement providing for a proportional representation of 
unionised workers73; 
73 See Article 5 of Collective Agreement N° 5; if the trade unions fail to reach an agreement, they can 
apply for conciliation at the joint committee. If the parties fail to conciliate, the employer may have to 
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• In addition, the right to request the establishment of a union delegation accrues 
only to the trade unions represented in the National Labour Council (i.e. trade 
unions which signed the Collective Agreement N° 5). If a joint committee has 
concluded a collective agreement on the status of the union delegation, only trade 
unions represented on this joint committee will be entitled to request the 
establishment of a union delegation. If the union is not represented on the joint 
committee, then it will be required to prove its representivity, either through having 
obtained at least one seat at the last social elections, or by showing that it 
represents at least 10 % of the unionised workers; 
• Because Collective Agreement N° 5 has not been extended to non-parties by 
Royal Decree, only employers who are affiliated to employers' organisations that 
were party to this collective agreement are expected to establish a union 
delegation. 
Collective agreements concluded to implement Collective Agreement N° 5 must 
determine, inter alia, the size74 of the enterprises where union delegations must be 
established and the number of union delegates75• With regard to the possibility 
offered to trade unions by Article 7 either to appoint employees as union delegates 
or to designate candidates amongst an employer's workforce to be elected, this 
decision is made at sectoral level76 . 
111.3 Functions of the union delegation 
A distinction must be made between the employees the union delegation represents 
and its competence to fulfil certain duties. 
111.3.1 Representation 
In principle, a union delegation only represents the unionised employees77 , i.e. 
employees affiliated to one of the signatory organisations. 
face two or three union delegations. 
74 i.e. the number of employees employed in an enterprise. Most of the collective agreements provide 
that only companies employing at least 50 persons must establish a union delegation when requested. 
75 Article 8 of Collective Agreement N° 5. 
76 Often, collective agreements concluded at sectoral level opt for the appointment of union delegates, 
instead of designating candidates to be elected by the unionised employees. See J. Piron, "Le role de la 
delegation syndicale et ses contradictions", J T. T., 1982, 153. 
77 C.T. Mons, 15 January 1990, J T. T., 1990, 181; this is not the case for the works council and the 
committee for security, health and enhancement of the workplace, where the delegates represent the 
entire workforce. 
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A collective agreement concluded within a joint committee may extend the 
competence of the union delegation to all employees of the undertaking, including 
non-unionised employees78• 
These principles are expressly stated in Article 6 of Collective Agreement N° 5: 
"Employers shall recognise that employees belonging to a trade union will be 
represented in their regard by a trade union delegation whose members shall be 
designated or elected from amongst the employees of the undertaking. It is meant by 
employees belonging to a trade union those affiliated to one of the signatory 
organisations. Under an agreement concluded by the joint committee, representation 
of employees by the trade union delegation may be extended to all employees in the 
categories covered by the agreement setting up the trade union delegation, on the 
conditions that are specific to the various sectors of activity and undertaking." 
It must be emphasised that the union delegation does not represent the trade 
union(s), but only unionised employees within the undertaking. Although union 
delegates derive their mandate from the trade union, since they have been 
designated or appointed by the trade union, they are not acting as representatives of 
the union but as representatives of unionised employees79 • 
This explains why, although union delegations are competent to negotiate collective 
agreements, they are not competent to conclude and to sign agreements on behalf 
of unions. This competence belongs to the unions' officials only80 • 
111.3.2 Duties 
The competence of the union delegation is laid down by Article 11 of Collective 
Agreement N° 5: 
"The responsibilities of the trade union delegation relate, amongst other things, to: 
78 For example, in the chemical industry, the collective agreement provides that the union delegation 
represents all the employees whose salaries are regulated by collective agreements. 
79 See J. Piron, "Le role de la delegation syndicale et ses contradictions", J. TT, 1982, 153; and C.T. 
Mons, 15 January 1990, J. TT, 1990, 181. 
80 This position has been confirmed by the National Labour Council in its Avis n° 682, of 27 February 
1981. See also C.T. Bruxelles, 7 November 1986, C.D.S., 1987, 224 where it was held that a collective 
agreement which has been concluded with the union delegation is not a collective agreement within the 
meaning of the 1968 Act. 
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1. industrial relations; 
2. negotiations with a view to concluding collective agreements within the 
undertaking, without affecting collective or other agreements concluded at 
other levels; 
3. ensuring that social legislation, collective agreements, the work rules and 
individual employment contracts are complied with within the undertaking; 
4. the observance of the general principles as set out in Articles 2 to S81 of 
this agreement". 
In addition, there are numerous Acts that increase the competence of the union 
delegation82• 
81 The general principles set out under Articles 2 to 5 concern the recognition of the legitimate 
authority of the employer, the conscientious compliance with the provisions of the contract and the 
respect in all circumstances of justice, equity, conciliation and freedom of association. 
82 Although those Acts are not to the issue of collective bargaining, on can refer to the Act of 8 April 
1965 on work rules, the Act of 10 June 1952 concerning the social security of workers, the Act of20 
September 1967 relating to plant closing, etc. 
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CHAPTER IV COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE 1968 ACT 
Chapter I of the 1968 Act defines essential terms used in the Act, its scope of 
application and the notion of representative organisations. 
1.1 Persons subject to the 1968 Act 
The 1968 Act applies to employees, employers83 and their organisations. 
According to the deeming provisions of Article 2 § 1, for the purpose of this Act: 
"1. an employee includes a person who, other than by virtue of a contract of 
employment, performs work under the authority of another person84; 
2. an employer includes a person who gives work to a person fulfilling clause 
(1); 
3. a contract of employment includes the employment relationship between 
persons deemed to be employees and employers; 
4. a branch of activity includes groups of persons assimilated to employers who, 
outside a defined sector of the economy, carry on identical or related 
activities; 
5. an undertaking includes the establishment belonging to a person considered 
as an employer." 
The question as to whether the 1968 Act applies to contracts of employment which 
have been declared null and void has been solved as follows by Article 2 § 2: 
"The nullity of a contract of employment shall not be considered ground for the non-
application of this Act, where work is performed: 
1. under a contract of employment declared null and void on the grounds of 
violation of the legislation regulating the employment relationship. 
2. in gambling rooms." 
83 Defined in terms of ordinary legal principles. 
84 An apprentice is deemed to perform work under the authority of an employer. Therefore, a collective 
agreement concluded within a joint committee may determine the remuneration payable to an 
apprentice; see Cass. 16 November 1992, C.D.S., 1993, 113 and note J. Jacqmain. 
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1.2 Persons who are not subject to the 1968 Act 
The 1968 Act mainly excludes persons employed by the State from its scope of 
application 85• 
According to Article 2 § 3, the 1968 Act does not apply to: 
"1. persons employed by the State, provinces, communes, public establishments 
owned or operated by the above and quasi-public or officially recognised 
bodies. Provided that the Crown may, by order, stating the grounds on which 
it is based, discussed and adopted by the Council of Ministers, extend in full 
or in part the application of this Act to the above-mentioned persons or 
certain categories thereof; 
2. persons employed in vocational training centres under the legislation with 
respect to the finding of jobs or vocational training for job seekers; 
3. members of staff subsidised by the central government in non-state 
subsidised educational establishments." 
II FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
A collective agreement is defined by Article 5 of the 1968 Act as: 
"an agreement concluded between one or more workers' organisations, one or more 
employers' organisations or one or more employers, regulating individual and 
collective relations between employers and employees86 in undertakings or in a 
branch of activity, and regulating the rights and obligations of the contracting 
parties87." 
11.1 A collective agreement is a contract 
Article 5 of the 1968 Act evidences the dualistic character of a collective agreement: 
on the one hand, it is a contract, in that its formation depends upon the consent of 
signatory parties and its obligatory provisions generate rights and obligations for 
85 The employment relationship of civil servants is regulated by administrative law. See A. Renard, "La 
non-application de la loi sur les conventions collectives de travail et les commissions paritaires au 
personnel engage dans les services publics", C.D.S., 1986, 2; C.T. Liege, 20 December 1989, J. TT, 
1990, 360. 
86 Provisions regulating the individual and collective relations shall be referred to a "normative 
provisions". 
87 Provisions regulating the rights and obligations of the contracting parties shall be referred to as 
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signatory parties88• 
This feature was expressed by G. Magrez-Song as follows: "Collective labour law is 
thus a law by consent, undertaken by representative organisations, in respect of 
which a high degree of autonomy is enjoyed'89 • 
On the other hand, it is a contract of a particular nature in that neither Article 1134 of 
the Civil Code, 90 which regulates the binding force of a contract, nor the principles of 
contractual liability are applicable to collective agreements: Article 4 of the 1968 Act 
excludes the typical contractual remedies and organises a specific system of liability 
in respect of the contracting parties to a collective agreement 91 • 
11.2 A collective agreement is a form of legislation 
A collective agreement is a form of legislation92 insofar as its normative provisions 
are legally binding on all the persons falling within its scope of application. 
Any collective agreement falling within the scope of application of the 1968 Act, 
whether declared generally binding or not, or concluded within a joint body or not, is 
binding on third parties93• 
In this regard, it must be observed that the normative provisions94 of a collective 
agreement do not bind the contracting parties, but bind employers and employees 
who have not participated in negotiations (i.e. members of the contracting parties). In 
this respect, a collective agreement appears to be a form of legislation. The law of 
"obligatory provisions". 
88 A. Mazy, "Commentaires de la loi du 5 decembre 1968 sur les conventions collectives de travail et 
les commissions paritaires", Rev. dr.trav., 114, V. Vannes, op cit., 25 
89 See G. Magrez-Song, "Le role des CCT ou !'elaboration parallele" in Revue de l'ULB, 1978, 101. 
90 This Article provides that a contract is binding inter partes only. 
91 Damages resulting from a breach of a collective agreement may only be recovered when the 
collective agreement specifically provides for it, which is seldom the case. See also W. Rauws, "De 
binding van de normatieve bepalingen" in Actuele problemen van het Arbeidsrecht, t. III, Antwerpen, 
Kluwer, 1990, 38 who holds that a collective agreement is "een overeenkomst met specifieke 
kenmerken die de wettelijke en beperkte autonomie van het sociaal recht aantoont." 
92 If one recognises that trade unions and employers' organisations have the right to conclude collective 
agreements which constitute a form of legislation, it means that those organisations have a type of 
legislative power. However, nowhere is it stated in the Belgian Constitution that these organisations 
have a "quasi-legislative power"; for further details, see L. Fran~ois, op cit., 355. This author goes as 
far as questioning the constitutionality of the 1968 Act; see also B. Haubert, "La nature des 
conventions collectives et des commissions paritaires", J. TT, 1992, 85. 
93 M. Jamoulle, Seize le<;ons sur le droit du travail, Fae. Dr. Liege, ed. 1994, 36. V. Vannes, op cit., 26 
94 See infra, section III. 
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contract might provide legal grounds for the enforceability of a collective agreement 
between employers and employees who are members of a contracting party, but it 
cannot explain how a collective agreement can be binding on employers and 
employees not affiJiated to a contracting party, and to employers and employees who 
have not departed, by individual written agreement, from a collective agreement 
concluded within a joint body and not extended by Royal Decree95 . 
11.3 The hybrid character of collective agreements 
The collective agreement has a hybrid character. It has a peculiar status which 
cannot be explained only by civil or public law. P. Durand held that collective 
agreements have a "dualistic nature"96 • 
When a collective agreement is extended to non-parties, its nature changes: it 
becomes a regulation (i.e. a form of legislation), but it maintains, to a certain extent, 
its contractual nature. It is a contract as far as obligatory provisions are concerned, 
and a regulation with regard to normative provisions. 
Ill CONTENT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
A collective agreement is composed of two parts: a normative part, imposing 
obligations on persons bound by the collective agreement, and an obligatory part 
determining the rights and obligations of contracting parties97 • 
The normative part is the most important: it establishes and regulates the rights and 
obligations of employers and employees bound by the collective agreement. 
The normative part comprises individual normative clauses and collective normative 
clauses. The distinction between these two parts is not merely academic. These 
clauses have different legal effects: the former have a "higher compulsory force" 
than the latter and remain in force even after the agreement that created them 
expires, and until a new collective agreement replaces them. 
Obligatory provisions relate only to contracting parties, i.e. employers' organisations 
95 On the binding force of collective agreements, see section VI infra. 
96 Durand, Traite de droit du travail, V. I, Paris, Dalloz, 132; G. Cox, "De juridische binding an 
afdwingbaarheid van obligatoire C.A.0. bepalingen", in Actuele problemen van het Arbeidsrecht, t. III, 
Antwerpen, Kluwer, 134. 
97 W. Rauws, op cit., 34 alleges that this division between normative and obligatory provisions finds its 
origin in Dutch literature. 
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and trade unions. They do not have any regulatory force and their binding force 
ceases at the expiration of the duration of the collective agreement which created 
them. 
111.1 The normative provisions of collective agreements 
Ill. 1. 1 Definitions 
The normative part of collective agreements comprises provisions which regulate the 
rights and obligations of persons bound by the collective agreement. R. Blanpain 
defines it as those norms which regulate labour relations between employers and 
employees98 • 
"Normative" means that these provisions are automatically compulsory. They are 
binding on employers and employees bound by the collective agreement, as if it 
were a form of legislation. 
Normative provisions of collective agreements can be individual or collective. 
Individual normative provisions regulate individual labour relations between 
employers and employees. They regulate matters such as: remuneration, working 
hours, job grading, social benefits, employment stability etc., and are incorporated 
into individual employment contracts. 
Collective normative provisions regulate labour relations between employers and 
employees, at a collective level and generate neither obligations for contracting 
parties nor for the individual employer in relation to individual employees. "They are 
almost 'in-between rules' (between individual normative and obligatory) regulating 
collective labour relations" 99 • They usually regulate the general functioning of the 
union delegation, works council, conciliation procedures that must be followed in 
case of collective dispute, etc. 
Ill. 1.2 Legal effect of the distinction between individual and collective 
normative provisions 
The distinction between individual and collective normative provisions is not merely 
98 R. Blanpain and C. Engels, 'Belgium', in International Encyclopaedia for labour law, Kluwer, 242. 
99 R. Blanpain and C. Engels, op cit., 243. 
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academic. These provisions have different legal effects. 
111.1.2.1 Individual normative provisions 
These provisions have a "more binding effect" than collective normative provisions: 
they are incorporated in the employment contract and are binding on non-parties. 
IIll.2.1.1 Incorporation of individual normative provisions in employment contracts 
Article 23 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
·~n individual employment contract implicitly modified by a collective agreement shall 
remain unchanged if the agreement ceases to be in force, unless there is a provision 
to the contrary in the agreement itself. " 
It follows from this provision that individual normative provisions: 
• implicitly modify the provisions of a contract of employment which are 
contrary to the provisions of a collective agreement without an amendment to 
the letter of appointment being necessary. Those provisions are incorporated 
into the individual100 employment contract as they are hierarchically superior 
to the provisions of an employment contract101 ; 
• remain in force even after the collective agreement that generated them 
ceases to be in force, unless the collective agreement contains a stipulation 
to the contrary102, and 
• once incorporated into the individual employment contract, they will only 
cease to be in force by virtue of a new agreement103 . 
IIll.2.1.2 Binding force of individual normative provisions on non-parties 
Article 26 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"The clauses of an agreement concluded in a joint body which deal with individual 
100 By virtue of Article 11 of the 1968 Act. 
101 See section V infra and Article 51 of the 1968 Act which sets out in hierarchical order a list of the 
legal sources regulating employment contracts. 
102 See Articles 22 and 13 of the 1968 Act. 
103 G. Magrez-Song, "Le role de la CCT dans l' elaboration parallele", in A l 'enseigne du droit social 
beige, ed. U.L.B., 1978, 101. V. Vannes, op cit., 31 
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relations between employers and employees shall bind all employers and employees 
other than those referred to in section 19, who are covered by the joint body, insofar 
as they fall within the scope of the agreement, unless the individual employment 
contract contains a written clause to the contrary. 
This provision shall apply as from the fifteenth day following the publication referred 
to in section 25, first paragraph." 
Article 26 extends the binding force of a collective agreement concluded within a joint 
body to non-parties. 
Consequently, the individual normative provisions of a collective agreement, which 
has been concluded within a joint body and has not been extended, 104 also bind 
employers who are not affiliated to a signatory organisation, and therefore their 
employees, whether they are unionised or not, provided the employers fall within the 
scope of the joint body. However, the collective agreement has only a 
"supplementary binding effect" as the employer and his employees may depart from 
it by inserting a written clause to the contrary in the individual contract of 
employment105• 
111.1.2.2 Collective normative provisions 
Collective normative provisions are not incorporated in individual employment 
contracts and cease to be binding upon the collective agreements' expiry. 
These provisions are, however, binding on all persons who fall within the scope of 
the agreement. 
111.2 The obligatory part of collective agreements 
The obligatory part of collective agreements determines the rights and obligations of 
signatory parties, i.e. employers' organisations and trade unions. It only binds those 
organisations which have taken part in the negotiation, regardless of whether the 
104 On extension, see section VII infra. 
105 See Expose des Motifs, Doc. Parl., Sen., session 1966-1967, 33 which justifies this solution on the 
basis that trade unions and employers organisations act for their entire sector when they conclude 
collective agreements within joint bodies. 
It must however be noted that the question as to whether this written clause must be inserted before or 
after the coming into force of the collective agreement is controversial. The majority of the authors are 
however of the opinion that such a clause could be inserted prior to the coming into force of the 
collective agreement and expressed in a broad way; see S. Du Bled, "La hierarchie des normes en droit 
du travail", Orientations, 1993, 269; P. Horion, "Syndicats, Conventions collectives de travail, organes 
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collective agreement has been extended by Royal Decree or not106• 
It regulates certain aspects such as the cancellation, renewal, re-negotiation, and 
interpretation of the collective agreement, etc. 
Most commentators 107 are of the view that two obligations are implicitly contained in 
any collective agreement: that of social peace and that of the loyal execution of the 
agreement. 
111.2. 1 Social peace 
The social peace obligation obliges parties to refrain, during the collective 
agreement's period of validity, from formulating any additional claims concerning 
matters regulated by the collective agreement during its existence108• It can also be 
wider in that it may prohibit any additional claim during the duration of the 
agreement. 
This obligation may be expressed tacitly or expressly. 
Where the collective agreement does not expressly provide for social peace, this 
obligation is considered to be relative109, i.e. that it only relates to matters regulated 
by the collective agreement. 
The social peace obligation is the transposition into labour law of the principles of 
civil law relating to the execution of contracts, i.e. the autonomy of will, the obligatory 
(binding) force of contracts and their execution in good faith: once it has been 
negotiated and concluded, a contract must be executed in accordance with the 
parties' agreement. 
In general, social peace clauses form part of the obligatory part of the collective 
agreement. This means that they bind neither employers nor employees, whether 
paritaires", Ann. Fae. Dr. Liege, 1969, 132; L. Frans;ois, op cit., 332; W. Rauws, op cit., 47. 
106 C.T. Anvers, 27 May 1988, J.TT., 1988, 357; see also G. Cox, op cit., 117-134; M. Rigaux, 
"Omtrent de juridische afdwingbarheid van obligatoire C.A.0. bepalingen", R. W., 1985-86, 913-918. 
107 P. Van der Vorst, op cit., 179; L. Frans;ois, op cit., 336; J. Piron and P. Denis, Le droit des relations 
collectives du travail en Belgique, Bruxelles, Larcier, 1970, 67; V. Vannes, op cit., 29; G. Cox, op cit., 
122; contra M. Magrez, "Le statut des conventions collectives de travail", J. T, 1969, 202. 
108 J. Piron, "Qu'est-ce qu'une greve irreguliere et quels en sont ses effets?", J.TT, 1979, 74; M. 
Magrez, note sous T.T. Namur, 11 February 1976, R.C.J.B., 1977, 587; G. Cox, op cit., 124. 
109 J. Piron, op cit., 74. 
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unionised or not, but bind the parties only110. However, social peace clauses could 
also be considered as forming part of the normative provisions when their wording is 
such that their scope of application is broader than that of signatory parties 111 • 
The wording of the social peace clause therefore determines which persons are 
bound by it. 
111.2.2 Obligation of loyal execution 
In terms of the obligation of loyal execution, signatory parties to a collective 
agreement are obliged to inform their members of the content of collective 
agreements and exert influence on their members to live up to the normative 
provisions of the agreement112. This obligation is relative (i.e. not absolute), since 
signatory parties are not responsible for the final conduct of their members113 . 
Furthermore, when a signatory party violates the social peace obligation, the right of 
the other party to be indemnified is limited. Article 4 of the 1968 Act specifically 
provides that in the case of non-performance of contractual obligations, damages 
can only be recovered from an organisation when the collective agreement 
specifically provides for such a possibility. This is however never done in practice. 
IV CONDITIONS OF VALIDITY OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
IV.1 Substantial formalities 
Articles 13, 14 and 16 of the 1968 Act set out a list of conditions which have to be 
met, failing which the collective agreement will be declared null and void114 . 
Any collective agreement must: 
• be made in writing. No specific formalities are required and an exchange of 
110 As trade unions lack legal personality, they cannot be sued. In other words, although the obligatory 
provisions are binding upon the parties to the agreement, they are not enforceable in court. See 
T.Lagneaux and J. Vandrooghenbroek, "note sous C.T. Liege 2 August 1984'', R.D.S. 1984, 588; C.T. 
Bruxelles, 1 December 1989, J. TT, 1990, 80 where it was held that the clauses of social peace do not 
bind emloyees considered individually; T.T. Charleroi 12 June 1989, C.D.S., 1989, 349. 
111 See V. Vannes, op cit., 30; R. Roels, "La greve et ses consequences sur la relation contractuelle", 
J.TT 1977, 232; T.T. Charleroi 12 June 1989, C.D.S., 1989, 349; M. Demanet, "Reflexions sur le 
droit de greve dans le secteur prive", J. TT., 1990, 69. 
112 Contra, L. Frarn;ois, op cit., 336. 
113 P. Denis, Droit du travail, Larcier, ed. 1992, 310. 
114 C.T. Mons, 18 June 1990, J.TT, 1990, 492. 
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correspondence is sufficient115; 
• be drafted in French and in Flemish, with the exception that when the collective 
agreement refers exclusively to one linguistic region116, it must only be drafted in 
the language of the region in which the collective agreement will be applicable, 
and 
• be signed by the persons concluding the agreement, on their or their 
organisation's behalf117• 
Furthermore, the collective agreement must contain the following compulsory 
information aimed at identifying the contracting parties: 
• the name of the organisations concluding the agreement; 
• the name of the joint body, if the agreement is concluded in such a body; 
• the names of persons concluding the agreement, and if the agreement is 
concluded outside a joint body, the capacity in which such persons act, and, 
where applicable, their function within the organisation; 
• the persons, branch of activity or undertaking and the territorial scope to which the 
agreement applies, unless the collective agreement binds all employers and 
employees falling within the scope of the joint body where such collective 
agreement has been concluded; 
• the period of validity, where the collective agreement has been concluded for a 
definite period, and the notice period to be given where the collective agreement 
has been concluded for an indefinite period; 
115 P. Van der Vorst, op cit., 189. 
116 Belgium is divided into three linguistic regions - French, Flemish and German-. Contrary to South 
Africa, where the 11 national languages are spoken throughout the entire country, in Belgium each 
language corresponds to one particular region. 
117 Article 14 of the 1968 Act provides that these signatures may be replaced by a mention that the 
chairperson and the secretary of the joint body have signed the minutes of the meeting approved by the 
members; the signature of a member of each organisation represented on the joint body in which the 
agreement was concluded; or the signature of the person who brought about conciliation between the 
parties in the case of a labour dispute and testifies that the parties have indicated their agreement on the 
written terms of conciliation. 
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• the date of coming into force in cases where the collective agreement does not 
come into force on the date of its conclusion; 
• the date of conclusion, and 
• the signature of the persons having signatory capacity118 . 
IV.2 Deposition of collective agreements 
Article 18 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"The agreement shall also be deposited with the Ministry of Employment and Labour. 
Deposition shall not be accepted if the agreement fails to fulfil the conditions laid 
down in Article 13, 14 and 16. 
The following documents shall be deposited at the Ministry of Employment and 
Labour: 
1. the accession of an organisation or an employer to the agreement; 
2. the notice of intention to terminate an agreement of unspecified duration or an 
agreement of specified duration containing a renewal clause; 
Any person may obtain a copy of the agreement deposited upon payment of a fee, 
the amount of which shall be fixed by the Crown." 
The deposition of a collective agreement shall be refused when the agreement does 
not contain the provisions prescribed by Articles 13, 14 and 16 of the 1968 Act119 . 
Deposition is required for all collective agreements within the meaning of the 1968 
Act, i.e. regardless of whether they have been concluded in or outside a joint body120• 
The deposition of a collective agreement has been described as a "substantial 
procedure, without which the legal existence of a collective agreement would be 
118 Article 16 of the 1968 Act. 
119 It must be noted that the Department of Labour may not question the legality of the content of a 
collective agreement; when the requirements set down by Articles 13, 14 and 16 of the 1968 Act have 
been fulfilled, the Ministry of Labour must register the collective agreement - See A. Mazy, 
''Commentaires de la loi du 5 decembre 1968 sur les conventions collectives de travail et les 
commissions paritaires", R.T., 1970, 68. 
120 J. Piron and P. Denis, "Le droit des relations collectives de travail en Belgique", Larcier 1970, 74; 
T.T. Charleroi, 18 February 1980, J.T.T. 1981, 57; C.T. Mons, 19 November 1981, J.T.T., 1982, 204; 
C.T. Liege, 17February1981,J.L., 1981, 319; T.T. Arion, 28February1984,J.T.T., 1984, 402. 
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para/ysed'121 • 
The status of collective agreements, depending on their deposition, can be described 
as follows: 
IV.2.1 Collective agreements deposited with the Ministry of Labour 
Although collective agreements deposited with the Ministry of Labour are referred to 
by the 1968 Act as "agreements" and are the result of negotiations which took place 
at sectoral or plant level, they are not "contracts" within the meaning of the Civil 
code. 
By virtue of Article 19 of the 1968 Act, these collective agreements have normative 
effects on persons represented both within and outside of the joint body, and, by 
virtue of Article 26, have supplementary normative effects on persons not 
represented and who therefore neither consented to nor participated in their 
establishment122• 
IV.2.2 Collective agreements not deposited with the Ministry of Labour 
Collective agreements which have not been deposited with the Ministry of Labour 
are not collective agreements in the sense of the 1968 Act. Consequently, they do 
not have the normative force provided by Article 19 and have no binding force 
whatsoever on non-parties. 
However, they retain a legal existence vis-a-vis the signatory parties. 
In a decision made on 30 May 1988, the Gour de Cassation held that a collective 
agreement is legally binding on those who signed it, despite not having been 
deposited123• 
Consequently, signatory parties to a collective agreement could not claim not to be 
bound by a collective agreement they have concluded because it is not a collective 
121 Expose des motifs, Doc. Parl., Sen., session 1966-1967, 27; C. Wantiez, note sous Cass. 30 May 
1988, J. TT., 1988, 353. 
122 See infra, section VI. 
123 Cass. 30 May 1988, J. TT, 1988, 352; see also M. Colens, Le contrat d'emploi, Bruxelles, Larcier, 
1980, 78; V. Vannes, op cit., 50; C.T. Mons, 19November 1981,J.TT, 1982, 204; C.T. Liege, 17 
February 1981, J.L., 1981, 319; C.T. Bruxelles, 3 April 1987, C.D.S., 1988, 40; T.T. Charleroi, 6 
January 1989, J.TT., 1989, 271; C.T. Mons, 18 June 1990, J.TT, 1990, 472. 
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agreement in the sense of the 1968 Act. The agreement exists between those 
parties by application of common law rules, and the provisions negotiated are 
enforceable. 
IV.3 Publication in the Moniteur Beige 
A collective agreement concluded in a joint body must be published by means of a 
notice inserted in the Moniteur Beige. Publication must take place regardless of 
whether the collective agreement has been extended to non-parties or not. 
Article 25 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"The object, date, duration, scope and place of deposition of an agreement 
concluded in a joint body must be published by means of a notice inserted in the 
Moniteur Beige. 
Notice of intention to terminate an agreement of unspecified or specified duration, 
containing a renewal clause, must also be published by means of a notice inserted in 
the Moniteur Beige." 
This act of publication is necessary, in view of the supplementary binding effect of 
individual normative provisions contained in a collective agreement on all employers 
and employees who are not already bound by the collective agreement by virtue of 
their membership to a signatory organisation, 15 days after the publication in the 
Moniteur Belge 124• 
In addition, when the Crown extends the binding force of collective agreements, a 
further notice must be published in the Moniteur Belge125• 
IV.4 Endorsement by joint committees 
When the Royal Decree adopted on recommendation from the joint committee 
requires this, collective agreements which have been concluded within joint 
subcommittees must be endorsed by the joint committee. 
Article 8 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
124 See supra section III; R. Blanpain and C. Engels, op cit., 237; P. Van der Vorst, op cit., 197. 
125 Article 30 of the 1968 Act. 
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"If endorsement is required, the joint committee shall make its decision within the 
month following the date on which the agreement is transmitted to it, failing which the 
agreement shall be deemed to. be endorsed." 
Article 8 of the 1968 Act consequently provides joint committees with a right of veto 
over decisions of joint sub-committees. 
V NULLITY OF THE NORMS CONTRARY TO HIERARCHICALLY SUPERIOR NORMS 
To ensure collective bargaining efficiency, the sources of labour law have been 
strictly organised into a hierarchy by the legislator. 
As a result, although social partners have total freedom to conclude collective 
agreements, and to define their content, employers' organisations and trade unions 
are bound by the hierarchy of sources of labour law126 • 
V.1 Compliance with peremptory provisions superior to collective 
agreements 
Article 9 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"The provisions of an agreement which 
1. are contrary to the peremptory provisions of Acts of Parliament and other 
statutory instruments, treaties and international agreements which have 
binding force in Belgium; (or which) 
2. provide for the settlement of individual disputes by arbitrators , 
shall be declared null and void." 
Collective agreements may consequently not contain provisions which would be 
contrary to international or national legislation. 
V. 1. 1 International provisions 
Any provisions of a collective agreement which are contrary to European or 
international provisions which have binding force in Belgium, are null and void127 • 
126 See S. Du Bled, "La hierarchie des normes en droit du travail", Orientations, 1993, 265-272; V. 
Vannes, op cit., 81; W. Van Eeckhoutte, Compendium Social 1997-98, t. I, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 
43. 
127 Cass. 27 May 1971, R.W, 1971-1972, 431. 
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The Gour de Cassation held that a collective agreement which permits air stewards 
to work after the age of legal retirement, and that does not grant the same 
advantage to air hostesses, is contrary to the principles of equality of treatment as 
laid down in the European Directive of 9 February 1976, in Article 6 of the Belgian 
Constitution 128 and in Article 116 of the 1978 Act for economic reorientation 129. 
These provisions are superior to those of a collective agreement concluded within or 
outside of a joint body130. 
In a decision of 7 February 1991, the European Court of Justice held that Article 
119 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as preventing a collective agreement 
from indirectly discriminating between men and women. According to the Court, 
when a collective agreement is discriminatory, the national judge must disregard it 
without having to demand or expect the deletion of the discriminating provision 
through collective bargaining or any other means 131 . 
V. 1.2 National provisions 
A collective agreement must also comply with peremptory provisions of national 
law132. As it is not possible to enumerate an exhaustive list of peremptory provisions 
of national law, the writer proposes to analyse three topics which have been 
considered by Belgian courts: equality of treatment between men and women, the 
regulation of notice periods for the termination of employment and the competence 
of labour courts. 
V.1.2.1 Equality of treatment between men and women 
: On ·27 January 1994, the Gour de Cassation held that the nullity of a provision of a 
collective agreement only affects this provision, and not the whole agreement. 
Moreover, it does not affect the rights of employees who are not prejudiced by the 
provisions 133. 
The facts of the case were as follows: a collective agreement granted a bonus to 
male employees who had reached the age of retirement. Female employees 
128 Article 6 of the Constitution lays down the principles of equality of treatment of Belgian people. 
129 Article 116 of the 1978 Act describes the scope of application of Article 6 of the Constitution in 
labour-related matters. 
13
° Cass. 27 January 1994, C.D.S., 1994, 75; see also C.T. Bruxelles, 12 November 1984, C.D.S., 
1984, 531. 
131 C.J.C.E. 7 February 1991,J.T.T., 1991, 346. 
132 Cass., 12 October 1992, J.T.T., 1992, 478. 
133 Cass. 27 January 1994, C.D.S., 1994, 75. 
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claimed indirect discrimination, and that this provision was null and void by virtue of 
Article 130 of 1978 Act for Economic Reorientation134,, in that they could not benefit 
from such a bonus. 
The Gour de Gassation ruled that the consequence of the nullity of a provision 
contrary to Article 130 of the 1978 Act which is aimed at prohibiting collective 
agreements from discriminating on the grounds of sex, meant that those employees 
had to be offered the same treatment. Therefore, the bonus had to be granted to 
both female and male employees upon reaching the age of retirement. 
V.1.2.2 Prohibition of collective agreements regulating notice periods for the 
termination of employment 
Article 82 of the 1978 Act relating to employment contracts provides that for senior 
employees: 
"the duration of the notice period to be respected by employers and workers is 
determined either by agreements concluded not earlier than the date on which 
notice of termination is given, or by the judge135• 
In a decision of 16 March 1987136, the Gour de Gassation held that a collective 
agreement cannot regulate notice periods. The right to a notice period has a 
personal character: its duration is determined by individual bargaining between the 
employer and employee. In the absence of an agreement, the judge has the 
exclusive power to determine the duration of the notice period. It is consequently not 
possible to determine the duration of notice periods through collective bargaining137. 
In a decision of 17 October 1990, the Gour de Gassation confirmed its previous 
jurisprudence: the right to determine the notice period cannot be limited by a 
134 Article 130 of the 1978 Act provides that any provisions which conflict with the principle of 
equality of treatment are null and void. 
135 In terms of Belgian law, the dismissal of white-collar workers does not have to be motivated. The 
only obligation resting on an employer is to terminate the employment contract on notice. The 1978 
Act on employment contracts provides that the notice period cannot be less than three months per five 
years of service, or part thereof. An employee with six years of service is therefore entitled to six 
months' notice of termination. 
136 Cass. 16 March 1987, C.D.S., 1987, 188. 
137 Cass. 9May 1994,JT.T., 1995, 8. 
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collective agreement 138• 
V.1.2.3. Competence Qf labour courts 
A collective agreement cannot depart from the provisions of public order contained in 
the Judicial Code regulating the courts' competence. As these provisions are related 
to public order, the judge has to raise then mero motu139• 
A collective agreement, even though declared generally binding, may consequently 
not extend, reduce or modify the courts' jurisdiction. 
V.2 Compliance with superior conventional provisions 
Collective bargaining takes place at various levels. In order to prevent conflicts 
between collective agreements concluded at different levels, but covering the same 
industry, the legislator has established a hierarchy of collective agreements140 . 
Article 51 establishes a hierarchy between collective agreements concluded within 
the National Labour Council, a joint committee, a joint subcommittee and outside a 
joint body, as follows: 
"The sources of obligations arising out of the employment relationship between 
employers and employees shall be as follows, in descending order of precedence: 
1. the law in its peremptory provisions; 
2. collective agreements declared to be generally binding, in the following order: 
a. agreements concluded in the National Labour Council; 
b. agreements concluded in a joint committee 
c. agreements concluded in a joint subcommittee; 
3. collective agreements which have not been declared to be generally binding, 
where the employer is a signatory thereof or is affiliated to an organisation 
signatory to such an agreement, in the following order: 
a. agreements concluded in the National Labour Council; 
b. agreements concluded in a joint committee; 
c. agreements concluded in a joint subcommittee; 
d. agreements concluded outside a joint body; 
4. an individual agreement in writing; 
138 Cass. 17 October 1990, J. T. T., 1992, 177. 
139 Cass. 14 April 1955, J.T., 1955, 494. 
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5. collective agreements concluded in a joint body, but not declared generally 
binding, where the employer, although not a signatory thereof or not affiliated 
to an organisation signatory thereto, falls within the jurisdiction of the joint 
body in which the agreement was concluded; 
6. workrules; 
7. the supplementary provisions of the law; 
8. a verbal individual agreement; 
9. custom." 
By virtue of Article 51, certain provisions of a collective agreement may therefore be 
declared null and void on the basis that they are contrary to provisions contained in a 
hierarchically superior collective agreement. 
Consequently, the outcome of collective bargaining which has taken place in a body 
which has the largest sphere of influence prevails over the others. 
To enforce this hierarchy, Article 10 of the 1968 Act provides that the provisions of a 
collective agreement which conflict with a peremptory provision of another collective 
agreement concluded within a hierarchically superior body are null and void 141 • 
According to this Article: 
"The following shall be null and void: 
1. the provisions of an agreement concluded in a joint committee which are 
contrary to an agreement concluded in the National Labour Council; 
2. the provisions of an agreement concluded in a joint subcommittee which are 
contrary to an agreement concluded in the National Labour Council or in the 
joint committee of which it is a sub-committee; 
3. the provisions of an agreement concluded outside a joint body which are 
contrary to an agreement concluded in the National Labour Council or a joint 
committee or joint subcommittee which is competent for the undertaking 
concerned." 
140 Expose des motifs, Doc. Parl., Senat, session 1966-1967, n° 148, 21and22. 
·. 
141 See C.T. Liege, 24 July 1990, J.TT., 1991, 261 where it was held that a collective agreement 
concluded at plant level must be declared null and void when it provides for higher wages than those 
provided by a collective agreement concluded at sectoral level, and are contrary to the legislation 
regulating maximum salaries. See also 0. De Leye, "De betekenis van artikel 10 van de C.A.0.-wet", 
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A provision of a collective agreement is null and void if it conflicts with a collective 
agreement which is concluded at a higher hierarchical levels, regardless of whether 
the conflicting provision is less or more favourable. Therefore, a collective agreement 
concluded in a joint committee and providing actual wages may not be departed from 
by a collective agreement concluded at plant level, even if the latter provides higher 
wages142. 
V.3 Nullity of provisions contained in an employment contract 
Article 11 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"The clauses of an individual contract of employment and the provisions of workru/es 
which are contrary to those of a collective agreement which is binding on the 
employers and employees, are null and void. 
Collective agreements concluded at any level prevail over the individual contract of 
employment, even if their provisions are less favourable than those included in the 
contract of employment143. This provision is, however, not applicable to a settlement 
agreement concluded after the termination of an employment contract 144. 
VI PERSONS BOUND BY COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
The persons bound by a collective agreement vary according to whether the 
employer falls within the scope of the joint body which has concluded the agreement, 
whether the collective agreement has been declared generally binding by Royal 
Decree, and whether the employer belongs to one of the employers' organisations 
that has concluded the collective agreement. 
The forum of conclusion -whether the collective agreement was concluded in a joint 
body or not - must also be taken into consideration. 
In this section, only the "normal" binding force of collective agreements will be 
analysed; the process of extension will be dealt with in section VII infra. 
J. T. T., 1988, 153-156. 
142 Cass. 3 April 1987, Pas., 1987, I, 846; C.T. Liege, 11October1984, J.T.T., 1984, 314; C.T. Liege, 
24 July 1990, J.T.T., 1991, 261. 
143 C.T. Anvers, 4 July 1985, J.T.T., 1986, 172; C.T. Liege, 11October1984, J.T.T., 1984, 314. 
144 Cass. 12 September 1989, J.T.T., 1992, 128. 
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Vl.1 Collective agreements concluded within a joint body 
Collective agreements concluded within a joint body may either have an imperative 
binding force or a supplementary binding force on employers who fall within the 
scope of the body which concluded the collective agreement. 
VI. 1. 1 Imperative effect of collective agreements 
Articles 19 and 26 of the 1968 Act regulate the binding force of collective 
agreements. 
Article 19 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"The agreement shall be binding on-
1. those organisations which concluded it, and the employers who are members of 
such organisations which concluded the agreement, as from the date of its coming 
into force; 
2. those organisations and employers subsequently acceding to the agreement, and 
the employers' members of such organisations, as from the date of their accession; 
3. employers who become affiliated to an organisation bound by the agreement, as 
from the date of their affiliation; 
4. all the workers in the service of an employer bound by the agreement." 
The employers and employees referred to in Article 19 are bound by collective 
agreements concluded in joint bodies. Any clauses contained in an employment 
contract which are contrary to the provisions of such collective agreements are null 
and void by virtue of Article 11. 
It is important to note that all employees in the service of an employer bound by a 
collective agreement, are bound by that collective agreement 145. In a decision of 1 
February 1993, the Gour de Cassation held that the dissatisfaction of some 
employees with the content of a collective agreement is irrelevant to the binding 
force of this collective agreement 146• 
145 See W. Rauws, op cit., 47: "de wetgever heeft die bijkomende aanvullende binding aanvaard omdat 
al de representatieve organisaties vertegenwoordigd in het paritair orgaan de belangen behartigen van 
de ganse bedrijfstk of van het ganse bedrijfsleven". 
146 Cass. l February 1993,JT.T., 1993, 327. 
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Apart from the supplementary effect of its individual normative provisions147 , a 
collective agreement only binds the employers represented within the joint body. It is 
not binding on employers who are not represented in the joint body. 
Article 19 of the 1968 Act has a dual purpose: 
• firstly, it determines those employers and employees bound by a collective 
agreement concluded in a joint body, even though they may not have 
participated in its negotiation or conclusion. The binding effect of these 
collective agreements can be explained either by the fact that employers' 
organisations represent their members or that they voluntarily acceded to the 
collective agreement; 
• secondly, it gives the collective agreement its normative character. 
By virtue of Article 23 of the 1968 Act, the individual normative provisions are 
incorporated in the individual contact of employment. They apply automatically to 
current contracts 148 . Employers bound by Article 19 may not deviate from the 
application of the individual normative provisions of an agreement concluded in a 
joint body. 
VI. 1.2 Supplementary binding force of collective agreements 
The normative force given to an agreement concluded in a joint body and not 
declared generally binding by Royal Decree is one of the main features of the 
Belgian legal system. 
Article 26 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"The clauses of an agreement concluded in a joint body which deal with individual 
relations between employers and employees shall bind all employers and employees 
other than those referred to in Article 19, who are covered by the joint body, in so far 
as they fall within the scope of the agreement, unless the individual contract of 
employment contains a written clause to the contrary. This provision shall apply as 
from the fifteenth day following the publication referred to in Article 25, first 
147 See section III supra and Article 26 of the 1968 Act. 
148 See A. Mazy, "Commentaires de la loi du 5 decembre 1968", Rev. Trav., 1969, 24; V. Vannes, op 
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paragraph. " 
Employers falling within the scope of Article 26 are those who are not members of a 
signatory organisation at the time of the conclusion of the collective agreement, who 
have not acceded to the agreement and who are not have not become affiliated to 
an organisation bound by the agreement subsequently to its conclusion. The 
employers falling within the scope of the joint body, whose activities fall within the 
scope of the agreement, and all the employees who are in their service are 
consequently bound by Article 26149. 
The supplementary normative force of a collective agreement results from the fact 
that a collective agreement regulates the rules applicable in a particular sector of the 
economy. Professional organisations which conclude a collective agreement in a 
joint body act for the whole branch of activity covered by the scope of the joint 
body150. 
Therefore, the individual normative provisions of a collective agreement not declared 
generally binding and concluded in a joint body also bind employers who are not 
members of a signatory organisation and employees in their service, within 15 days, 
following the publication in the Moniteur Beige. 
This extension of the binding force of the individual normative provisions is subject to 
one provisio: the employers may depart from these provisions by inserting a clause 
to this effect in the contract of employment. It must be stressed that this clause may 
only be inserted in the employment contract a posteriori, i.e. after the conclusion of 
the agreement that the parties wish to exclude. In other words, the parties could not 
insert a general clause in the individual employment contract whereby they exclude 
the application of any future collective agreement concluded within a joint body and 
which has not been extended by Royal Decree 151 . 
Vl.2 Collective agreements concluded outside a joint body 
In order to determine the persons bound by a collective agreement concluded at 
cit., 68. 
149 C.T. Mons, 3 March 1995, J.TT, 1996, 377. 
150 See W. Rauws, op cit., 38: "representatieve organisaties in een paritair orgaan traditioneel een 
bedrijfsreglement wensten op te stellen voor de ganse bedrijfstak." 
151 See S. Du Bled, op cit., 269. 
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plant level, a distinction must be drawn between those agreements deposited with 
the Ministry of Labour and those which are not. 
Vl.2. 1 Collective agreements deposited 
Collective agreements deposited with the Ministry of Labour constitute collective 
agreements within the meaning of the 1968 Act. They have a normative force: they 
bind all employees employed by the signatory employer, whether they are unionised 
or not and whether they belong to the signatory trade union or not. 
It must be noted that in respect of collective agreements concluded outside a joint 
body, the 1968 Act provides no guidance regarding as to who the parties must be. 
Consequently, even when two or more trade unions are represented within an 
undertaking, an employer may conclude a collective agreement with one trade union 
only (even if it is a minority union) that will be binding not only on non-unionised 
workers, but also on employees belonging to another trade union152 . 
The Conseil d'Etat153 has held that there is no Act of Parliament which prescribes 
that a collective agreement concluded outside a joint body can only be concluded 
with the consent of all the represented organisations, or only with the consent of the 
majority organisation 154• Any organisation empowered to conclude collective 
agreements is, within the meaning of the 1968 Act, deemed to be representative of 
employees, and may therefore conclude a collective agreement which will bind all 
employees of the undertaking, regardless of its representivity155• 
Those trade unions represented in the enterprise, but which did not take part in the 
152 C.T. Bruxelles, 20 March 1987, JT.T., 1987, 238. 
153 The Conseil d'Etat, or Council of State, can be described as the Supreme Administrative Court. It 
was created by an Act of Parliament in 1946 and constitutes a body which does not belong to the 
judiciary and that gives final and conclusive judgements. 
As an advisory and jurisdictional institution of the executive authority, but situated at the juncture of 
the three powers, the Council of State owes its existence essentially to the wish of the legislator to offer 
all natural and legal persons the possibility of an effective appeal against irregular administrative acts 
that might have damaged their interests, in as far as no other judicial body is competent. 
As a result, the most important task of the Council of State is related to its power to annul 
administrative acts that are contrary to the legal rules in force. 
However, protection against arbitrary acts of public administration is not the only task of the Council. 
It is also an advisory body in legislative and regulatory matters. 
154 C.E. 8 January 1986, C.D.S., 1986, 5. 
155 Nothing precludes the parties, however, to specifically exclude certain categories of employees from 
the scope of application of the agreement. 
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conclusion of the collective agreement can therefore not claim that it has not been 
concluded in the interests of their members, nor that the collective agreement should 
be negotiated and concluded by all organisations represented in the enterprise. 
Thus, the validity of a collective agreement concluded outside a joint body is not 
affected in circumstances where it has not been signed by all trade unions 
represented in the enterprise. The agreement does not have to represent the 
interests of all different categories of unionised workers. 
Vl.2.2 Collective agreements not deposited 
The deposition of a collective agreement is a substantive condition that confers its 
legal existence. 
Consequently, a collective agreement not deposited is not a collective agreement 
within the meaning of the 1968 Act; it does not have the normative force provided by 
Article 19 of the Act, i.e. it does not bind non-parties 156. 
In a decision of 30 May 1988, the Gour de Gassation held that the mere fact that a 
collective agreement has not been deposited does not mean that the parties to the 
agreement are not bound by it157• 
The binding force of collective agreements which have not been deposited is 
regulated by the rules of civil law158 , and a distinction must then be drawn between 
signatory parties, unionised employees, non-unionised employees, and non-
signatory organisations. 
Vl.2.2.1 The signatory parties 
In a decision of 30 May 1988, the Gour de Gassation held that a collective 
agreement that has not been deposited retains its legal existence in respect of those 
who signed it. The signatory employer and trade unions could not, for this reason, 
refuse to comply with an obligation contained in such a collective agreement. 
The Gour du Travail held that the absence of deposition does not amount to the 
156 C.T. Liege, 11 October, 1984, J.T.T., 1985, 314; T.T. Adon, 28 December 1984, J. T. T., 1985, 402. 
157 Cass. 30 May 1988 and obs. Wantiez, J.T.T., 1988, 352; C.T. Mons, 19 November 1981, J.T.T., 
1982, 204; J.F. Gerard, "Les effets de !'absence de depot d'une convention collective de travail et la 
place du droit commun des obligations", J. T. T., 1990, 169. 
60 
non-execution of a legal obligation. Therefore, the employer could not allege that, 
since the agreement had not been deposited, it was entitled to breach the obligations 
contained in the agreement concluded159• 
Since trade unions are also bound by collective agreements they have concluded but 
which have not been deposited, they would be obliged to comply with a social peace 
clause contained in such agreements 160. 
Vl.2.2.2. Employees affiliated to the signatory trade union 
Those employees who are members of the trade union which concluded the 
agreement are bound by the provisions of the collective agreement. Although this 
situation has not been regulated by the 1968 Act, this conclusion is inferred from the 
law of contract: the agreement binds the employees who are members of the trade 
union which concluded it, by means of the general mandate given to the union 
delegation to bargain collectively 161 • 
The members of the signatory trade union cannot avoid the binding force of the 
agreement on them on the basis that, for example, they had not given a special 
mandate to conclude a collective agreement, to the trade union's officials 162. 
It should be noted that a collective agreement which has not been deposited may 
restrict the contractual rights of a worker, provided that the agreement does not 
contradict the rights hierarchically superior to· those provided by the collective 
agreement 163• 
Vl.2.2.3. Non-signatory organisations and non-unionised workers 
Non-unionised employees are not bound by a collective agreement which has not 
been deposited with the Department of Labour. However, they could rely on the 
agreement in support of a claim that the benefits should be extended to them, on the 
basis that the employer unilaterally bound himself to offer the same benefits to his 
158 Horion, "Syndicats, conventions collectives, organes paritaires", Anna/es Fae. Dr., 1969, n° 70 
159 C.T. Bruxelles, 20 March 1987, J.T.T., 1987, 238. 
160 See C. Wantiez, note sous Cass. 30 May 1988, J.T.T., 1988, 355. 
161 C.T. Liege, 11 October 1984, J. T. T., 1985, 314; T.T. Arlon, 28 December 1985, J. T. T., 1984, 402 
162 C.T. Mons 19 November 1981, J.T.T., 1982, 204; T.T. Charleroi, 18 February 1980, J. T. T., 1980, 
157; C.T. Bruxelles, 6 June 1979, J.T. T., 1980, 80; it should be borne in mind that, at plant level, 
collective agreements are negotiated by the union delegation, but concluded by the trade union's 
officials - see supra. 
163 C.T. Bruxelles, 7 November 1987, J.J.T.B., 1988, 1190; C.T. Anvers, 4 July 1985, J.T.T., 1986, 
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entire workforce, i.e. regardless of their affiliation to a trade union164• 
VII EXTENSION TO NON-PARTIES 
Vll.1 Binding force conferred by Royal Decree 
Only collective agreements which have been concluded in joint bodies may be 
declared generally binding by Royal Decree. Once a collective agreement has been 
extended, the provisions of the agreement become binding without any possibility of 
deviation on all employers and the employees in their service, provided they fall 
within the territorial and professional scope of the agreement165• 
Two consequences flow from the extension to non-parties: 
• collective agreements declared generally binding will bind all employers and 
workers falling within the jurisdiction of the joint body, insofar as they fall 
within the scope stipulated in the agreement166 , and 
• if an employer does not comply with the normative provisions of a collective 
agreement, he commits a criminal offence. 
Articles 56 to 60 of the 1968 Act provide that an employer or his representative or 
agent found guilty of violating an agreement declared to be generally binding, or any 
person obstructing inspections under this Act are liable for a term of imprisonment or 
a fine, or both. 
In respect of the employers who are members of a signatory organisation or who 
have themselves concluded or acceded to the agreement, and their employees, the 
only consequence resulting from the extension by Royal Decree is that the 
infringement of normative provisions constitute a criminal offence subject to penal 
sanctions. 
172; T.T. Bruxelles, 1September1986, J.J.T.B., 1987, 29. 
164 C.T. Bruxelles, 9 November 1977, FEB, 1978, 2322; C.T. Bruxelles, 3 April 1987, C.D.S., 1988, 
40. 
165 See T.T. Bruxelles, 13 June 1989, C.D.S., 1991, 34 where it was held that where the employer is not 
a party to a collective agreement, nor affiliated to a signatory organisation, and where the collective 
agreements has not been declared generally binding, obligatory provisions do not bind that employer. 
166 Article 31 of the 1968 Act. 
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In respect of employers who are not members of a signatory organisation and who 
have not concluded or acceded to the agreement, and their employees, the 
extension of a collective agreement has various consequences: 
• individual normative provisions, which had only a supplementary binding 
effect, become compulsory; 
• collective normative provisions, which were not applicable, become 
applicable and compulsory, and 
• non-compliance with these provisions constitutes a criminal offence 167. 
It should be stressed that collective agreements, whether declared generally legally 
binding or not, "belong" to the contracting parties. This means that the parties retain 
the right to terminate the agreement, even if it has been declared generally binding. 
In addition, when the Crown extends the binding force of a collective agreement, it 
may not modify its content. 
Vll.2 Collective agreements and clauses susceptible of extension 
Only collective agreements concluded in a joint body may be declared generally 
binding by Royal Decree. This is because these agreements are presumed to be 
concluded by representatives of the entire branch of activity168. 
Furthermore, only the normative provisions of the agreement, whether individual or 
collective, may be declared generally binding by Royal Decree. 
Since the obligatory provisions of collective agreements bind only the contracting 
parties, they cannot be extended by Royal Decree. 
Vll.3 Procedures 
A collective agreement may be extended to non-parties only upon request, either by 
the joint body within which the agreement has been concluded, or by one of the 
employers' organisations or trade unions that is a member of the joint body169. 
167 This last consequence only applies to employers, their representatives and their agents, i.e. not to 
employees. 
168 See supra. 
169 Article 28 of the 1968 Act; see also Cass. 11 April 1951, Pas., 1951, I, 692 where it was held that 
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The request can be made at the time of the conclusion of the collective agreement 
or afterwards. 
The Crown is free to gr.ant or to refuse the extension of the agreement. If the 
extension is refused, the Crown must give the reasons for its refusal to the joint 
body 110. Such a refusal could occur when the content of the collective agreement is 
contrary to "imperative"171 statutory provisions 172, or when the Crown is of the 
opinion that the collective agreement does not promote the public interest. In the 
latter circumstance, however, the collective agreements' validity is not affected as 
far as the binding force towards the parties who signed the agreement is 
concemed173. 
Vll.4 Publication 
A collective agreement extended by Royal Decree is published in the Moniteur 
Beige, together with the Royal Decree declaring it to be generally binding174. The 
publication of the agreement is carried out in French and Flemish, even if the 
agreement was drawn up in only one language. 
VH.5 Termination of the general binding force 
The Royal Decree declaring a collective agreement to be generally binding shall 
cease to be in force 
• either upon the expiration of the specified duration of the agreement; or 
• in case of agreements of unspecified duration, or agreements of specified 
duration containing a renewal clause, in terms of a "new" Royal Decree repealing 
the order declaring the agreement to be generally binding, with effect from the 
date on which the agreement is terminated by the parties 175. 
a Royal Decree extending the binding force of a collective agreement where such extension had not 
been requested, is invalid 
170 Article 29 of the 1968 Act. 
171 See footnote 20. 
172 See for example C.E., 3 June 1978, Rev. Administration Publique, 148 where a Royal Decree 
extending the binding force of a collective agreement which had the effect <>fpreventing distribution 
of pharmaceutical products in cases of emergency (contrary to an Act regulating the distribution of 
pharmaceutical products), was cancelled. 
173 See P. Van der Vorst, op cit., 200; V. Vannes, op cit., 55. 
174 Article 30 of the 1968 Act. 
175 Article 33 of the 1968 Act. 
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The expiry of the general binding force of a collective agreement of specified 
duration does not cause any problem since the Royal Decree extending the binding 
force of the agreement indicates the same date of expiration as that contained in 
the collective agreement. 
With regard to collective agreements concluded for an unspecified duration, or for a 
specified duration and containing a renewal clause, it has already been noted that 
parties involved are free to terminate the agreement even when it has been 
declared generally binding by Royal Decree. 
A Royal Decree of abrogation must be passed after the formalities of cancellation 
have been complied with, and once the cancellation has been communicated to the 
Crown. The Royal Decree of abrogation officially terminates the general binding 
force which had been conferred on the agreement. As long as the Royal Decree of 
abrogation has not been passed, the general binding force of the collective 
agreement continues. 
Vll.6 Anticipated abrogation of the general binding force 
The Crown may repeal a Royal Decree declaring an agreement to be generally 
binding, totally or partially in the following circumstances 176: 
• the agreement no longer addresses the situation or fulfils the conditions 
which justified the declaration making it generally binding. In this case, the 
repeal of the Royal Decree can be total or partial. The repeal by the Crown is 
then subordinate to the consent of the joint body in which the agreement was 
concluded; 
• the collective agreement contains a provision which is null and void by virtue 
of Articles 9 or 1 O of the 1968 Act 177: the Crown may repeal the generally 
binding force on its own initiative. Prior notice must, however, be given to the 
joint body concerned. If the provision becomes null on a date later than the 
date on which the Royal Decree comes into force, the Royal Decree shall be 
repealed as from the later date. Prior notice must also be given to the joint 
body concerned. 
176 See Article 34 of the 1968 Act. 
177 These Articles relate to the compliance with norms which are hierarchically superior. See Section 
V supra. 
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The Act has not made provision for the case where nullity already existed at the 
date of the conclusion of the agreement or at the date of the extension of the 
binding force. By analogy with the solution given by the legislator when the nullity is 
subsequent to the Royal Decree, it can be concluded that the Royal Decree of 
repeal must have retrospective effect to the date on which the Royal Decree 
extended the agreement178. 
If the collective agreement contains a provision which is null and void by virtue of 
Article 9 of the 1968 Act, the repeal of the Royal Decree which extended the binding 
force has no consequence on the collective agreement itself, and the null and void 
provisions remain binding between the parties. In other words, the power given to 
the Crown concerns only the general binding force of the agreement itself; the 
agreement being the work of the contracting parties, it subsists after the Royal 
Decree of repeal179• 
VIII BINDING FORCE AND MANDATE OF THE ORGANISATIONS' REPRESENTATIVES 
Vlll.1 lrrebuttable presumption of the mandate of the representatives 
Article 12 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"Representatives of organisations shall be presumed to have the power to conclude 
collective agreements on behalf of their organisation. This presumption is 
irrefutable. 
If the agreement is concluded in the National Labour Council, all the organisations 
referred to in section 3, clause 2, shall be deemed to be one sole organisation 
represented by the members nominated on the recommendation of the High Council 
for the Middle Classes." 
The objective of the legislation is to avoid trade unions and employers' 
organisations or their members, questioning the validity of a collective agreement 
concluded by their representatives for reasons relating to their mandate 180• 
178 See J. PironandP. Denis, op cit., 88; C.T. Liege, 24July1990,JT.T., 1991, 261. The writer is not 
aware of any decision dealing with the consequences of such repeal on rights which had previously 
been granted. 
179 Cass. 12 October 1992, J. T. T., 1992, 4 78 where it was held that the collective agreement subsists 
between the parties to the agreement and the provisions which are not null and void remain binding. 
180 Doc. Parl., Sen., session 1967-1968, 23. 
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Vlll.2 The mandate of the representatives 
The nature of the mandate given by the 1968 Act to trade unions' and employers' 
organisations' representatives has different implications. 
V/11.2.1 Binding force of collective agreements on trade unions and 
employers' organisations affiliated to a signatory 
organisation 
A collective agreement concluded by an organisation's representative binds that 
organisation, as well as all trade unions or employers' organisations which are 
affiliated to such organisations 181 • 
It must be noted that trade unions and employers organisations have no obligation to 
sign the collective agreements negotiated by union delegations182• 
V/11.2.2 Binding force of collective agreements between trade 
unions or employers' organisations and their members 
Trade unions' representatives 183 are given a general mandate in respect of the 
negotiation and conclusion of collective agreements 184• 
According to consistent jurisprudence, an employee who becomes a member of a 
trade union gives the union a general mandate to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements which are regulated by the 1968 Act. 
Therefore, an employee can not allege that he is not bound by a collective 
agreement negotiated by his union on the grounds that he has not given a special 
mandate to negotiate this agreement185• 
It follows from this rule that employees are bound to the agreements concluded by 
their representatives, provided these agreements have been validly concluded, i.e. 
181 Doc. Parl., Sen., session 1967-1968, 66. 
182 See C.T. Bruxelles, 7 November 1986, C.D.S., 1987, 224 where it was held that a collective 
agreement concluded by a union delegate is not a collective agreement within the meaning of the 1968 
Act, save where the union delegate holds a special mandate; C.T. Bruxelles, 26 May 1989, J.J.B., 
1989, 378; T.T. Bruxelles, 7 January 1988, J.T.B. 1988, 44. 
183 And the employers' organisation's representative. 
184 C. Willems and F. Lagasse, "Le mandat syndical: principes, portee, effets" J. TT, 1990, l; T.T. 
Charleroi, 12 November 1984, C.D.S., 1984, 521; T.T. Arlon, 28 February 1984, J.TT, 1984, 402 
185 C.T. Mons, 19 November 1981, J.TT, 1981, 204; T.T. Arlon, 28 February 1984, J.TT, 1984, 402; 
T.T. Charleroi, 12 June 1989, C.D.S., 1989, 349. 
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they comply with the conditions for validity of collective agreements as laid down in 
the 1968 Act186 and have been deposited with the Ministry of Labour187. 
V/11.2.3 Nature of the relationship between trade unions and non-
unionised employees 
The travaux preparatoires of the 1968 Act state that most representative 
organisations represent not only their members but also all employees, whether 
unionised or not188• As a result of the fiction created by the 1968 Act, trade unions 
are presumed to represent all the employees. 
It follows from this presumption of representation that non-unionised employees are 
bound by collective agreements189 . They cannot claim that they are not bound by 
reason of not being affiliated to a signatory representative organisation or not having 
given a specific mandate to the trade union. 
IX COMING INTO FORCE OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
IX.1 Collective agreements not extended to non-parties 
The date on which a collective agreement concluded in a joint body comes into force 
varies according to whether the agreement binds employers who are members of a 
signatory employers' organisation, employers who accede to the agreement, or 
employers who are not members of a signatory organisation, but fall within the scope 
of the body which concluded it. 
IX. 1. 1 Employers represented in the joint body 
Employers represented in the joint body which concluded a collective agreement 
(either because they are members of the employers' organisation or because they 
become affiliated to the organisation) or who accede to the agreement, are bound by 
such agreement in accordance with principles of civil law. 
For these employers, and according to Article 19: 
186 See Section IV supra. 
187 C.T. Brussels, 6 June 1979, J.T.T. 1980, 85; T.T. Bruxelles, 9 September 1977, J.T.T. 1977, 334. 
188 Doc. Parl., Sen., session 1967-1968, 15. 
189 Provided that they are in the service of an employer who is bound by the agreement. It must also be 
reminded that towards employers who are not members of a signatory organisation, collective 
agreements which have not been declared generally binding have a supplementary binding force only. 
See section Vl.1.2. supra. 
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"The agreement shall be binding on: 
1. those organisations which concluded it and those employers who are members 
of such organisations which have concluded the agreement, as from the date of 
its coming into force 190; 
2. those organisations and employers subsequently acceding to the agreement, 
and those employers' members of such organisations, as from the date of their 
accession; 
3. employers who become affiliated to an organisation bound by the agreement, as 
from the date of their affiliation; 
4. all the workers in the service of an employer bound by the agreement." 
IX. 1.2 Employers not represented in the joint body 
The employers who must be considered as third parties to a collective agreement, 
either because they are not affiliated to an employers' organisation which is a party 
to the agreement, or because they have not acceded to the agreement, are bound 
as from the fifteenth day following its publication in the Moniteur Beige, unless the 
contract of employment contains a written clause to the contrary191 . 
IX.2 The collective agreement is extended to non-parties 
Where collective agreements have been extended to non-parties, employers and 
employees are bound from either the date chosen by the parties to the agreement, 
or from the date of its conclusion, irrespective of the date on which the Royal Decree 
has been adopted 192• 
IX.3 Retrospectivity of collective agreements 
Only collective agreements which have been declared generally binding may be 
retrospective to a limited extent. 
Article 32 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"The Royal Decree declaring an agreement to be generally binding shall come into 
force as of the date of coming into force of the agreement itself: provided that it may 
not have retrospective effect for more than one year preceding the date of its 
190 The date of coming into force is the one that the parties determine; otherwise, it is the date of 
conclusion of the collective agreement. 
191 Article 26 of the 1968 Act. 
192 Article 32 provides amongst others that "the Royal Decree extending the binding force of a 
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publication." 
The legislator has thus allowed collective agreements to have retrospective effect to 
a certain extent. First of all, a collective agreement may be retrospective only if the 
parties to the agreement request this193• Secondly, when the collective agreement is 
declared generally binding, the Royal Decree may not have retrospective effect for 
more than one year preceding the date of its publication. It seems that this possibility 
offered to parties to request the Crown to give retrospective binding force results 
from the possibility that a certain amount of time might elapse between the moment 
the parties request the extension of the agreement and the date the Crown grants 
the extension. Since the principles of civil law provide that agreements are only 
prospectively binding, it was necessary that a provision allowing for retrospectivity be 
adopted194 . 
It should be noted that when a collective agreement has been extended by Royal 
Decree, the infringement of its normative provisions constitute a criminal offence. 
However, when a collective agreement is retrospective, only infringements 
committed after the date of the extension of the collective agreement by Royal 
Decree may be subject to penal sanctions195 . 
X PARTICULAR SITUATIONS 
The 1968 Act regulates certain particular situations which can affect collective 
agreements, namely: the transfer of an undertaking, the disaffiliation of the employer 
from the signatory employers' organisation, the dissolution of an organisation and 
the modification of the scope of jurisdiction of a joint committee. 
X.1 Transfer of an undertaking 
Article 20 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"In the case of a total or partial transfer of an undertaking, the new employer shall be 
bound to observe the terms of the agreement which bound the former employer, until 
collective agreement takes effect from the date of coming into force of the agreement." 
193 See Expose des motifs, Doc. Parl., Sen., 39; Hayoit de Termicourt, conclusions preceding Cass. 24 
February 1968, Pas., 1968, I, 819; Cass. 19 November 1973, Pas., 1974, I, 340; Cass. 25 June 1980, 
Pas., 1980, I, 1324. 
194 C.E., 10 January 1964, R.JD.A., 1964, 30; Doc. Parl., Sen., 30. 
195 Cass. 1January1993, J.T.T., 1993, 225; see also Cass. 25 June 1980, Pas., 1980, I, 1324; J. Piron 
and P. Denis, op cit., 91; V. Vannes, op.cit., 62; P. Van der Vorst, op cit., 203. 
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the agreement is no longer in force." 
This provision guarantees the upholding of terms and conditions of employment 
contained in collective agreements which bound the former employer to employees 
affected by a transfer of an undertaking, irrespective of whether these collective 
agreements were concluded at a sectoral or enterprise level. 
It must be emphasised that, although the new employer is bound by the individual 
and collective normative provisions of the collective agreement, it is not obliged to 
comply with the obligatory provisions which bind only the signatory parties to the 
agreement196. 
However, the new employer is not bound by collective agreements which bound the 
previous employer when he undertakes another activity. In this case, the transferred 
undertaking no longer falls within the scope of the previous collective agreement 197. 
X.2 Disaffiliation of the employer 
An employer cannot avoid the application of normative provisions by disaffiliating 
from the signatory employers' organisation. 
According Article 21 of the 1968 Act: 
"An employer whose affiliation to an organisation bound by the agreement comes to 
an end shall remain bound by the said agreement unless and until the terms of the 
said agreement are so amended as to bring about a considerable modification of 
the obligation arising out of the agreement." 
This provision guarantees some stability in labour relations and avoids the situation 
where an employer who is dissatisfied with a collective agreement negotiated in a 
joint body attempts to avoid its application by disaffiliating from the signatory 
organisation 198. 
The collective agreement therefore remains applicable until the agreement itself 
comes to an end, or until its terms are so amended as to bring about a considerable 
196 Cass. 30 November 1989, J.T.T., 1990, 37. 
197 Doc. Parl., Sen., session 1967-1968, 29; W. Rauws, op cit., 54. 
198 W. Rauws, op cit., 44. 
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modification of the obligation arising out of the agreement199. 
X.3 Modification of the scope of a joint committee 
Article 27 of the 1968 Act establishes an interim system for the application of 
collective agreements where the amendment of the scope of jurisdiction of a joint 
committee results in an employer no longer falling within the jurisdiction. 
According to this Article: 
"In the case of modification of the scope of a joint committee or joint subcommittee, 
agreements concluded within the latter shall continue to be binding on employers 
and workers to which they applied before such modification, until such time as the 
committee within whose jurisdiction they fall after such modification has arranged for 
the application to the said employers and workers of agreements concluded in such 
committee. 11 
Consequently, employers and workers will remain bound by the collective 
agreement until the new joint body has solved the problem of the application of 
these agreements, either by replacing them by another agreement, or by repealing 
their content200. 
X.4 Dissolution of a representative organisation 
Article 22 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
"In the case of dissolution of an organisation bound by an agreement, the rules 
governing individual relations between employers and workers, drawn up by virtue 
of the agreement shall continue to apply to the members of the organisation until the 
agreement itself is so amended as to bring about a considerable modification of the 
said relations. 11 
Contrary to the situation where the scope of a joint committee is amended, only 
individual normative provisions remain in force. This can be explained by the fact 
that, as the representative organisation no longer exists, collective normative 
199 On the meaning of"considerable modification", see J. Piron and P. Denis, op cit., 81. 
200 See 0. De Leye, "Zin en toepassing van artikel 27 van die C.AO.-wet van 5 December 1968", 
J.T.T., 1989, 449; W. Rauws, op cit., 49. 
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provisions are no longer supported201 . 
XI ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS 
Xl.1 Enforcement 
The surveillance of collective agreements differs according to whether the collective 
agreement has been declared generally binding by Royal Decree or not. 
When a collective agreement is not declared generally binding by Royal Decree, the 
signatory parties must themselves ensure its correct implementation, inter a/ia by 
suing in court for the enforcement of the agreement. It can be said, however, that 
the observance of the collective agreement is secured in the first place by the union 
delegation, whose functions are, amongst others, to ensure that the employer 
complies with social legislation202 . 
Where a collective agreement is declared generally binding, public servants of the 
Ministry of Labour are responsible for the enforcement of the Act, and therefore 
collective agreements which have been extended203 . They have extensive powers at 
their disposal: the right to enter freely into any workplace, to conduct to any 
examination, to control and audit, to receive any documents, etc.204 
Xl.2 Sanctions 
The sanctions in the case of violation of a collective agreement differ depending on 
whether the person committing the violation is the employer, the employees or a 
signatory party, and further on whether the collective agreement has been declared 
generally binding or not. 
Xl.2. 1 Civil sanctions 
Individual normative provisions of a collective agreement are incorporated in a 
contract of employment. Therefore, when the collective agreement is not generally 
binding, the employees, the employer and the signatory parties may institute legal 
proceedings to enforce compliance with normative provisions, to recover 
damages205 and even to cancel the agreement. The sanction is of a civil nature. 
201 P. Van der Vorst, op cit., 195. 
202 See supra, Chapter III, Section 111.3.2. 
203 Article 52 of the 1968 Act. 
204 See Articles 4 and 5 of the Act of 16 November 1972 re the Social Inspection. 
205 See C.T. Mons, 4 May 1987, C.D.S., 1988, 42. 
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In terms of Article 4 of the 1968 Act: 
"The organisations shall have the capacity to sue and to be sued in all litigation 
arising out of the application of this Act, and to defend their members' rights arising 
out of the agreement concluded by them. This representation by the organisations 
shall not affect the right of the members to bring an action individually on their own 
behalf, to join in the action, or to intervene therein at any stage." 
In principle, the action arising out of the execution of individual normative provisions 
is exercised by the employee as it implies new rights for him. 
Regarding the action arising out the execution of collective normative provisions, 
even if these provisions are not incorporated in the individual employment contract, 
they constitute the rules of the profession. Therefore, both the representative 
organisations and their members individually, would have an interest to sue in order 
to enforce compliance with the collective normative provisions, for example the 
peace obligation. 
When the object of the action is to recover damages, or to obtain cancellation of the 
agreement, it must be noted that: 
• damages for non-performance of the obligations arising out of an agreement may 
be claimed from the organisation, only insofar as the agreement expressly 
provides therefor; 
• when the object of the action is to obtain cancellation of the collective agreement, 
the cancellation may not have any retrospective effect, and has prospective 
effect only. 
Xl.2.2 Criminal sanctions 
Article 56 of the 1968 Act provides that: 
'Without prejudice to the provisions of section 269, to 27 4 of the Penal Code, the 
following persons shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of eight days to one 
month or a fine of 26 to 500 francs, or both: 
1. an employer or his representative or agent found guilty of violating an 
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agreement declared to be generally binding; 
2. any person obstructing inspections under this Act." 
It should be noted that only collective agreements extended to non-parties are 
subject to criminal sanctions206. 
206 See Section VII.I supra; Toumai, 10 January 1989, J.T.T., 1989, 134; Cass. 29 October 1990; 
J.T.T., 1991, 195; Cass. 18 April 1983, J.T.T., 1984, 165. 
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PARTB 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
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CHAPTER I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The history and development of South African collective bargaining is linked not 
only to the process of industrialisation which characterised the twentieth century but 
also to the political context of apartheid which marked this century. These two 
factors created a "dualistic system of labour relations"207. 
The history of the period from 1652, when Jan Van Riebeck landed at the Cape, 
until the discovery of diamonds circa 1870 shows, that South Africa's economy was 
based mainly on agriculture. There was not much, if anything, that might be 
described as industrial relations. 208 
The discovery of diamonds and gold attracted more than 600 000 immigrants, 
mainly skilled white workers, to South Africa between 1875 and 1900. The majority 
of these immigrants came from Britain, and with them came the British trade union 
system. This marked the beginning of South Africa's industrial revolution.209 
The first Act regulating collective relations resulted from industrial unrest in the 
mining industry at the beginning of the century. The importation of Chinese labour in 
1904 and widespread unemployment among the whites afforded employers in the 
mining industry an opportunity to attempt to break the white trade unions' monopoly 
of skilled work , by engaging black workers at lower wages to take the whites' place. 
This led to the 1907 strike, which resulted in the promulgation of an Act aiming at 
preventing industrial disputes. 210 The Transvaal Industrial Disputes Act of 1909 had 
as its purpose to combat strikes in the industry, and introduced procedural bars to 
unilateral action. This Act is considered as being an "important first step down the 
road to industrial self-regulation"211 . 
From 1920 onwards, the government had a clear concern to provide preferential 
employment opportunities to white workers as opposed to blacks, and to prevent 
207 J. Piron, Recognising trade unions, Southern Book Publishers, 1990, 16. 
208 The Complete Wiehahn Report - Part 1 to 6, xvii. 
209 R. Jones & H. Griffiths, Labour legislation in South Africa, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Johannesburg, 1980, 1. 
210 The Complete Wiehahn Report - Part 1 to 6, xix. 
211 C. Thompson & P. Benjamin, South African Labour Law, Juta 1965, 3rd ed, Al-22. 
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"white wages from falling to 'uncivilised' levels in the face of black competition"212 • 
The 1920's were marked by the violent revolts and protest actions of white 
mineworkers due to various attempts by employers to open the door to non-whites in 
certain categories of skilled work monopolised by white trade unions. This led to a 
fundamental legislative re-think and the enactment of the first statute to be fashioned 
around the concept of collective bargaining: the Industrial Conciliation Act No 11 of 
1924213 • This Act created a statutory industrial council system, as well as a system 
for the registration of trade unions, employers' organisations, and industrial councils. 
Black employers were not excluded from the system, but black employees were 
excluded through the definition of "employee" in the Act, which was so formulated as 
to exclude blacks from participation in the statutory systems. 
The industrial council was a voluntary body which could be formed and used by 
employers and employees as a vehicle for the negotiation of all matters of mutual 
interest to them, such as wage levels, working conditions, hours of work, annual 
leave and so on. All industrial councils so established had to be formally registered, 
one of the conditions being that it had to be sufficiently representative within any 
area of the particular undertaking, industry, trade or occupation214 • The agreements 
concluded by such councils could be published by the Minister of Labour in the 
Government Gazette, the terms of which were then binding upon all the parties 
concerned for the period of the agreement. Penalties were stipulated for a breach of 
any of the terms of the agreement. Should any dispute arise between the parties 
concerned in connection with matters of mutual interest, the industrial council could 
be used as the forum for its negotiation and settlement. No strike or lock-out could 
212 See R. Jones and H. Griffiths, op cit., 19 and 26. The government was of the view that "because of 
the differences in the standards of living of the different races, the Commission is unable to 
recommend the adoption of the proposal that there should be no racial discrimination in industrial 
legislation ... However notwithstanding unsatisfactory features characterising the Native trade union 
movement, the Commission is satisfied that there are a number of unions which are well organised and 
run on correct lines. The leaders of some of these unions have in the past rendered considerable 
assistance by advising against, and restraining their members from taking drastic action ( ... ) The 
Commission therefore recommends recognition in separate legislation which will bring them into 
official cognisance ( ... ) rather than leave them to adopt dangerous advice of some unbalanced semi-
educated Native or the prompting of disreputable Europeans who batten on Native ignorance and 
cupidity ... However the Commission recommends strongly against any course which would enable 
Native workers to hold the balance of power in or dominate the process of collective bargaining.", 
Report of the Industrial Relations Legislation Commission of Enquiry, quoted from Essays in Southern 
Africa Labour History, Ravan Labour Studies, 1978, 80. 
213 See Essays in southern Africa Labour History, Ravan Labour Studies, 1978, 69. 
214 See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union of SA v National Industrial Council of the 
Leather Industry of SA, (1989) 10 IL! 894 (IC). 
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be called in respect of any dispute until the matter forming the subject of the dispute 
had been submitted to, considered by, and reported on, by the relevant industrial 
council. 
If no industrial council existed in any area, then any number of employees or 
employers considered by the Minister to be sufficiently representative of the 
industry, undertaking, trade or occupation in that area could apply to the Minister for 
the appointment of a conciliation board in order to consider and determine any 
dispute215 in that area between any employer and any of his employees in that 
particular industry, trade, or occupation. The board would then be appointed by the 
Minister, and consisted of one half employers' representatives, and one half 
employees' representatives. An agreement reached at a conciliation board could be 
published by the Minister in the Government Gazette, and the terms thereof would 
then be binding on all parties for the period of the agreement. 
R. Jones and H. Griffiths, commenting on this Act, stated that: 
"there can be little doubt, in retrospect, that this Act has been successful in creating 
viable machinery for industrial negotiation and the settlement of disputes. However, 
by excluding the majority of male black workers from membership of registered trade 
unions, it effectively eliminated their representation on industrial councils and denied 
them a say in the collective bargaining process. Jn subsequent years, white workers 
were able, therefore, to enhance their position through the mechanism of free 
bargaining and trade union membership."216 
In the thirties, due to severe droughts and economic recession, close to 300 000 
white farmers left the rural areas for the cities in search of job opportunities. This 
migration gave rise to the appointment of the Van Reenen Commission in 1934, 
whose task was to revise the Industrial Conciliation Act, No 11 of 1924. This 
Commission's recommendations led to the promulgation of the second Industrial 
Conciliation Act, No 36 of 1937. The industrial council system with its components of 
employers' organisations and trade unions was retained; black employers could 
register, but black employees were still essentially largely excluded. 
215 Certain types of dispute, such as disputes in regard to engagement, promotion, transfer etc. could 
however not be considered by a conciliation board. 
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After the Second World War, black workers started to move to the cities, this 
movement being accelerated by the white manpower shortage caused by the 
whites' participation in the war. 
In 1948, the National Party came to power. This resulted in the institutionalisation of 
the principle of segregation between blacks and whites in all spheres. 
In the same year the government appointed the Botha Commission to revise four 
Acts, among others the Industrial Conciliation Act, No 36 of 1937. The 
Commission's Report led to the passing of the Black Labour (Settlements of 
Disputes) Act, No 48 of 1953 and the third Industrial Conciliation Act, No 28 of 1956. 
The Black Labour (Settlements of Disputes) Act, No 48 of 1953 aimed to create 
differentiated machinery for industrial negotiation and the settlement of disputes 
amongst black workers. As black workers were prevented from using the collective 
bargaining institutions set up by the Industrial Conciliation Act, it provided for the 
establishment of four different types of committee at plant level, having as their 
function the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in relation to wages or other 
conditions of employment. The agreements concluded were binding on the 
employer and the black workers concemed217 . These committees were the liaison 
committee, the co-ordinating liaison committee, the works committee and the co-
ordinating works committee. By means of this committee system, black workers 
were enabled to participate in plant-level negotiations only with their employer218. 
The system created by this Act never attained any credibility, primarily because the 
committees were initiated and controlled by management219. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act No 28 of 1956 retained the industrial council system, 
with its employers' organisations and trade unions. Black unions were, however, 
totally excluded from the statutory trade union system. 
"In other words the politics of separation that existed in other spheres of society 
216 R. Jones & H. Griffiths, op cit., 26. 
217 R. Jones & H. Griffiths, op cit., 90 to 98. 
218 The concept of industrial black trade unions had always been regarded with suspicion and distrust 
on the grounds that they would be "slumbering giants" and could be used as a vehicle for infiltration, 
and used as a weapon aimed at securing political and social change. See R. Jones and H. Griffiths, op 
cit., 98. 
219 See A Rycroft andB. Jordaan,A guide to South African labour law, Juta, 1990, 117. 
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were extended to an economy which in reality, however, was increasingly showing 
signs of integration."220• 
It should be noted that the exclusion of black workers from the definition of 
"employee" only excluded them from forming or becoming members of registered 
trade unions which would utilise the collective bargaining mechanisms of the Act. It 
did not, however, prevent them from forming or joining a trade union of their own221 
and to approach an employer to negotiate outside statutory structures. 
A combination of various factors such as a decline in the white birth rate, a 
phenomenal development in the economy multiplying the demand for skilled labour, 
the international community threatening economic sanctions unless the country's 
internal policies were reformed and the increasing organisation and assertiveness of 
black labour, forced the government to re-think its legislative system. In 1977, the 
Wiehahn Commission was appointed to report and make recommendations in 
connection with existing labour legislation. The Wiehahn Commission issued a 
number of reports from 1979 onwards, resulting in a series of legislative reforms 
during the period 1979-1983. With regard to collective bargaining, the Wiehahn 
Report suggested that: 
"the industrial council system must be preserved as the most important mechanism 
for negotiation and bargaining between employers and trade unions, i.e. in the 
organised sector. But this does not mean to say that industrial relations at enterprise 
level should be neglected. On the contrary, such a system can be developed as an 
essential means of complementing the industrial council system. In the unorganised 
sector it has an even more important role to play."222 
The main changes resulting from the Wiehahn Commission's Report were the 
following: 
• The Labour Relations Act, as the Industrial Conciliation Act was known after the 
passing of Act No 57 of 1981, was deracialised, and the Black Labour Relations 
220 The Complete Wiehahn Report - Part l to 6, xxiv. 
221 In fact, black trade unions were created as early as 1917 and were established on a fairly large 
scale, but were concentrated in specific areas or in single factories of large employers. See P.A.K. Le 
Roux and AC. Basson, Labour law- Workbook 3, UNISA, 1996, 14 and The Complete Wiehahn 
Report - Part 1 to 6, xxi and xxiv. 
222 The Complete Wiehahn Report - Part 1 to 6, xxvi. 
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Regulation Act was repealed; 
• The creation of the Industrial Court, with an extensive unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction. An unfair labour practice was originally defined as "any labour 
practice which in the opinion of the Industrial Court is an unfair labour practice." 
The Labour Relations Act was then amended on various occasions, most 
importantly in 1988, by the introduction of a broad definition of specified unfair 
labour practices, and in 1991, by the reintroduction of an earlier unfair labour 
practice definition223. 
Until 11 November 1996, the date of coming into force of the new Labour Relations 
Act, No 66 of 1995, the main problem regarding collective agreements was that their 
binding nature was only partially regulated224. Collective agreements concluded in 
industrial councils were binding and enforceable on the parties and their members, 
and could be extended to non-parties, provided that they had been promulgated by 
the Minister of Labour in the Government Gazette. These agreements were even 
regarded as a type of subordinate legislation225. 
In SA Association of Municipal Employees v Pretoria City Councif26 , it was held that: 
"the so-called industrial agreement is not really an agreement or contract, but a 
form of permitted domestic legislation by which the will of a statutory body is by a 
majority vote imposed on all the members of a designated group of employers and 
employees, irrespective of any concurrence by the individual affected, and 
notwithstanding any positive disapproval by any such individual." 
However, collective agreements concluded in industrial councils, but which were not 
promulgated227, and agreements concluded outside the institutions created by the 
223 C. Thompson, "A bargaining Hydra emerges from the unfair labour practice swamp", (1989) 10 
JLJ808. 
224 J. Wilson & G. Giles, "Collective agreements: some present and future implications", Labour Law 
News and Court Reports, vol.5, No 3, Oct. 1995, 3; R.G. Beaton, "The enforceability oflabour 
agreements", (1989) 10JLJ388. 
225 S v Prefabricated Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd, 1974 (1) SA 535 (A); SMME v Pretoria City 
Council, 1948 (1) SA 11 (T); Nouwens Carpets (Pty) Ltdv National Union ofTextile Workers, (1989) 
10 JLJ 44 (N); Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation v Minister of manpower & others, (1984) 5 
ILJ309 (D). 
226 1948 (1) SA 11 (T). 
227 Nouwens Carpets (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Textile Workers (1989) 10 JLJ 44 (N). 
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Labour Relations Act of 1956, were not regulated and were not legally binding228 • 
In Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation v Minister of Manpower & others229 , it was 
held that: 
"agreements concluded at industrial council level do not constitute contractually 
binding agreements but take the form of gentlemen's agreements until promulgation, 
whereupon they acquire the force of subordinate legislation." 
Agreements concluded outside the statutory bodies were known as "non-statutory 
agreements". The rationale behind these agreements is closely linked to the 
development of trade unions catering for black workers. 
Because these trade unions could not be registered in terms of the Labour Relations 
Act, they could not take part in collective bargaining within the statutory bodies. The 
practice therefore developed that once they had recruited sufficient members in a 
specific company, they would approach its management and ask for recognition. If 
management agreed to grant recognition, it was often formalised in a "recognition 
agreement". This negotiated agreement would then regulate the relationship 
between the employer and the union concerned, and create collective bargaining 
institutions and procedures to be utilised by the parties. It would also include the 
parties' undertaking to negotiate at regular intervals over amendments to existing 
conditions of employment. These negotiations would then result in the conclusion of 
a "substantive agreement" regulating terms and conditions of employment230 • 
The system of non-statutory agreements carried on even after black trade unions 
became entitled to registration in terms of the Act, for various reasons231 • Alec Erwin 
of the Federation of South African Trade Unions indicated that the reasons for 
rejecting participation in industrial councils was that they had provided a shelter for 
some industrial unions that had represented racial minorities232• 
228 AA Landman, "Collective agreements - Which judicial pigeon hole for new bargaining 
agreements?", CLL 1996, 71. See also R.G. Beaton, "The enforceability oflabour agreements'', (1989) 
10 IL/ 388. 
229 Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation v Minister of manpower & others, (1984) 5 IL/ 309 (D). 
230 J. Piron, Recognising trade unions, Southern Book Publishers, 3rd edition, 1990, 46; J. Grogan, 
Collective Labour Law, Juta, 1993, 52. 
231 A.A. Landman, "The registration of trade unions -The divide narrows'', (1997) 18 JLG 1183. 
232 A. Erwin, "Adequate Collective Bargaining structures", (1981) Industrial Relations Journal of 
83 
The Labour Relations Act contained no provision regarding the status or 
enforcement of non-statutory collective agreements, and their legal status and 
binding force had to be analysed in the light of the common law. Although they were 
binding on the parties on the basis that a collective agreement is nothing more than 
an ordinary contract233, various legal techniques had to be employed to enforce 
these agreements on the union's members. Because they are not parties to 
collective agreements, they would not directly acquire contractual rights or 
obligations in terms of these agreements. 
Among the theories utilised to confer binding force on these agreements, one can 
identify the theory of agency and the automatic incorporation of the content of 
collective agreements into individual employment contracts, the theory of stipu/atio 
alteri, the unfair labour practice theory, and the fact that equity demands that 
collective agreements should be binding234 • Each of these theories were, however, to 
some extent unsatisfactory. 
• Agency 
In terms of this theory, the binding effect of collective agreements resulted from a 
mandate given by the union members to their representatives to negotiate 
working conditions on their behalf 235• 
This theory could however only partially explain the binding effect of collective 
agreements. Furthermore, it could not prohibit the employer from bypassing the 
union by negotiating directly with its employees236• In Food and Allied Workers 
Union v Ko-operatief Wijnbouwers Vereniging van ZA, it was held that: 
South Africa, 1 (3)71-73. 
233 J. Grogan, op cit., 53. 
234 S. Christie, "Majoritarianism, Collective Bargaining and Discrimination", (1994) 15 IL.J708; J. 
Wilson & G. Giles, "Collective agreements: some present and future implications", Labour Law News 
and Court Reports, Vol 5, No 3, Oct 1995, 3; For a case where all those mechanisms were invoked 
together to justify the binding force, see Chemical Industrial Union & others v Indian Ocean Fertilizer 
(1991) 12 IL.J822 (IC). 
235 See Ntsangani and others v Golden Lay Farms Ltd (1992) 13IL!1199 (IC); Ramolesane and 
another v Andrew Mentis and another (1991) 12 IL.f 329 (LAC); Don Products (Pty) Ltd v Manage 
and others (1992) 13 ILJ900 (LAC); Mngomezulu v Khutala Mining Services (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 
374 (IC); SA Society of Bank Officials v Standard Bank of SA Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 332 (IC); Collins v 
Volkskas Bank (1994) 15 ILJ 1398 (IC); Broodryk and others v SA Airways (1996) 17 ILJ 278 (IC); 
Mazibuko and others v Hotels, Inns and Resorts (SA) (Pty) Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 263 (IC). 
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"in strict contract, to agree to recognise a representative agent does not mean 
that negotiation with the principal in his personal capacity is thereby excluded. 
The contention that the union is not only a conventional common-law agent of its 
members, but in fact is also principal in its own right, with separate entitlements 
under the recognition agreement, consequently has in this regard to be treated at 
the very least, with some circumspection. The fact that the union is 
acknowledged, in fact and in deed, to be the representative agent of its members 
could in strict contract not prohibit the employer from negotiating directly with an 
employee member in his personal capacity. An agent, even sole agent, cannot 
claim the right to representation which excluded his principal from acting in his 
personal capacity if he so desires unless this is expressly so stipulated. '12.37 
Another difficulty arose from the fact that an employee could not withdraw his 
union's mandate to negotiate on his behalf on a particular issue because such 
negotiations do not happen to be going his way. It was held that: 
"if employees were allowed to withdraw their union's mandate at will because 
they did not like the way certain negotiations seem to be going for them, both the 
employer's and the union's position in the collective bargaining process would 
become untenable"238 • 
• Stipulatio alteri 
In terms of this theory239 , the union acts as a stipulans whilst concluding a 
collective agreement. The benefits conferred in the collective agreement are 
regarded as a form of stipulatio alteri, the third parties in whose favour the 
benefits are conferred being the union members and other employees. In 
Mngomezulu v Khutula Mining Services (pty) Ltd, Marcus held that : 
"I am prepared to accept that the employees must be deemed to have authorised 
the trade union to negotiate and conclude with the employer both the recognition 
agreement and the wage agreement. In the absence of sufficient evidence of the 
236 S. Christie, "Majoritarianism, Collective Bargaining and Discrimination", (1994) 15 IL.!708. 
237 Food and Allied Workers Union v Ko-operatiefWijnbouwers Vereniging van ZA Beperkt, Worcester 
(1994) 15IL!1065. 
238 Mazibuko and others v Hotels, Inns and Resorts (SA) (Pty) Ltd, (1996) 17 IL! 263 (IC). 
239 On the general principles of stipulation alteri, see RH Christie, The Law of Contract in South Africa, 
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requisite authority being present, one could, alternatively, view the collective 
agreement in question as being in nature of contracts for the benefit of a third 
party (the employee in casu, i.e. stipulatores alteri), whereby the trade union 
concluded agreements with the employer for the employee's benefit which were 
tacitly accepted by the employee"240• 
This theory was referred to in various court cases, but just as the theory of 
mandate, it could not satisfactorily explain the binding effect of collective 
agreements, especially when employees reject an agreement concluded by their 
union241 • 
• Unfair labour practice 
Another means to enforce non-statutory collective agreements was by arguing 
that the failure to comply with a provision of a collective agreement constituted an 
unfair labour practice242• Under previous legislation, the industrial court had a 
very broad unfair labour practice jurisdiction, in terms of which any act or 
omission which in an unfair manner infringed or impaired the labour relations 
between an employer and employees constituted an unfair labour practice. 
• Equity 
Some Presiding Officers of the Industrial Courts enforced collective agreements 
3rd ed., Butterworths, Durban, 1996, 289-300. 
240 (1994) 15 IL.!374 (IC); see also Collins v Volkskas Bank, (1994) 15IL!1398 (IC). 
241 Food And General Workers Union & others v Sundays River Citrus Co-operative Co LtdNHE 
11/2/179 (PE) (unreported); Gubb and Inggs Ltd v SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union of South 
Africa, (1991) 12 IL! 415 (Arb); S. Christie, op cit., 710; D. du Toit, "An Ill Contractual Wind 
Blowing Collective Good? Collective Representation in Non-statutory Bargaining and the Limits of 
Union Authority", (1994) 15 IL! 39; J. Grogan, op cit., 53. 
242 Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation v Minister of Manpower, (1984) 5 IL!, 309 (D); MMAWU 
v Transvaal Pressed Nuts, Bolts and Rivets (Pty) Ltd (1986) & IL!, 703 (IC); National Union of 
Mineworkers v Goldfields of SA Ltd & others, (1989) 10 IL! 86 (IC); SACCA WU & others v Checkers 
SA Ltd & another, (1992) 13 IL! 411 (IC); Chemical Workers Industrial Union and others v Electric 
Lamp Manufacturing of SA (Pty) Ltd (1989) 10 IL.f 347 (IC); Transport & General Workers Union & 
others v SA Stevedores, (1994) 15 IL! 358 (IC); R.G. Beaton, "The enforceability oflabour 
agreements", (1989) 10 IL! 390 who stated that "a collective bargaining agreement concluded outside 
an industrial council may or may not be enforceable as a contract, depending on the presence of the 
animus contrahendi of the parties. Even where this factor cannot be inferred the aggrieved party will 
have a remedy in the industrial court since a breach of such an agreement will constitute an unfair 
labour practice." 
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on the basis of equity243• In Mngomezulu v Khuta/a Mining Services (Pty) Ltcf44 , 
it was held that even if there is unsufficient evidence of authority in terms of 
common law requirements of agency, or of the existence of stipulatio a/teri, this 
would not in itself preclude the industrial court from recognising and enforcing 
collective agreements on the equitable ground that it would be contrary to the 
interests of sound labour relations and labour peace, were the court to allow an 
individual employee to appoint a union to negotiate working conditions and 
procedures with management on his behalf, and thereafter permit such 
employee to ignore with impunity the provisions of the ensuing agreement 
reached. In Collins v Volkskas Bank245 , it was held that conditions of 
employment negotiated collectively are binding and enforceable against 
individual union members, whether through the common law principles of 
agency or stipu/atio alteri, or on equitable considerations such as the promotion 
of collective bargaining which is the prime means of resolving labour disputes 
contemplated by the Labour Relations Act. 
A further problem arose when collective agreements concluded outside the 
statutory bodies were extended to non-parties, i.e. to all the employees falling 
within the bargaining unit, whether unionised or not. At common law, a person 
may not contract for another unless that other person has authorised him to do 
so246. It however became a common practice for employers to apply a collective 
243 Mngomezulu v K.hutala Mining Services (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 IL! 374 (IC); See also BCA WU v 
Masterbilt CC (1987) 8 IL! 610 (IC) where the Presiding Officer held that: "I am not particularly 
concerned whether the agreement was or became a contract between the respondent and its employees 
or union members ... it is far more important to see the agreement as the foundation of a relationship 
between the employer, the union and the union members who are employees of the employer. The fact 
of the matter is that within a certain closed community consisting of the employer, the union and the 
employees/union members, the rules made between the employer and organised labour are regarded as 
having binding authority. This authority may be complemented if the recognition agreement 
constitutes a contract at common law. However, a recognition agreement does not require force at 
common law or in statutory law for this court to take cognisance of its rules. This is particularly the 
case where no attempt is being made by either party to enforce the procedural agreement as a legally 
binding contract ... The approach which will be adopted is one which is based on the recognition by 
this court that recognition agreements provide rules which are acknowledged by the parties to a 
particular relationship to be binding upon themselves. These parties legitimately expect that the rules 
will be observed by all the parties concerned. It is of utmost importance for this court to give effect to 
the rules of such procedural agreement because in this way the court will be fostering the concept of 
collective bargaining and the related concept of self-government." 
244 (1994) 15 IL! 314 (IC). 
245 (1994) 15 IL! 1398 (IC). 
246 JC De Wet, "Agency and representation" in Joubert, The Law of South Africa, Vol I, Butterworths, 
Durban, 1993, 97; (1994) 15IL!1398 (IC); J. Grogan, Collective Labour Law, Juta, 1993, 54 who 
held that "no collective agreement can be imposed upon an unwilling employee who is not represented 
in the negotiation preceding it." Radio Television Electronic and Allied Workers Union v Tedelex 
(Pty) Ltd and another (1990) 11IL!1272 (IC). 
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agreement concluded with a majority union throughout the bargaining unit, 
therefore binding non-parties. The Industrial Court failed to provide a clear and 
unambiguous jurisprudence on the issue as to whether or not non-parties to 
collective agreements could be bound on the basis that the agreement was 
concluded by a trade union representing the majority of the employees in a 
bargaining unit247. The theory which was used to grant or deny such extension is 
known as the doctrine of majoritarianism. 
The doctrine of majoritarianism was defined as follows by Copeling AM in Food 
Worke!S Council of SA v Bokomo Mills: 
"In general terms, the doctrine of majoritarianism may be described as that 
doctrine whereby representatives (including a trade union) designated or 
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the 
employees in a particular bargaining unit are deemed to be the representatives 
of all employees in that unit for the purpose of such collective bargaining'248. 
This doctrine has been applied on various occasions by the Industrial Court. 
Whilst the trade union represents the majority of the employees in the 
delineated bargaining unit, all the employees within that bargaining unit will 
generally be bound by such an agreement249• It seemed that the legal rationale 
behind such extension was equity. In Food Worke!S Council of SA v Bokomo 
Mills250 , it was held that: 
"the employee's right to negotiate with his employer, albeit an absolute right, 
must bow to the legitimate and reasonable interest of othe!S where 
considerations of equity objectively judged so dictate." 
The problem resulting from the theory of majoritarianism was that it lacked legal 
247 B. Grant, "In Defence ofMajoritarianism: Part 1 -Majoritarianism and Collective Bargaining", 
(1993) 14 IL! 305. 
248 Food Workers Council of South Africa v Bokomo Mills (1994) 15IL!1371 (IC). 
· 
249 SA Polymer Holdings {Pty) Ltd v Llale & others (1994) 15 IL! 277 (LAC), Luthuli & others v 
Flortime (Pty) Ltd & another (1988) 9 IL! 287 (IC); Ngiba & others v Van Dyck Carpets (Pty) Ltd & 
another (1988) 9 IL! 453 (IC); Mineworkers Union v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1990) 11 
IL! 1070 (IC);Mtuzimele v Cover/and Roof Tiles (1996) 7 BLLR 789 (IC); Ramolesane and Another 
vAndrewMentis, (1991) 12IL/329 (LAC); TAWUvMotoravia (Pty) Ltd, (1996) 9 BLLR 1189 (IC) 
250 (1994) 15 IL! 1371 (IC). 
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support251 . 
The Ministerial Legal Task team appointed by the Cabinet in July 1994 to overhaul 
the laws regulating labour relations described the problems encountered by the 
legal system in the following terms: 
"the fundamental problem with the existing law is the lack of conceptual clarity as to 
the structure and functions of collective bargaining [. . .] the result of (the lack of 
commitment to an orderly system of industry-level bargaining and the separate 
tradition of black workers of bargaining at the level of the workplace) is that there is 
no existing statutory framework which can properly accommodate and facilitate an 
orderly relationship between bargaining at the level of industry and at the level of 
the workplace. '252 
The Labour Relations Act, No 66 of 1995 (hereafter referred to as "the Acf' or "the 
LRA 1995") marked a major change in South Africa's statutory industrial relations 
system. Following the transition to political democracy, the Act encapsulates the 
new government's aims to reconstruct and democratise the economy and society in 
the labour relations arena253 . 
As far as collective agreements are concerned, the LRA 1995 promotes collective 
bargaining at industry level254. It also recognises the validity and binding effect of 
any collective agreements, provided that they are concluded by registered trade 
unions on the one side and one or more employers and or employers' organisations 
on the other side. 
The debate over the legal status of collective agreements concluded outside the 
25iNational Union of Mineworkers v Henry Gould (Pty) Ltd & another (1988) 9IL!1149 (IC); Natal 
Baking & Allied Workers Union v BB Cereals (Pty) Ltd & another (1989) 10 IL! 870 (IC); Radio 
Television Electronic &Allied Workers Union v Tedelex (Pty) Ltd & another (1990) 11IL!1272 
(IC); contra, B. Grant, op cit., 306; Ramolesane & another v Andrew Mentis & another (1991) 12 IL! 
329 (LAC). 
252 Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, Government 
Gazette, 10 February 1995, No 16259, 121. 
253 D. du Toit, D. Woolfrey, J. Murphy, S. Godfrey, D. Bosch and S. Christie, The Labour Relations 
.Act of I995, Butterworths, Dutban, 1996, 3. 
254 See though the brief to the Ministerial Legal Task team to prepare a negotiating document in draft 
Bill form which would "promote and facilitate collective bargaining in the workplace and at industry 
level", Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, Government 
Gazette, 10 February 1995, No 16259, 111, and the long title to the LRA 1995 which gives equal 
weight to plant level and sectoral bargaining. 
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statutory institutions has ended with the LRA 1995. They are expressly made 
binding for their duration on each party and its members, and, in certain 
circumstances, on employees who are not members of the union-party. Collective 
agreements, moreover, vary any individual contracts of employment insofar as they 
subsume their terms255. 
255 X, "Collective bargaining'', Employment law, September 1995, vol 12, No 1, 2; J. Grogan, 
Workplace law, Juta, 1997, 215. 
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CHAPTER II PARTIES TO COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
The right to bargain and conclude collective agreements within the meaning of the 
LRA 1995 belongs exclusively to registered trade unions, employers and registered 
employers' organisations. 
The LRA 1995 is characterised by the absence of a statutory duty to bargain. The 
legislator has opted for a model which allows the social partners through the 
exercise of power, to determine their own arrangements. The power play is given 
statutory impetus by the provisions on organisational rights and the protected right to 
strike256 . 
Strictly speaking, the requirement to be a registered organisation is the only 
condition laid down in the Act. However, the exercise of power play by the social 
partners often results in the fact that only trade unions and employers' organisations 
enjoying a certain level of representivity will conclude collective agreements. 
REGISTRATION OF TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' ORGANISATION 
According to section 95 of the LRA 1995: 
"Registration shall be granted by the Registrar of Labour Relations appointed by the 
Minister of Labour, to any trade unions or employers' organisations that: 
• have adopted a name which does not resemble so closely the name of another 
trade union or employers' organisation that it could mislead or cause confusion; 
• have adopted a constitution that meets the requirements of subsections (5) and 
(6)257; 
256 Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, Government 
Gazette, 10 February 1995, No 16259, 121; See also SANSEA v NUSOG, (1997) 4 BLLR 486 where 
Commissioner Christie held that "collective bargaining is based on the socio-economic power of the 
parties who participate in it." 
257 Subsections (5) and (6) of section 95 of the LRA 1995 provide that the constitution of any trade 
union or employees' organisation that intends to register must in particular, contain no provision that 
unfairly discriminates against any person on the ground of race or gender. C. Thompson and Benjamin 
described the constitutional requirements as "not onerous and aiming simply at promoting good 
organisational governance", South African Labour Law, Juta, 2nd, 1965, as amended by service 34 of 
1996, AAl-4. 
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• have an address in the Republic of South Africa;(. . .)" 
Furthermore, trade unions seeking registration must be independent from any 
control or influence from any employer or employers' organisation, through financial 
assistance or by any other means. 
The Registrar has no discretionary power to grant or reject registration when the 
requirements are met258. 
According to Landman: 
" ... registration has been deliberately made a mere formality. Recognition is 
encouraged because it permits the state and employers to know with whom they are 
dealing, to have access to the constitution of the trade union as a public document, 
to contribute towards the maintenance of the principles of democracy in the union, 
to secure protection for union members, also as regards the financial circumstances 
of the union and to enable society to measure the progress and development of 
trade unions. '259 
Even though registration of trade unions is a mere formality, the LRA 1995 
encourages such registration by conferring exclusive advantages to registered trade 
unions. For instance, only registered trade unions are eligible for membership of a 
bargaining council, may qualify for the exercise of organisational rights, or may 
enter into collective agreements within the meaning of the LRA 1995. Any collective 
agreement entered into by an unregistered trade union cannot be enforced under 
the LRA 1995. Such an agreement would have to be enforced in the civil courts as if 
it was a common-law contract260. 
258 Under the previous legislation, the registrar had wide discretionary powers to register an 
organisation and no trade union could be registered where an existing union was considered to be 
representative. 
259 A.A Landman, "The registration of trade unions -The divide narrows'', (1997) 18IL!1190; see 
also the Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, 
Government Gazette, 10 February 1995, No 16259, 146. 
260 A.A Landman, "The registration of trade unions - The divide narrows", ( 1997) 18 IL! 1191; 
FA WU v Simba (Pty) Ltd (1997) 4 BLLR 408 (LC) at 409; A Rycroft & B. Jordaan, A guide to South 
African Labour Law, 2ed (1992) 49. 
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II REPRESENTATIVE ORGANISATION 
11.1 At sectoral level 
II. 1. 1 Bargaining council 
Although the only objective criterion laid down in the LRA 1995 to register a 
bargaining council261 as far as the status of the parties is concerned, is that the 
parties to a bargaining council must be registered organisations, their level of 
representivity can be a decisive factor. 
Section 29(11 )(b)(iv) of the LRA of 1995 provides that prior to registering a 
bargaining council in respect of a sector and area, the registrar must determine that 
the parties to the bargaining council are sufficiently representative within the sector 
and area. The Act, however, does not give any clear indication with regard to the 
concept of "sufficiently representative". Section 49 of the LRA 1995 provides that: 
"When considering the representativeness of the parties to a council, or parties 
seeking registration of a council, the registrar, having regard to the nature of the 
sector and the situation of the area in respect of which registration is sought, may 
regard the parties to a council as representative in respect of the whole area, even if 
a trade union or employers' organisation that is a party to the council has no 
members in part of that area." 
Du Toit suggests that when the registrar has to determine the representivity of 
employers' organisations for the purpose of section 29 (11 ), he should have regard 
to both the number of employer members of an employers' organisation as a 
proportion of the total number of employers in a sector and area, as well as the total 
number of employees employed by those employers as a proportion of the total 
number of employees in the sector262• 
11.1.2 Statutory council 
Since statutory councils are established263 at the request of one party only, i.e. at the 
request of a trade union or an employers' organisation, the parties to collective 
261 The establishment of bargaining councils is regulated by section 27 of the LRA of 1995 and is 
reviewed in more detail in Chapter III infra. 
262 D. du Toit et al, op cit., 142. 
263 The establishment of statutory councils is dealt with in detail infra, in Chapter III. 
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bargaining at this level might be somewhat unusual. 
An applicant for the establishment of a statutory council must be a registered, 
representative trade union or registered, representative employers' organisation. 
The concepts of "representative trade union" and "representative employers' 
organisation" are defined in section 39 {1) of the LRA 1995 as: 
"a registered trade union, or two or more registered trade unions acting jointly, 
whose members constitute at least 30 per cent of the employees in a sector and 
area; and 
a registered employers' organisation, or two or more registered employers' 
organisation acting jointly, whose members employ at least 30 per cent of the 
employees in a sector and area." 
Because a statutory council may be established at the request of one party, with no 
need for co-operation between employers and unions, the law provides a strict 
threshold of representivity to be complied with by the applicant as a requirement for 
its establishment. Taking into account the primary object of the Act, the diversity of 
registered trade unions and registered employers' organisations in the sector and 
area and the principle of proportional representation, the Minister might however, 
decide that other registered trade unions or registered employers' organisations in 
the sector and area should be admitted, regardless of their threshold of 
representivity264. 
It should be noted that once the applicant to a statutory council meets the statutory 
representivity requirements, the other party does not have to meet any particular 
requirements, except that of being a registered organisation. 
Normally, the other party will be one or more registered trade unions or one or more 
registered employers' organisation active in the sector and area. 
Sections 41 {6) and {7) of the LRA 1995 provide specifically for the situation where 
there is no "counterpart" registered organisation. In such cases, the Minister must 
264 Section 41 (3) of the LRA 1995. 
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consult the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and thereafter 
appoint suitable persons as representatives and alternates. Technically, it is 
therefore possible that a statutory council will be composed of a registered 
representative organisation on one side, and individuals on the other side. 
At the time of editing this dissertation, the writer is, however, unaware of the 
establishment of any statutory council. 
11.2 At plant or enterprise level 
The level of representivity of a trade union wishing to bargain at plant or enterprise 
level will depend on the willingness of the employer to enter into an agreement. 
An important feature of the LRA 1995 is the absence of a legally enforceable duty to 
bargain. Collective bargaining has been left to power play between the parties, with 
the result that it is up to each employer to determine the criteria under which it will 
be prepared to enter into collective bargaining with a registered trade union, taking 
into account the possibility that the union may take recourse to strike action to 
obtain recognition. 
In order to encourage collective bargaining at plant or enterprise level, the LRA 
1995 provides for the granting of organisational rights to representative trade 
unions, namely: 
the right of access to employers' premises for union-related purposes; 
the right to hold meetings; 
the right to conduct ballots; 
the right to stop order facilities; 
the right of union office-bearers to time off for union activities; 
the right to elect trade union representatives with specified rights, and 
the right to information for collective bargaining purposes. 
It is assumed that these rights will assist unions in building up a degree of power 
that will enable them to coax reluctant employers to the negotiating table265. It must, 
however, be emphasised that an employer could validly conclude a binding 
collective agreement with a trade union which is not sufficiently representative for 
265 D. du Toit et al, op cit., 87. 
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the purpose of obtaining organisational rights. 
Depending on the organisational rights that the registered trade union seeks to 
secure, it will have to establish that it either represents the majority of employees 
within the workplace or that it is sufficiently representative of such employees. 
Section 21 (8) of the LRA 1995 gives some guidance to the CCMA when 
establishing whether a registered trade union is sufficiently representative. It 
provides that the commissioner must seek to minimise the proliferation of trade 
union representation in a single workplace, as well as the financial and 
administrative burden of requiring an employer to grant organisational rights to more 
than one registered trade union. 
The commissioner must also consider the nature of the workplace, the nature of the 
organisational rights that the union seeks to exercise, the nature of the sector in 
which the workplace is situated and the organisational history at the workplace of 
the employer266. 
In South African Workers Union v Mondi Kratf67 Commissioner Vetter held that: 
"The Act grants organisational rights to representative unions (but) these rights can 
be seen as a 'means' to securing an 'end' namely, collective bargaining rights. In the 
final analysis, however, it is the relative strength of the parties which will determine 
the 'end'." 
In SACCAWU v Metlife268 , Commissioner Freemantle held that the LRA 1995 "does 
not set out to regulate or establish any right to bargain, or create any concomitant 
duty to do so. Equally clear is the concept that parties may set out to position 
themselves in these matters by the exercise of power or persuasion." 
266 See C. Thompson, "Collective bargaining'' in Current Labour Law 1997, Juta, 1997, 2-21; For 
cases of application of these guidelines, see Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Millner's Dental 
Suppliers (Pty) Ltd, quoted by C. Thompson, in Current labour Law 1997,_Juta, 1997, 17; SACCAWU 
v Metlife, CCMA WE735, 7 May 1997, SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union v Sheraton Textiles, 
(1997) 18ILJ1412 (CCMA); UPUSA v Komming Knitting, (1997) 4 BLLR 508 (CCMA); SACTWU v 
WM Eachus & Co, CCMA WE152, 15 April 1997; NUMSA v Feltex Foam, (1997) 6 BLLR 798 
(CCMA); SACWUv Technical Systems, CCMA WE3341, 4 August 1997. 
267 (CCMA) KN544, 7 August 1997. 
268 Quoted by C. Thompson in Current Labour Law 1997, Juta, 1997, 18. 
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Since practice shows that collective agreements are mostly concluded with trade 
unions which enjoy organisational rights, it can be said as a matter of practice, that 
in order to enter into a collective agreement at company level, a trade union must 
enjoy sufficient representivity. 
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CHAPTER Ill FORUMS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Collective bargaining can take place at a variety of levels: at sectoral level, through 
bargaining councils, statutory councils or even through other non-statutory 
centralised forums269 , at company270 or plant level, or at any other level agreed to by 
the social partners. 
BARGAINING COUNCILS 
1.1 Origin of bargaining councils 
Bargaining councils are the successors to the industrial councils already established 
in terms of earlier legislation271 . Except for a few differences, they are very similar to 
their predecessors. The LRA 1995 provides that the industrial councils established 
under the LRA 1956 are deemed to be bargaining councils under the LRA 1995, and 
continue to be bodies corporate272• 
The notion of a bargaining council has not been defined in the LRA 1995, but can be 
defined as a registered forum voluntarily established for a particular economic 
sector273 and area, by one or more registered trade unions and one or more 
registered employers' organisations for purposes of concluding and enforcing 
collective agreements regulating any matters of mutual interest in that particular 
sector and area, preventing and resolving labour disputes, and advising NEDLAC or 
any appropriate forum on policy and legislation that may affect that sector and area. 
269 See for example the bargaining forum for the Chemical Industry which has been in place for the last 
2 years. The social partners have bargained through this forum, and have now applied for the 
registration of the forum as a Bargaining Council. 
270 The writer has come across a variety of agreements concluded at company level. In some instances, 
wages and terms and conditions of employment are negotiated at "group" level, disciplinary, 
grievances and retrenchment procedures at "divisional" level, and any other terms and conditions not 
specifically dealt with at other levels are dealt with at plant level. The variety of levels where collective 
bargaining may take place is infinite, and for the purpose of this dissertation, the writer will refer to 
"Company level" when referring to collective agreements concluded between one or more trade unions 
and one employer, and regulating terms and conditions of employment in an undertaking. 
271 Industrial councils have been renamed bargaining councils because the LRA 1995 applies to all 
sectors of the economy, not just the industrial or private sector. They now permit membership by the 
State, educational and other non-industrial sectors. See Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the 
Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, Government Gazette, 10 February 1995, No 16259, 124; X., 
"Collective bargaining'', Employment Law, September 1995, Vol 12, No 1, 4. 
272 Schedule 7, Part C, item 7 (1). 
273 A sector is defined by section 213 of the LRA 1995 as an industry or service, with the public service 
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1.2 Establishment of bargaining councils 
Bargaining councils are bipartite forums voluntarily established by one or more 
registered trade unions and one or more registered employers' organisation for one 
or more sectors and an area. The establishment therefore requires the collaboration 
of both social partners274. 
The LRA 1995 lays down certain requirements that the parties must meet in order to 
establish a bargaining council275• Those conditions are the following: 
1.2.1 Constitution 
Section 27 (1) (a), read with section 30 of the LRA 1995, prescribes certain 
requirements that must be contained or addressed in the bargaining council's 
constitution. 
It appears from section 30 of the LRA 1995 that the legislator has adopted a non-
interventionist policy as far as the establishment of bargaining councils is 
concerned. It sets up a framework within which the parties must regulate a minimum 
set of matters, but leaves at their discretion how these matters must be regulated, 
thereby enhancing the principle of free collective bargaining. 
1.2.2 Registration 
Section 27 (1) (b), read with section 29 of the LRA 1995, provides that in order to 
establish a bargaining council in terms of the Act, the parties must obtain the 
registration of that council. 
In order to acquire registration from the registrar, the parties to the bargaining 
council must submit their application on the prescribed form, together with a copy of 
its constitution and any other information that may assist the registrar to determine 
whether or not the bargaining council meets the requirements for registration. 
A notice is thereafter published by the registrar in the Government Gazette inviting 
274 D. du Toit et al, op cit., 139; See also Paper, Printing, Wood & Allied Workers Union v SA 
Printing & Allied Industries Federation (1990) 11IL!345 (IC), where the Industrial Court held that 
"the voluntary nature of an industrial council is an element which contributes to its usefulness. . . The 
principle of voluntarism entails that as a general rule no eligible party could be compelled to join, or 
to remain in, or to resign from, an industrial council." 
275 For an application of these principles, see National Manufactured Fibres Employers' Association v 
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the general public to object to the establishment of the bargaining council on the 
grounds that the applicant is not sufficiently representative of the sector and area in 
respect of which the application is made, or the sector and area in respect of which 
the application is made is not appropriate, or because the applicant has not complied 
with the provisions relating to registration276• 
After a certain period of time has elapsed and the applicant has been given the 
opportunity to respond to the objections raised by the general public, the registrar 
must send the application, objections and responses to NEDLAC for consideration. 
NEDLAC then has to consider the appropriateness of the sector and area in respect 
of which the application is made, demarcate277 the appropriate sector and area in 
respect of which the bargaining council should be registered, and report to the 
registrar in writing. Should NEDLAC fail to agree on a demarcation, the onus is then 
on the Minister of Labour to do so. In determining the appropriateness of a sector 
and area, he must seek to give effect to the primary objects of the Act. 
Thereafter, if the registrar is satisfied that the constitution complies with section 30 
(see supra), that adequate provision is made in the constitution of the bargaining 
council for the representation of small and medium enterprises, that the parties are 
sufficiently representative of the sector and area for which they seek registration, and 
that there is no other council registered for the sector and area in respect of which 
the application is made, he must register the bargaining council by entering the 
applicant's name in the register of councils and issuing a certificate of registration. 
The registrar accordingly has very little discretionary power in registering a 
bargaining council. The main discretionary reason for which he may refuse to 
register a bargaining council relates to the representation of small and medium 
enterprises which may not be adequate. The LRA 1995, however, is not explicit 
CWIU & others, Labour Court, DlOl/97, 15 August 1997. 
276 For an example of such an application under the LRA 1956, see Amalgamated Clothing & Textile 
Workers Union of SA v National Industrial Council of the Leather Industry of SA, (!989) 10 ILJ 894 
(IC). 
277 Landman held in National Manufactured Fibres Employers' Association v CWIU & others, Labour 
Court, D 101/97, 15 August 1997, that "the determination or demarcation of a sector takes place in two 
distinct situations. First a demarcation is performed when a bargaining council or similar institution is 
in the process of being set up. The second situation deals with the case where a sector has already been 
authoritatively established in respect of a bargaining council, statutory council or statutory instrument 
(a collective agreement) and the question is whether or not an employer or employees fall within the 
ambit of a particular sector and thereby also fall within the ambit of the council concerned or the 
legislative instrument." 
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about the notion of "adequate provision". 
Once a bargaining council has been established, it is deemed to be representative 
for one year. Thereafter, the council will have to satisfy the registrar on an annual 
basis that it remains representative, at the risk of losing its certificate of 
representativeness. 
1.3 Composition of bargaining councils 
Subject to the requirement that a bargaining council must be a bipartite body 
consisting of registered trade unions and registered employers' organisations, the 
parties to the council are free to determine its composition. However, half of the 
representatives must be appointed by the trade unions and the other half by the 
employers' organisations that are party to the bargaining council. 
1.4 Competence of bargaining councils 
Section 28 of the LRA 1995 deals with the powers and functions of bargaining 
councils. It provides that: 
"The powers and functions of a bargaining council in relation to its registered scope 
include the following: 
(a) to conclude collective agreements; 
(b) to enforce those collective agreements; 
(c) to prevent and resolve labour disputes; 
(d) to perform the dispute resolution functions referred to in section 51 278; 
(e) to establish and administer a fund to be used for resolving disputes; 
(f) to promote and establish training and education schemes; 
(g) to establish and administer pension, provident, medical aid, sick pay, holiday, 
unemployment and training schemes or funds or any similar schemes or 
funds for the benefit of one or more of the parties to the bargaining council or 
their members; 
(h) to develop proposals for submission to NEDLAC or any other appropriate 
forum on policy and legislation that may affect the sector and area; 
(i) to determine by collective agreement the matters which may not be an issue 
in dispute for the purposes of a strike or a lock-out at the workplace, and 
278 Section 51 of the LRA 1995 relates to the resolution of disputes about matters of mutual interest. 
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(j) to confer on workplace forums additional matters for consultation." 
Those powers and functions are not exhaustive; the fact that section 28 provides 
that the powers and functions "include the following' implies that other functions 
could be performed by the bargaining council. 
It must be noted that a bargaining council is competent to exercise these functions 
and powers only within its registered scope, i.e. for the sector and area for which it 
obtained registration279 . 
II STATUTORY COUNCILS 
11.1 Origin of statutory councils 
In order to accommodate COSA TU's demand for greater compulsion towards 
centralised bargaining, the LRA 1995 provides for the establishment of statutory 
councils in sectors and areas where no bargaining council exists. 
Their creation resulted from a compromise between COSATU, which insisted on 
compulsory centralised bargaining during the negotiation of the new Labour 
Relations Act, and business, which wanted to retain the principle of voluntarism as 
the basis on which participation in centralised bargaining forums should be 
premised. 
The new legislation kept this voluntarist principle, but introduced a measure of 
compulsion by permitting the establishment of statutory councils with attenuated 
functions280• 
279 The writer has not found any decision issued under the LRA 1995 dealing with the situation where 
a bargaining council has acted ultra vires, and the consequences on the binding force of collective 
agreements. For cases of application under the LRA 1956, see S. v Prefabricated Housing Corp. (Pty) 
Ltd & another, (1974) 1 SA 535 (A); Transvaal Manufacturers' Association and another v Bespoke 
Tailoring Employers' Association and others, (1953) 1 SA 47 (A); NICISEMI v Photocircuit SA & 11 
others, NH16326/91, IC, 14 May 1993; See also Photocircuit SA (Pty) Ltdv De Klerk No & others 
(1991) 12 IL.! 289 (A), where the Appellate Division held that "an industrial council can only exercise 
its powers in regard to the undertaking, industry, trade or occupation in respect of which it has been 
registered - an occupational limitation; and in the area in respect of which it has been registered - a 
territorial limitation." 
Regarding the question of which criteria must be used to determine whether a company falls within 
the scope of an industrial council, Jacobs held in Industrial Council for the Motor Transport 
Undertaking (Goods) v Bothma & Sons (Pty) Ltd, (1997)2 BLLR 140 (IC) that it depends on whether 
the activities carried on by the Company are regular and ongoing. 
280 D. du Toit et al, op cit., 145. 
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It is noteworthy that nearly two years after the coming into force of the LRA 1995 
which made provision for the establishment of such institution, no statutory council 
has yet been established 281 • 
11.2 Establishment and composition of statutory councils 
The LRA 1995 provides a two-step procedure for the formation of statutory councils. 
The first is the establishment of the council, and the second is the registration of the 
council282 • 
11.2.1 The establishment of statutory council 
A statutory council can only be established on application by one or more registered 
representative trade unions or one or more registered representative employers' 
organisations, for a sector and area in respect of which no bargaining council is 
registered283. 
It has been stated that "the most notable feature of the process is that there is no 
need for cooperation between employers and unions. Either party may unilaterally 
make application for the establishment of a statutory council. '284 
The establishment of statutory councils is subject to requirements similar to those 
for bargaining councils. 
11.2.2 The registration of statutory councils 
Le Roux describes the process leading up to registration as the filling of a "shell": 
"the establishment of a statutory council leads to the creation of a 'shell', the content 
of which still has to be filled. This is done by determining who the parties to the 
council will be, as well as deciding on the provisions of its constitution. '285. 
The process of registration is marked by the intervention of the CCMA. All the 
281 It seems, however, that one application was made on 7 April 1998 to establish a statutory council 
for the Printing Industry. Information retrieved from CCMail, Legalinfo System site. 
282 Due to the fact that statutory councils do not seem to have met the favour of the social partners, the 
writer will not analyse this institution in detail. For further details, see P.A.K. Le Roux, "Statutory 
councils: their powers and functions", C.L.L., Vol 5 No 7, February 1996, 62. 
283 For the meaning of "representative" in the context of statutory councils, see supra, Chapter IL See 
also section section 39 (1) and (2) of the LRA 1995. 
284 D. du Toit, D. Woolfrey, J. Murphy, S. Godfrey, D. Bosch, S. Christie, The Labour Relations Act 
of 1995, Butterworths, Durban, 1996, 145. 
285 P.A.K. Le Roux, "Statutory councils: their powers and functions", op cit., 63. 
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registered trade unions and registered employers' organisations in the sector and 
area, as well as any interested parties in that sector and area who nominate 
representatives for the statutory council286, are invited by the registrar to attend a 
meeting that will be chaired by a commissioner appointed by the CCMA. 
The Act is not specific as to what it considers to be interested parties in the sector 
and area. It seems that "individual employers, employees or group of employees 
and perhaps administrative regulatory bodies (acting in their capacity as 
administrators and regulators) are most likely intended'287 . 
During the meeting chaired under the auspices of the CCMA, the commissioner 
must try to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement regarding the registered trade 
unions and registered employers' organisations that are to be parties to the 
statutory council, and a constitution that meets the same requirements as those for 
a bargaining council288. At this stage, the parties either reach an agreement during 
the meeting chaired under the auspices of the CCMA, or they do not. In the latter 
case, the Minister of Labour is given extensive powers to appoint the parties. 
Furthermore, sections 41 (6) and (7) of the LRA 1995 expressly regulates the 
situation where there is no corresponding trade union or employers' organisation to 
the applicant. 
The Minister is then empowered, after consulting the CCMA, to appoint suitable 
persons as representatives and alternates, taking into account the nominations289 
received from employees and trade unions, or from employers and employers' 
organisations. It has been argued that this mechanism which gives the Minister 
power to appoint representatives over whom employers or unions have no control 
provides a powerful incentive for them to take part in the process290. 
11.3 Competence of statutory councils 
In terms of section 43 of the LRA 1995: 
"(1) the powers and functions of a statutory council are-
286 Section 40 (2) of the LRA 1995. 
287 D. du Toit et al, op cit., 146. 
288 Section 40 (3) of the LRA 1995. 
289 Those nominations were received after the registrar published a notice in the Government Gazette 
establishing the statutory council and inviting the interested parties to nominate representatives for the 
statutory council - section 40 (2) (b) of the LRA 1995. 
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(a) to perform the dispute resolution functions referred to in section 51; 
(b) to promote and establish training and education schemes; 
(c) to establish and administer pension, provident, medical aid, sick pay, holiday, 
unemployment schemes or funds or any similar schemes or funds for the 
benefit of one or more of the parties to the statutory council or their 
members; and 
(d) to conclude collective agreements to give effect to the matters mentioned in 
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c). 
(2) A statutory council, in terms of its constitution, may agree to the inclusion of any 
of the other functions of a bargaining council referred to in section 28." 
The limited powers of statutory councils in respect of the conclusion of collective 
agreements can be explained by the way those councils are established, and the 
fact that they can be formed by parties with a low threshold of representivity. 
290 P.A.K. Le Roux, "Statutory councils: their powers and functions", op cit., 64. 
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CHAPTER IV COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
The Labour Relations Act of 1995 regulates the conclusion of collective agreements 
and their binding force. 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE LRA 1995 
The LRA 1995 covers employers and employees in all sectors of the economy, 
barring three exceptions: the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence 
Agency and the South African Secret Service291 • 
For the purpose of this Act, an employee is defined as: 
"(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another 
person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any 
remuneration; and 
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer, 
and 'employed' and 'employment' have meanings corresponding to that of 
'employee "'292• 
The notion of 'employer' has not been defined by the Act. The definition of employee 
consequently has to serve as the point of reference for determining who is an 
employer. An 'employer' can, however, be defined as "any person who receives 
services from an employee for remuneration or is assisted in the conduct of its 
business by an employee. "293 
The scope of application is consequently very wide and includes nearly anybody 
engaged in an employment relationship294• 
The Act makes no reference to the validity of the employment contract as a pre-
291 Section2 of the LRA 1995. 
292 Section 213 of the LRA 1995. 
293 D. du Toit et al, op cit., 56. 
294 For further details regarding the rationale behind the very broad scope of application of the LRA 
1995, see Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, 
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requisite for its application. The CCMA and the Labour Court will have to construe 
the necessary guidelines in determining which defect in an employment contract 
could affect the binding effect of a collective agreement. The proposal that the LRA 
1995 is applicable, regardless of the validity of the employment relationship has 
been upheld in a matter concerning the employment of an illegal alien295. 
II FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
11.1 The notion of a collective agreement 
A collective agreement is defined by section 213 of the LRA 1995 as: 
"a written agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other 
matter of mutual interest concluded by one or more registered trade unions, on the 
one hand and, on the other hand -
(a) one or more employers; 
(b) one or more registered employers' organisations; or 
(c) one or more employers and one or more registered employers' 
organisations." 
This definition shows that on the employees' side, only employees acting collectively 
through registered trade unions may enter into a collective agreement, whilst on the 
employers side, individual employers may enter into such an agreement. The same 
condition of registration is applicable when employers' organisations wish to enter 
into a collective agreement within the meaning of the LRA 1995296. 
11.2 Collective agreements and temporary employment services 
The Act contains a provision which has not been tested by the courts yet, however, 
295 Kabey v Bester CCMA GA635, 11 March 1997; contra see Mthethwa v Vorna Valley Spar, CCMA 
GA15771; see also D. du Toit et al, op cit., 54 who held that "since the definition does not require 
that there be a valid and binding employment contract between employer and employee, the Act will 
also apply to employees who do not have valid contracts of employment, such as unassisted minors 
whose contracts of employment have not been ratified by their legal guardians." 
296 See SANSEA v NUSOG, (1997) 4 BLLR 486 (CCMA) where Commissioner Christie held that 
"there is nothing in the LRA or any other law which states that a collective agreement can only be 
made in a registered collective bargaining structure. Although a union must be registered, the forum 
does not need to be." NUSOG's argument that the bargaining forum was not registered, and that no 
agreement concluded in an unregistered body can be a 'collective agreement' as defined in the LRA, 
was therefore dismissed. See also Fidelity Guards v Professional Transport Workers Union & others, 
case No J843/97 (LC) where it was admitted that the constitution of an unregistered industrial council 
constitutes a collective agreement within the meaning of the LRA 1995. 
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11.2 Collective agreements and temporary employment services 
The Act contains a provision which has not been tested by the courts yet, however, 
and which causes some confusion as to the parties to collective agreements. Section 
198 (5) of the LRA 1995 refers to the possibility of two or more bargaining councils 
agreeing to bind a temporary employment service, its employees and clients who fall 
within their combined registered scope, to a collective agreement concluded in any 
one of them. This does not create any particular problem297 . However, subsection (7) 
refers to the possibility of two or more bargaining councils agreeing to bind a 
temporary employment service, its employees and clients who fall within their 
combined registered scope, to a collective agreement. In order to avoid being a 
duplication of the previous subsection, this can only refer to a "newly concluded" 
collective agreement. The questions then arise: "who are the parties to this 
agreement, and in which forum is the agreement concluded?" As subsection (8) 
provides that an agreement concluded in terms of subsection (7) is binding only if 
each of the contracting bargaining councils ( .. .) it can only be assumed that the 
parties are the bargaining councils themselves. If this were the correct answer, one 
would face a situation where the binding effect of such collective agreements is not 
regulated at all by the LRA 1995: the legal definition of collective agreements does 
not contemplate bargaining councils being parties to them. Neither section 23298 nor 
section 31 299 of the LRA 1995 can justify the binding effect of such agreements. 
Furthermore, section 198 (8) refers to the obligation to extend such agreements to 
give them binding effect, but does not specify the process to be followed to grant 
such extension, and section 32 seems to be inappropriate for the situation 
297 Save that the expression "falling within their combined registered scope" is subject to confusion. A 
bargaining council may only be registered in respect of a sector and area for which a bargaining 
council does not exist already (section 29 (1 l)(b)(v) of the LRA 1995). Furthermore, section 62 of the 
LRA 1995 establishes a procedure for demarcation when there is a dispute about whether or not an 
employer falls within the ambit of a particular sector, and thereby also falls within the ambit of the 
council concerned or the legislative instrument. Subsection 12 even provides that the registrar must 
amend the certificate of registration of a council in so far as is necessary in the light of the award made 
by the Commissioner. This last subsection implies that, should the scope of one council overlap the 
scope of another council, the scope of registration of one of the two councils must be amended. 
298 Section 23 provides that a collective agreement binds the parties - which in this case would mean 
the bargaining councils - and their members - which would mean the trade unions and employers' 
organisations. Provided that it is accepted that an agreement concluded by bargaining councils 
constitutes a collective agreement within the meaning of section 213 of the LRA 1995 (and this is 
arguable), the question would then be "how does it bind the 'members of the members', i.e. the 
employees and employers taken individually?" 
299 Section 31 regulates the binding nature of collective agreements concluded in bargaining councils. 
The collective agreements referred to in section 198 (7) are not concluded in a bargaining council but 
by bargaining councils, as opposed to the agreements referred to in section 198 (5) which are 
concluded in any one of the bargaining councils. The provisions of section 31 would therefore not be 
applicable to these collective agreements. 
108 
contemplated by section 198300• 
11.3 Hybrid character of collective agreements 
The LRA 1995 brought some clarification as to the nature of collective agreements. 
Under the previous legislation, the binding nature of collective agreements was 
uncertain. It was sometimes described as a contract regulated by the common 
law301 , and sometimes as a form of subordinate legislation302• 
Under the LRA 1995, collective agreements remain agreements voluntarily entered 
into by the parties, but their binding force is regulated by the law. It is no longer 
necessary to have recourse to various theories of the law of contract to enforce a 
collective agreement concluded within the parameters of the Act. 
According to Landman303, the LRA 1995 has not resolved what the legal foundation 
of a collective agreement is. From a reading of section 23 of the LRA 1995, he 
concludes that a collective agreement is a form of delegated legislation, "albeit in a 
most unconventional setting". He draws this conclusion from the fact that a collective 
agreement goes far wider than the boundaries of a common law contract, especially 
when it constitutes a bond between the parties and non-parties. He adds, however, 
that it could also be a common law agreement if there was the intention (by the 
parties) to enter into a common law agreement. But, "at the same time, and 
irrespective of the intention to contract, the agreement will become enforceable by 
virtue of the provisions of section 23 of the LRA 1995." Other writers are however of 
the view that in as much as collective agreements do not need to be Gazetted, save 
when they are concluded in bargaining councils and extended to non-parties, they 
300 Not only is section 32 applicable to collective agreements concluded in a bargaining council only, 
but the requirements laid down to grant the exemption, and more particularly the conditions of 
representivity, do not address the problem of temporary employment service. 
301 Radio Television Electronic and Allied Workers Union v Tedelex (Pty) Ltd and another, (1990) 11 
IL! 1272 (IC) where it was held that a collective agreement concluded with a majority union cannot be 
binding on non-members by virtue of the common law. Collins v Volkskas Bank (1994) 15IL!1398 
(IC) where it was held that "conditions of employment so negotiated in the course of collective 
bargaining are generally binding and enforceable against individual union members, whether through 
the common law principle of agency or stipulatio alteri, or on equitable considerations such as the 
promotion of collective bargaining which is the prime means of resolving labour disputes contemplated 
· by the LRA." 
302 See supra, Historical background. 
303 A.A. Landman, "Collective Agreements - Which judicial pigeon hole for new bargaining 
agreements?", C.L.L., Vol 5, No 8, March 1996, 74; see also D. du Toit et al, op cit., 161 who view a 
collective agreement as a "statutory contract". 
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cannot be held as being a form of subordinate legislation, but constitute a 
contract304. 
The question of the true nature of a collective agreement is, according to Landman 
an important one. He believes that if the agreement is a contract then it means that 
a party to the contract can challenge it on the basis of misrepresentation, but not 
that the bargain which it reflects is unreasonable. If, however, it is a species of 
delegated legislation, then it would be open to any affected person, including a 
signatory, to complain that the "law'' is invalid because it allows for an unreasonable, 
unfair or unjustified consequence or is void for vagueness. 
The writer is of the opinion that a collective agreement is a contract with a hybrid 
nature. In other words, it is a common law contract in as much as it can only be 
voluntarily entered into by the parties, and all the conditions for a valid contract 
(capacity, consent3°5 and object) must be present at the time of conclusion306. The 
effect of such contract is however not regulated by the law of contract, but by the 
LRA 1995. It is therefore not possible to describe a collective agreement as falling in 
the category of contract only, or in the category of subordinate legislation only. Both 
the contractual and the legislative regulation components are intrinsic to the concept 
of collective agreement, and this, regardless of the level of conclusion or the 
extension of such agreement. 
It further appears that the arguments used prior to the coming into force of the LRA 
1995, to consider a collective agreement a piece of subordinate legislation are no 
longer valid. In S. v Prefabricated Housing Corp. (Pfy) Ltd & another07 , the 
Appellate Division ruled that a collective agreement was a piece of subordinate 
legislation on the following basis: 
"It is true that the type of document now under consideration is termed under the Act 
304 X., "Collective bargaining'', Employment Law, September 1995, Vol 12, No 1, 5; see also SR van 
Jaarsveldt and BPS van Eck, Kompendium van Suid-A.frikaanse Arbeidsreg, 2°d edition, 187, quoted 
by A.A Landman inFAWUv Simba (Pty) Ltd, Labour Court 015/97. 
305 In Deukers Bosveld Gold Mine v National Union of Mineworkers, (1993) 14 /LJ778 (ARB), 
Revelas held that "any party who enters into an agreement under duress cannot be held to it in 
accordance with the common law governing contract. In industrial relations, collective bargaining 
forms the focus of agreements and the common law contract to a great extent falls away as a guide-
line. Duress, in itself, cannot render agreements arrived through negotiations invalid." 
306 For an example of a lack of consent and error on the cause, see Chemical Workers Industrial Union 
v Lutheni Plastics, CCMA, EC3147, 23 March 1998. 
307 1974 (1) 5:4 535 (A). 
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and in industrial parlance an 'agreement', and it is said to be 'negotiated' or 'entered 
into', but technically it is not a contract in the legal sense. The parties to the 
industrial council are the employer(s) or employers' organisation(s) and trade 
union(s) or their representatives. They do not contract inter se to produce the 
measures. They may 'negotiate' or 'enter into' the agreement, but it is the industrial 
council as the corporate body that decides whether to adopt it and transmit it to the 
Minister for consideration and promulgation. Moreover, it only becomes effective if 
and when the Minister deems it expedient to declare it binding by notification in the 
Gazette. It is noteworthy, too, that it is the Minister who fixes the period of its 
duration, and that he can also declare it (or parts of it) to be binding on employers 
and employees in the industry other than those who entered into the agreement and 
for an area additional to the area for which the industrial council is registered. 
From all those provisions it is clear, I think, that an industrial agreement is not a 
contract but a piece of subordinate, domestic legislation made in terms of the Act by 
the industrial council and the Minister. Jn that respect it does not differ from by-Jaws 
made by the council of a local authority and approved by the Administrator of a 
Province under its Local Government Ordinance, or from a wage determination 
made by the Minister on the recommendation of the Wage Board under the 
provisions of the Wage Act, presently 5 of 1957, both of which are similarly 
regarded." 
Under the LRA 1995, a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council does 
not have to be adopted by a majority vote to be binding, nor does it have to be 
transmitted to the Minister for consideration and promulgation. As soon as it is 
concluded, a collective agreement is binding by virtue of section 23 or 31, 
regardless of the forum in which it has been concluded308• The Minister only 
intervenes when the bargaining council wishes to extend the agreement to non-
parties, and then his powers are limited to verifying that the requirements laid down 
by the Act have been met. As soon as he is satisfied that the requirements have 
been met, he must extend the agreement309, as requested by the council, and 
308 Whilst under the prior legislation, an agreement concluded at industrial council level did not 
constitute a contractually binding agreement, but took the form of a gentlemen's agreement until 
promulgation. See Consolidated Frame Cotton Corp. v Minister of Manpower, 1985 (1) SA 189 (D). 
But see Nouwens Carpets (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Textile Workers 1989 (2) SA 363 (N) in 
which it was held that an agreement reached by parties to a conciliation board was binding in terms of 
the ordinary principles of contract until it was promulgated by the Minister. 
309 Section 48(1) of the LRA 1956 provides that "the Minister may, if he deems it expedient to do so," 
111 
cancel the extension as and when requested by the council. From all those 
provisions, it could be argued that under the LRA 1995, a collective agreement does 
not constitute a piece of subordinate legislation anymore310. 
It results from these arguments that a collective agreement does not fit into any 
delimited, fixed category of source of rights and obligations. It is neither totally a 
contract, nor totally a piece of legislation. In this respect, it must be accepted that 
collective agreements constitute sui generis acts peculiar to labour law. 
Commissioner Christie held in SANSEA v NUSOG311 that: 
"collective bargaining is based on the socio-economic power of the parties who 
participate in it. The law does not interfere in the decisions of the parties unless the 
process or decisions are discriminatory or there is fraud or some other serious 
abuse of the process." 
Regardless of the "true" nature of collective agreements, and whether considered as 
a contract or as a piece of subordinate legislation, it therefore seems that the mere 
"unreasonableness" would not be sufficient ground to strike out a collective 
agreement, and some kind of public policy should be invoked in order to obtain relief 
from the court312 . 
11.4 Interpretation of collective agreements 
The LRA 1995 deals with the interpretation of collective agreements under section 
24, headed "Disputes about collective agreements". 
This section provides that any dispute about the interpretation or application of a 
declare the provisions of the agreement to be binding. 
310 See Bargaining Council for the Clothing Industry (Natal) v Confederation of Employers of 
Southern Africa & others, Labour Court 0136/98, 15 June 1998 where Landman held that an 
industrial council agreement is not deemed by the LRA 1995 to be a collective agreement. 
311 (1997) 4 BLLR 486 (CCMA). 
312 See Collins v Volkskas Bank (1994) /LJ 1398 (IC) where it was held that "only if such agreements 
are, after all, the outcome of a manifestly gross unfair labour practice being perpetrated against an 
individual member or employee, would this court possibly be justified in intervening or striking down 
the provisions of a collective agreement."; BCA WU v Masterbi It CC ( 1987) /LJ 670 (IC) where it was 
held that "it is a well established principle of our law that a statutory provision enacted for the special 
benefit of any individual or body may be waived by that individual or body, provided that no public 
interests are involved."; SACCA WU v Garden route Chalets Pty Ltd, (1997) 3 BLLR 325 (CCMA); 
FAWU v Royal Beechnut (Pty) Ltd, (1988) 9/LJ1033 (IC); See also J. Wilson and G. Giles, 
"Collective agreements: some present and future implications", Labour Law News & Court reports, 
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collective agreement must be referred to conciliation and arbitration in accordance 
with the dispute resolution procedures contained in the collective agreement, and if 
these procedures are not provided or are inoperative, to the CCMA for conciliation 
and if the dispute remains unresolved, for arbitration313. 
It seems from the most recent jurisprudence that the CCMA will be reluctant to 
depart from the plain meaning of the wording of a collective agreement, save when 
the consequences of doing so would create some absurdity. In SACTWU v Best 
Clothing (Pfy) Ltd314, Commissioner Murphy held that: 
"when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous no evidence may be given 
to alter such plain meaning... Even if the application of the agreement seems 
somewhat anomalous, the consequences of giving the words their plain meaning 
are not so absurd that I am permitted to depart from them." 
This approach is consistent with the rules of interpretation that apply to South 
African law of contract. 
Ill CONTENT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
111.1 Matters of mutual interest 
A collective agreement is an agreement, which regulates terms and conditions of 
employment315 or any other matter of mutual interest between the signatory parties. 
Vol 5, No 3, October 1995, 3. 
313 In SA Motor Industry Employers Association & another v NUMSA (1997) 18 ILJ 1301 (LAC), the 
Labour Appeal Court considered that the scheme of section 24 is to compel the parties to a collective 
agreement to resolve a dispute about the interpretation of a collective agreement by conciliation, and if 
that fails, by arbitration, either in terms of an agreed procedure or, in the absence of an agreed 
procedure, by the CCMA. In terms of section 157 (5) the Labour Court does not have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate an unresolved dispute if the LRA requires the dispute to be resolved through arbitration, 
except if, in terms of section 158 (2), the parties consent to the Labour Court sitting as arbitrator. In 
this matter the parties had not given their consent. See also SACCA WU v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd, 
(1998) 19 ILJ 57 (LC). 
314 (1997) 5 BUR 658 (CCMA); see also SACCA WU v Crown Furnishers, (1998) 19 ILJ 
663 (CCMA), where it was held that the mechanisms for resolving disputes about collective 
agreements are not available only to the parties to the agreement. These mechanisms in fact remain 
available to non-parties bound by the agreement. Commissioner Le Roux therefore ruled that "it 
could not have been the intention of the legislature to leave all persons other than the collective 
bargaining agents who entered into the agreement without any recourse to the mechanisms provided 
by section 24."; For further cases on the application of section 25 of the LRA 1995 and the 
interpretation of collective agreements, see Towerkop Dairies (Pty) Ltd v SACWU, CCMA WE7551, 
20March 1998; FAWUv Bromor Foods (Pty) Ltd, CCMAKN11973, 24May1998; NUMSA v 
Merkim Motors, CCMA NC1595, 22 July 1998; CAWU v Grinaker Duraset, CCMA NC57, 18 
March 1997; Food and Allied Workers Union v Premier Food Industries, Labour Court, J205/97; 19 
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In Rand Tyres and Accessories (Pfy) Ltd v Industrial Council for the Motor Industry 
(Tvl) and Two Others, it was held that "whatever can be fairly and reasonably 
regarded as calculated to promote the well-being of the industry concerned is a 
matter of mutual interest to employers and employees in that industry. "316 
Its content may accordingly be very wide, and may include wages, leave, sick leave, 
hours of work, overtime, pension, provident fund, social peace provisions, stop 
orders etc. 
111.2 Incorporation in the individual employment contract 
Section 23 (3) of the LRA 1995 provides that: 
"where applicable, a collective agreement varies any contract of employment 
between an employee and an employer who are both bound by the collective 
agreement." 
This provision, read in conjunction with section 199 of the LRA 1995, regulates the 
effect of collective agreements on the contract of employment. It follows from these 
sections that: 
When the employee's treatment provided for in the employment contract is less 
favourable than the one provided by the collective agreement, the contract of 
employment is implicitly modified, without an amendment to the letter of 
appointment being necessary. The provisions of the collective agreement are 
automatically incorporated into the individual employment contract and remain in 
force even after the collective agreement that generated them terminates317• 
May 1997; Reactor Clothing (Pty) Ltd v Robertson & others, Labour Court, Dl46/97, 13 February 
1998; for a case of interpretation of collective agreement under the LRA 1956, see SASBO v First 
National Bank, (1996) 17IL!135 where AM van Wyk held that when the court is "confronted with a 
lacuna in the written record in that both parties wish the Court to read into the written record a 
qualification, ( ... ) I fail to see how the Court can come to a conclusion on this point other than 
allowing evidence extraneous to the written document. ( ... ) Every document should be read in the 
light of the circumstances existing at the time, and evidence may rightly be given of every material 
fact which will place the court as near as may be in the situation of the parties to the instrument ( ... ) I 
can see no obstacle either in principle or in contract for the Court, where the wording is equivocal and 
the contending interpretations are finely balanced, prohibiting the Court from invoking equity in 
coming to a decision to accept one interpretation rather than the other." 
315 According to D. du Toit et al, op cit., 159, the expression "terms and conditions of employment" is 
taken to refer to the express or implied terms of the contract of employment in the narrow sense, and 
does not include the physical conditions or the surrounding circumstances of employment. 
316 1941 TPD 108. 
317 See section 199 of the LRA 1995 and the comment under section V. For an application of this 
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The position is, however, uncertain when the collective agreement treats the 
employee less favourably than the employment contract. A reading of section 23 (3) 
of the LRA 1995 could imply that even if the collective agreement contains a less 
favourable provision, the agreement will take precedence over the contract of 
employment. On the other hand, it could be argued that the words "where 
applicable" contained in section 23 (3) refer to such circumstance, and therefore 
exclude the precedence of the collective agreement over the employment contract 
when the latter is more favourable to the employee, unless the collective agreement 
makes it clear that this is not the case. 
It is submitted that the CCMA and the Labour Court will have to construe the 
necessary guidelines for determining when section 23 (3) of the LRA 1995 applies, 
and when an employment contract is varied by a collective agreement. In other 
words, the expression ''where applicable" will have to be defined318. 
IV CONDITIONS OF VALIDITY OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Provided that a collective agreement is recorded in writing, the LRA 1995 does not 
require any specific formalities such as the signature of the parties, or the inclusion 
of the date of the agreement, or other information to be included in the agreement. 
It can therefore be submitted that labour law does not depart at all from the common 
law of contract in regulating the form of collective agreements319, barring the 
requirement of it being recorded in writing. 
Even though section 24 (1) of the LRA 1995 seems to make it obligatory that "evety 
collective agreement must provide for a procedure to resolve any dispute about the 
principle, see Towerkop Dairies (Pty) Ltd v SACWU, CCMA WE755 l, 20 March 1998, where it was 
held that "the collective agreement being considered here contains new conditions of employment for 
all those employees covered by the agreement and supersedes any other contract or practice unless the 
aFsc:ment contains a clause excluding certain provisions governed by another agreement or practice." 
3 8 For example, do the provisions contained in a collective agreement regulating retrenchment 
procedures vary an employment contract? In Transport & General Workers Union & others v SA 
Stevedores, (1994) 15 ILJ 358 (IC), Van Zyl held that these were not incorporated into individual 
employment contracts. See also SACWU v Engen Petroleum Ltd & Colas International (Pty) Ltd, 
unreported case, (LC) C240/97. 
319 See TGWU obo Dube v Value Truck Rental, CCMA GAl 7683, 28 January 1998, where 
Commissioner Seedat held the inquiry into the validity of a collective agreement is strictly 
contractual. In casu, when the union communicated the agreement to the employer, a covering letter 
was attached, stating 'if in agreement, please contact the. writer for the purposes of signing the 
contract.' Commissioner Seedat held that "Besides in the often volatile milieu of industrial relations 
negotiations, the practice has developed to formalise an agreement only after the terms have been 
reduced to writing and signed by the parties. Otherwise disputes about interpretation and 
implementation would abound." 
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interpretation or application of the collective agreement", this cannot be considered 
a condition of validity. Indeed, section 24 (2) goes on to state that "if there is a 
dispute about the interpretation or application of a collective agreement, any party to 
the dispute may refer the dispute in writing to the Commission if the collective 
agreement does not provide for a procedure as required by subsection (1)." 
Therefore, the lack of a dispute resolution procedure does not invalidate the 
agreement320. 
V NULLITY OF THE NORMS CONTRARY TO HIERARCHICALLY SUPERIOR NORMS 
V.1 Compliance with statutory provisions superior to collective agreements 
Section 1 of the LRA 1995 provides that: 
"The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of 
this Act, which are-
a) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27 
of the Constitution; 
b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of 
the lntemational Labour Organisation; 
c) to provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, 
employers and em11oyers' organisations can-
(i) collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of 
employment and other matters of mutual interest; and 
(ii) formulate industrial policy; and 
d) ( ... )" 
Furthermore, section 3 provides that: 
"Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions-
(a) to give effect to its primary object; 
(b) in compliance with the Constitution; and 
320 A.A Landman, "Collective agreements - Which judicial pigeon hole for new bargaining 
agreements", C.L.L., Vol 5, No 8, March 1996, 75 states that the LRA 1995 in effect allows the 
parties two options. The first allows them to provide for their own conciliation and arbitration 
processes. The second option, which one can choose by default e.g., by failing to insert one's own 
dispute resolution procedure in a collective agreement, is to access the conciliation and arbitration 
mechanism of the CCMA. 
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(c) in compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic." 
Any collective agreement must therefore comply with the Constitution, peremptory 
statutory provisions and international provisions that have binding force in South 
Africa. Should any provision of a collective agreement be contrary to such 
hierarchically superior norms, this provision may be declared null and void. 
In SACCAWU V Garden Route Chalets (pty) Ltd321 , Commissioner Murphy analysed 
the extent to which parties can exclude statutory remedies by means of collective 
agreements. The circumstances of the case were as follows: The company and 
SACCAWU entered into a collective agreement in terms of which the company 
would make travel arrangement for employees living in certain towns. The parties 
could not reach agreement with regard to employees living in George, and agreed 
to refer this issue to the CCMA for mediation. The agreement also contained a 
clause providing that the parties would not institute any industrial action in respect of 
the above issue. The dispute remained unresolved after mediation, and the union 
referred the dispute to the CCMA for arbitration, alleging that by excluding the 
George employees, the company committed an act of unfair discrimination. The 
company submitted in limine that the union had waived its right to refer the matter to 
arbitration in terms of item 3 Schedule 7 of the LRA 1995322 • 
Commissioner Murphy stated that the role of an arbitrator is to safeguard the 
constitutional and statutory right to equality and fairness. Although section 23 of the 
LRA 1995 contains no mention that a collective agreement can exclude statutory 
rights to refer an unfair labour practice dispute to arbitration, if "the legislature had 
intended collective agreements generally to override statutory rights, presumably it 
would have said so. That it has expressly done so in the specific instances 
contemplated by section 65 (1) and section 64 (3) is a further indication that usually 
the statutory rights shall prevail." 
Analysing the circumstances in which an employee is entitled to enter into a contract 
whereby he undertakes not to invoke the remedies prescribed in Item 3 of Schedule 
7, the commissioner ruled as follows: 
321 (1997) 3 BLLR 325 (CCMA); see also SANSEA v NUSOG, (1997) 4 BLLR 486 (CCMA) where it 
was held that "the law does not interfere in the decisions of the parties unless the process or decisions 
are discriminatory or there is fraud or some other serious abuse of the process." 
322 This item provides for dispute resolution procedures for unfair labour practices. 
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"Apart from cases where the statute expressly or by necessary implication prohibits 
waiver, the general rule is that any person can enter into a binding contract to waive 
a benefit conferred upon him by Jaw for his sole benefit. But where public as well as 
individual interests are concerned, in other words where public policy demands the 
observance of a statute, then the benefit of its provisions cannot be waived by the 
individual, because he is not the only person interested. There is no express 
provision prohibiting the waiver of the right of an employee or employer to refer an 
unfair labour practice to arbitration by the CCMA or an accredited bargaining council 
or agency in terms of Item 3 of Schedule 7 ... In regard to the question of whether 
the Act by necessary implication prohibits waiver, the existence of express 
provisions such as section 65 (1) and section 64 (3)(b) suggests that the statutory 
rights can be waived by contract only where the Act expressly allows waiver or 
variation323 ...• Moreover, there are sound reasons of public policy why employees 
should not be permitted to contract out of the equitable jurisdiction of the CCMA ... 
Accordingly, for these reasons alone I would be reluctant to hold that the collective 
agreement ... excluded the union's right to refer the alleged unfair Jabour practice to 
the CCMA." 
He then analysed the European jurisprudence regarding the principle of equal pay 
in European Community law, and concluded that by excluding the George 
employees from the transport benefit, the company committed an unfair labour 
practice. He made an award granting the George employees a transport allowance. 
The possibility of exclusion of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1983 by 
means of collective agreements is uncertain. Section 1 (3) of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act 1983 (BCEA 1983) provides that . . . the Labour Relations Act 
1995, or any matter regulated thereunder in respect of an employee, shall not be 
affected by this Act, but this Act shall apply in respect of any such employee in so 
far as a provision thereof provides for any matter which is not regulated by or under 
any of the said Acts in respect of such employee. 
Wallis states that "what is required is express regulation of a matter otherwise 
.. covered by the Act. Any matter not so regulated is to be dealt with under the 
323 See, however, Johnson Mambo & 45 others v Macrall Timbers, CCMAEC1618, 17 August 1997, 
where Commissioner Mias enforced a collective agreement in respect of retrenchment providing for 
one week severance week per completed year of service, up to a maximum of ten weeks. The question 
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BCEA.324,, 
Neither Wallis, nor the BCEA 1983, however, defines the term 'regulate'. 
Thompson and Benjamin state that "the act of putting an industrial council 
agreement, a wage determination, ... into effect therefore suspends the operation of 
the Act in respect of matters regulated by that measure.325" 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1956, collective agreements were regulated only as 
far as they were concluded by an industrial council and published in the 
Government Gazette. The departure from the BCEA 1983 was therefore effected by 
means of a piece of "subordinate legislation"326 which could even provide for 
conditions of employment less favourable than those provided in the BCEA 327• The 
LRA 1995 does not provide for the publication of collective agreements, save when 
they are concluded in a bargaining council and are extended to non-parties. The 
argument that a collective agreement constitutes a piece of subordinate legislation 
could therefore have fallen away328. However, the LRA 1995 clearly regulates 
collective agreements, whether concluded at bargaining council or elsewhere. It 
could therefore be argued that parties could negotiate terms and conditions of 
employment, which conflict with or purport to vary the BCEA 1983, without having to 
request an exemption. This interpretation would be in line with the LRA 1995, which 
promotes and encourages self-regulation at sectoral level. 
In Simba (Pty) Limited v FAWU & others329 , the employer had concluded a collective 
of waiving statutory rights was not analysed in this decision. 
324 MJD Wallis, Labour and Employment Law, Butterworths, Durban, 1992, Part 2, 9-11. 
325 C. Thompson & Benjamin, "Commentary on the Basic Conditions of Employment Act", in South 
African Labour Law, Juta, 2nd ed, 1965 as amended by service No 30, Bl-4. 
326 See S. v Prefabricated Housing Cor (Pty) Ltd & another, 1974 (1) SA 535 (A). 
327 See Photocircuit SA (Pty) Ltd v De Klerk No & others, (1991) 12 ILJ 289 (A), where a collective 
agreement concluded in an industrial council under the LRA 1956 and extended by the Minister, 
prohibited the employer from making any deduction from an employee's salary. Some employee 
members of a trade union not party to the agreement requested check off facilities from the employer,, 
which were refused on the basis that the employer was bound by the collective agreement. One of the 
argument raised at the Appelate division was that this provision of the collective agreement was in 
conflict with the BCEA 1983. The Court held that "the matters regulated in (the collective agreement) 
are obviously matters regulated under the LRA 1956 in respect of employees. It follows that Act 3 of 
1983 cannot be invoked to override the prohibition in clause 8 (3) of the agreement."; see also Chetty 
v Raydee (Pty) Ltd tla St James Accommodation, (1988) 9 JLJ 318 (IC) where in terms of an 
industrial council agreement, the hours of work of 'other employees' could not exceed 54 hours whilst 
the BCEA provides for a maximum of 46 ordinary hours of work. 
328 See Section II supra. 
329 LC J40/97, 20 March 1997. 
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agreement with FAWU regulating tea and lunch breaks. In terms of this agreement, 
certain employees would work continuously for longer than five hours without a meal 
interval. The Labour Court held that this constituted a contravention of the BCEA 
1983. Zondo J ruled that: 
"to the extent that the terms of the agreement between the parties may be in conflict 
with the provisions of the BCEA, such terms are, to the extent of such conflict, 
unenforceable. In my view the workers do not lose any of the rights they have under 
the Act by virtue of the fact that they have chosen to exercise such a right 
collectively in circumstances where we are not dealing with the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction ... The BCEA is a very important piece of legislation laying down 
the so-called "floor of rights" which every employee covered thereby is obliged to 
comply with. In this regard there may seem to be a conflict between the approach I 
have adopted in this matter and one of the principles which underpin the new Act, 
namely to promote self-regulation. There is, however no conflict between the two 
because self-regulation is promoted in so far as it does not violate the basic rights 
which are laid down in the BCEA." 
It is regrettable that Zondo J did not enquire into the effect of section 23 of the LRA 
1995 which provides that collective agreements are binding, nor into the meaning of 
section 1 (3) of the BCEA 1983. Section 1 (3) seems to deal with the scope of 
application of the Act330, and provides that it shall not affect any matter regulated 
under the LRA 1995331 . If one accepts that collective agreements are regulated by 
the LRA 1995, it should be accepted that all terms and conditions of employment 
which are regulated by a collective agreement override the BCEA 1983. 
Although not yet in force at the time of the submission of this dissertation, it must be 
noted that the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 specifically regulates 
the circumstances in which a basic condition of employment may be varied by a 
330 It is noteworthy that section 1 is headed "Definitions" and does not expressly state that section 1 
(3) regulates the scope of application of the Act. 
331 See also A. Rycroft & B. Jordaan, A guide to South African Labour Law, 2°d ed., Juta, 1992, 47. 
They stated that "section 2(3) (sic) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act makes it clear that this 
Act is weaker in its operation than any of the other measures referred to in that section. This includes 
wage determinations in terms of the Wage Act and wage-regulating measures in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act. The latter, in turn, prevail over conflicting provisions in any wage determination made 
in terms of the Wage Act. Thus, in the event of conflict, wage-regulating measures in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act prevail over the provisions of both the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and 
wage determination made in terms of the Wage Act." 
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collective agreement332. 
The BCEA 1997 distinguishes between collective agreements concluded by 
bargaining councils and other collective agreements. A bargaining council 
agreement may vary any provision of the Act provided that the agreement is in 
keeping with the purpose of the Act and does not vary a core right333• 
The ability of other collective agreements to vary conditions of employment is 
considerably more restricted. Collective agreements may be used to introduce 
flexibility arrangements such as the averaging of working time, to vary the provisions 
of family responsibility leave, or to alter the requirements for the giving of notice to 
terminate contracts of employment within the limits set in the Act. It can also vary 
the provisions relating to overtime, weekly rest periods, Sunday work and sick-pay. 
V.2 Compliance with superior conventional provisions 
V.2. 1 Collective agreements 
Neither the LRA 1995, nor other current legislation regulates the hierarchy between 
collective agreements. In other words, nothing seems to preclude the conclusion of 
a collective agreement at plant level which departs from the provisions of a 
collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council, and vice versa. In terms of 
sections 23 and 31 of the LRA 1995, both agreements have statutory force. 
Following approaches may be adopted to resolve this issue, namely: 
• Plant or enterprise level agreements override sectoral level agreements 
It has been suggested that in such circumstance, the ordinary principles of 
interpretation should apply to reconcile the two agreements334• "Where the 
conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable the principles genera/ia 
specialibus non derogant could be applied to give force to the specific plant or 
enterprise collective agreement." 
• Sectoral collective agreements prevail over any other agreements 
Such an approach would seem to be in accordance with the Act's primary object 
332 See section 49 of the BCEA 1997. 
333 P. Benjamin, "The basic conditions of employment bill", in Cu"ent Labour Law, Juta, 1997, 110 
334 D. du Toit et al, op cit., 168. 
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to promote collective bargaining at sectoral level. By using a purposive 
interpretation of the LRA 1995, preference should then be given to sectoral 
agreements335. 
• The most recent agreement overrides any other agreement, regardless of the 
level of conclusion. In terms of this approach, the normal principles of the law of 
contract are applied336. By entering into a new collective agreement, the parties 
have replaced an existing obligation by a new one. 
• The more favourable agreement to the employees overrides any other 
agreement 
Whatever approach is preferred must be applied consistently, i.e. applied 
throughout all possible situations. 
Although, from a strictly legal perspective, the principle that the latest agreement 
overrides any other agreement should be applied, the writer is of the opinion that 
the second approach listed above must be preferred for pragmatic reasons. A 
purposive interpretation of the LRA 1995 also supports such approach. The 
Explanatory Memorandum states that the LRA "promotes industry-level bargaining 
and gives to industry-level bargaining forums the power to determine the matters 
that can be bargained at plant level.337" It must, however, be admitted that this 
approach could also be opposed on legal grounds. 
The following example demonstrates the problems caused by the lack of legislative 
335 Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, Government 
Gazette, 10 February 1995, No 16259, 115. 
336 See RH Christie, The Law of Contracts in South Africa, Butterworths, Durban, 3rd ed, 1996, 498: 
"as a generic term for replacing an existing obligation by a new one, novation includes voluntary 
novation, which is what happens when an existing obligation is replaced by a new contract between 
the same parties, and is usually referred to as novation, without qualification." 
337 Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, Government 
Gazette, 10 February 1995, No 16259, 115; This approach was adopted by P. Benjamin sitting as an 
arbitrator inSimba Group v FAWU, (1993) 14JLJ1110 (ARB). In casu, a national bargaining forum 
was established between the employer and the union, which negotiated terms and conditions of 
employment nationally for its employees who fell in the bargaining unit. One division of the Company 
subsequently entered into an agreement governing the terms and conditions of employment of 
employees falling in the bargaining unit, which agreement was signed by the local shop steward. 
Benjamin considered that this undermined the national bargaining forum, and made an order 
upholding the primacy of national bargaining in terms of the agreement. Benjamin did not, however, 
expand on the binding force of the respective agreements entered between the same parties, nor on the 
principles supporting the primacy of centralised bargaining. 
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regulation on this issue: assume that Employers' Organisations A and B, and Trade 
Unions C and D conclude a collective agreement at sectoral level which provides for 
payment of overtime at twice the hourly rate. If thereafter Employer X, (a member of 
Employers' Organisation A) concludes an agreement at plant level with Trade Union 
C providing for payment of overtime at one and a half times the hourly rate, it could 
be argued that by doing so, the parties have novated their first collective agreement 
in so far as that particular plant is concerned on the basis that the latest agreement 
overrides any other agreement. The plant level agreement will be binding by virtue 
of section 23 of the LRA 1995. 
Assume now in the same example but add the fact that 65% of Employer X's 
workforce is affiliated to Trade Union C, and 15% to Trade Union D, and that the 
parties have decided to bind employees who are not members of Trade Union C. 
The position becomes then more difficult. By virtue of section 23 (1)(d), such an 
agreement would be binding on the employee members of Trade Union D, even 
though Trade Union D had agreed at sectoral level that overtime would be paid at a 
higher rate. 
If the sectoral collective agreement was extended to non-parties by the Minister, and 
if one accepts that parties to a collective agreement may agree to vary it at plant 
level, one would face a problem with regard to non-parties. Section 31 (3) of the 
LRA 1995 provides that the collective agreement must establish an independent 
body to grant exemptions to non-parties. The Act does not make reference to the 
granting of exemptions to parties. One could argue that whilst Employer Z and 
Trade Union E, who are not parties to the sectoral agreement, would need an 
exemption to conclude an agreement which departs from the sectoral agreement, 
Employer X and Trade Union C, being parties to the sectoral agreement, could vary 
it without any difficulty. To avoid this last situation, one would have to argue that a 
collective agreement concluded at sectoral level and which has been extended 
constitutes a piece of subordinate legislation338, which can therefore only be varied 
by another piece of subordinate legislation. 
The new BCEA No 75 of 1997 provides that: 
"no provision in this Act or a sectoral determination may be interpreted as permitting 
338 See however our comments under Section II supra. 
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a collective agreement contrary to the provisions of a collective agreement 
concluded in a bargaining council'a39. 
This provision creates some ambiguity in so far as it neither prohibits nor allows the 
variation of a collective agreement concluded at bargaining council by any other 
collective agreement. As indicated supra, the LRA 1995 does not regulate the 
hierarchy between collective agreements, and therefore this provision of the BCEA 
1997 could be nothing more than an "empty shell". 
V.2.2 Nullity of provisions contained in employment contracts 
Section 199 of the LRA 1995 provides that: 
"1) A contract of employment, whether concluded before or after the coming into 
operation of any applicable collective agreement or arbitration award, may not-
(a) Permit an employee to be paid remuneration that is less than that 
prescribed by that collective agreement or arbitration award; 
(b) Permit an employee to be treated in a manner, or to be granted any 
benefit, that is Jess favourable than that prescribed by that collective 
agreement or arbitration award; 
(c) Waive the application of any provision of that collective agreement or 
arbitration award. 
2) A provision in any contract that purports to permit or grant any payment, benefit, 
waiver or exclusion prohibited by subsection (1) is invalid." 
Collective agreements concluded at any level prevail over the individual employment 
contract340. Any provision in an employment contract contrary to section 199 (1) will 
be invalid, whether concluded before or after the coming into operation of the 
collective agreement. 
The new BCEA No 75 of 1997 contains a similar provision in section 49, providing 
that "no provision in this Act or a sectoral determination may be interpreted as 
permitting 
339 Section 49 (4)(a) and (b) of the BCEA 1997. 
340 See, however, our comments under Section 111.2 supra. 
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a contract of employment or agreement between an employer and an 
employee contrary to the provisions of a collective agreement. 
(. .. )" 
This provision, combined with section 199 of the LRA 1995, provides 
unambiguously for the supremacy of collective agreements over individual 
employment contracts, when the provisions contained in collective agreements are 
more favourable to the employees than the ones provided for in the employment 
contract341 . 
VI PERSONS BOUND BY COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
The binding force of a collective agreement will vary according to the forum where it 
has been concluded, and also depending on whether it has been extended or not. 
Only the "normal" binding force of collective agreements will be analysed in this 
section; the process of extension will be dealt with in section VII infra. 
Vl.1 Collective agreements concluded within a council 
Section 31 of the LRA 1995 provides that: 
"Subject to the provisions of section 3i342 and the constitution of the bargaining 
council, a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council binds-
(a) the parties to the bargaining council who are also parties to the collective 
agreement; 
(b) each party to the collective agreement and the members of every other party to 
the collective agreement, in so far as the provisions thereof apply to the relationship 
between such a party and the members of such other party; and 
(c) the members of a registered trade union that is a party to the collective 
agreement and the employers who are members of a registered employers' 
341 Whilst in the context of hierarchy between collective agreements, section 49 of the BCEA only 
creates ambiguity. The difficulty created by section 49 in this latter context results from the fact 
neither the BCEA 1997 nor the LRA 1995 regulates the hierarchy between collective agreements, nor 
their variation by other collective agreements. Section 49 only provides that "no provision may be 
interpreted as permitting ... " . This does not mean that the variation of a bargaining council 
agreement by a plant level agreement is prohibited. In the context of collective agreement taking 
precedence over employment contract, section 49 of the BCEA 1997 enjoys the "back up" of section 
199 of the LRA 1995 which expressly prohibits employment contract to treat employees less 
favourably than prescribed by a collective agreement. 
342 Section 32 regulates the extension of collective agreements concluded in a bargaining council. See 
Section VII infra. 
125 
organisation that is such a party, if the collective agreement regulates-
(i) terms and conditions of employment; or 
(ii) the conduct of the employers in relation to their employees or the 
conduct of the employees in relation to their employers." 
Collective agreements concluded in a statutory council have to the same binding 
force as those concluded in a bargaining council343. 
Collective agreements concluded in a council therefore have a "limited" binding 
force in as much as they only bind the parties to the agreement, and their members. 
All of the parties to the bargaining council will only be bound if they are also parties 
to the agreement344. 
VI. 1.2 Provisions binding on the parties to the agreement 
The normal principles of the law of contract regulate these provisions. They have a 
contractual nature and are binding on the parties. Examples of such provisions are 
found in the provisions of collective agreements dealing with communication 
channels between the parties to the agreement. These provisions create neither 
rights nor obligations for the union's members, and purely regulate the relationship 
between the parties sensus stricto. 
Vl.1.2 Provisions binding on each party and the members of every other 
party 
Section 31 (b) of the LRA 1995 provides that a collective agreement binds each 
party to the collective agreement and the members of every other party to the 
collective agreement, in so far as the provisions are applicable between such a 
party and the members of such other party. 
Section 31 (b) thus regulates the binding effect of a collective agreement between a 
trade union and individual employer members of an employers' organisation party to 
the agreement, and between an employers' organisation and the employee 
members of the union party to such agreement. 
343 See section 43 (3) which provides that if a statutory council concluded a collective agreement ... , 
the provisions of sections 31, 32, 33 apply, read with the changes required by the context. 
344 Thus, the parties to the council who are not party to the agreement will not be bound by it, unless 
it is extended to them under section 32. 
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Examples of such provisions are the clauses regulating the right to picket345: should 
a collective agreement provide, for instance, that the union will only call for a picket 
after 24 hours notice has been given, such provision will be binding between the 
union and the employer member of the employers' organisation party to the 
collective agreement, and will also apply to the relationship between the union and 
the members of the employers' organisation. Should an individual employer try to 
obtain an interdict, the union could not argue that the employer concerned is not a 
party to the agreement and is therefore not entitled to rely on it. 
Vl.1.3 Provisions binding on the members between themselves 
Section 31 (c) of the LRA 1995 further provides that a collective agreement binds 
the members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of a 
registered employers' organisation that are party to the collective agreement if the 
collective agreement regulates -
(i) terms and conditions of employment; or 
(ii) the conduct of the employers in relation to their employees or the conduct of 
the employees in relation to their employers. 
Vl.2 Collective agreements concluded outside a council 
Although the Act does not expressly state that section 23 regulates the binding 
force of collective agreements concluded outside a bargaining or statutory council, 
this can be deduced from section 31 which expressly regulates such agreements. It 
is peculiar, however, that section 23 makes reference to an "employers' 
organisation", as outside a bargaining or statutory council, it is more than probable 
that the "employer party'' will be an individual employer46. Section 23 also makes 
reference to a ''workplace" which is delimited by reference to a single employer. 
Section 23 of the LRA 1995 provides the following: 
·~ collective agreement binds-
(a) the parties to the collective agreement; 
345 In South African law, only a registered trade union may authorise a picket by its members and 
supporters. Although it is not the subject of this dissertation, it must be noted that even though a 
protected strike can be organised without the support or intervention of a trade union, employees may 
not picket without the authorisation of a registered trade union. 
346 It could also be collective agreements concluded in centralised bargaining forums which are not 
registered. It is the case for example in the chemical industry and the mining industry. 
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(b) each party to the collective agreement and the members of evety other party to 
the collective agreement, in so far as the provisions are applicable between 
them; 
(c) the members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of 
a registered employers' organisation that are party to the collective agreement if 
the collective agreement regulates-
(i) terms and conditions of employment; or 
(ii) the conduct of the employers in relation to their employees or the 
conduct of the employees in relation to their employers; 
(d) employees who are not members of the registered trade union or trade unions 
party to the agreement if -
(i) the employees are identified in the agreement; 
(ii) the agreement expressly binds the employees; and 
(iii) that trade union or those trade unions have as their members the 
majority of employees employed by the employer in the workplace." 
Such collective agreements accordingly bind the signatory parties and their 
members347, but may also bind employees who are not members of the trade union 
parties to the agreement provided that the requirements provided for in subsection 
(1) (d) are met. 
Landman is of the opinion that the last requirement (1 (d) (iii)) must be present at 
the time when the written agreement is concluded. He adds, however, that "the 
agreement could contain a suspensive condition providing that it will not be 
operational until a ballot has been taken and it has been established that the 
majority of the employees employed by the employer party are members of the 
trade union(s) parties. ,;ua The writer is of the view that this last requirement could be 
met at a later stage. The Act does not specify that the majority representation must 
be present on the day the agreement is concluded. In other words, it could contain a 
suspensive condition providing that the collective agreement will be binding in any 
workplace in which the trade union(s) party to the agreement reaches a majority 
membership at a later date. Nothing in the Act seems to prohibit the inclusion of 
347 A.A Landman refers to "the principals and the components of the principals who are bound to 
each other." , "Collective agreements - Which judicial pigeon hole for new bargaining agreements?", 
C.L.L., Vol 5, No 8, March 1996, 72. 
348 A.A Landman, "Collective agreements - Which judicial pigeon hole for new bargaining 
agreements?'', C.L.L., Vol 5, No 8, March 1996, 72. 
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such suspensive condition and the general principles of the law of contracts should 
therefore be applicable349. 
Through section 23 (1 )(d), the Act therefore recognises the principle of 
majoritarianism in a limited way: one or more trade unions acting jointly who 
represent the majority of the employees employed by an employer in a workplace 
may conclude a collective agreement which will be binding on non-unionised 
employees or employees affiliated to a minority union350. A workplace is the place or 
places where the employees of an employer work. If an employer carries on or 
conducts two or more operations that are independent of one another by reason of 
their size, function or organisation, the place or place where employees work in 
connection with each independent operation, constitutes the workplace for that 
operation351 . 
The "extension" of the binding force of collective agreements to non-members of the 
majority union could however be problematic in as much as the union party to the 
agreement must represent the majority of the employees employed in a workplace 
349 Should this proposition be correct, it will then rest on the parties to verify regularly whether the 
suspensive condition is met, and to ensure the implementation of the agreement as soon as the 
condition comes to existence. 
350 Under the LRA 1956, it often occurred that an employer extended the collective agreement to 
employees who were not members of the union party to the agreement but fell within the bargaining 
unit. The enforceability of the agreement against non-unionised employees or employees belonging to 
minority unions was often problematic. Where unrepresented employees acquiesced in the change, 
their contracts could be deemed to have been varied by implied consent. But where they objected, such 
holistic agreements could not be justified by any principle of common law. The Industrial Court 
vacillated between declaring that these employees were bound by virtue of the principle of 
majoritarianism and declaring that such extension constituted an unfair labour practice. See B. Grant, 
"In Defence ofMajoritarianism: Part 1 - Majoritarianism and Collective Bargaining'', (1993) 14 JL.J 
305; Among the decisions in favour ofmajoritarianism, the following can be referred to: See .s:4 
Polymer Holdings (Pty) Ltd versus L/ale and others, (1994) 15 JL.J 277, where the Labour Appeal 
Court held that "whilst the trade union represents the majority of the employees in the delineated 
bargaining unit all the employees within that bargaining unit will generally be bound by such 
agreement. This is the consequence of the process ofmajoritarianism"; Food Workers Council of SA v 
Bokomo Mills (1994) 15 ILJ 1371 where the Industrial Court defined the doctrine of majoritarianism 
as that doctrine whereby representatives (including a trade union) designated or selected for the 
purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a particular bargaining unit are 
deemed to be the representatives of all employees in that unit for the purpose of such collective 
bargaining; Tsambo v Ovestone Farms (Pty) Ltd, (1996) 17 JL.J 418 (ALC). 
Contra, see Radio Television Electronic and Allied Workers Union v Tedelex (Pty) Ltd and another 
(1990) 11JL.J1272 where the Industrial Court held that "any change in wages and other conditions of 
employment agreed on between an employer and a majority union will not be and cannot be made 
binding on non-members unless they agree. The fact that an employer has agreed to negotiate with a 
majority union or even granted it the sole right to bargain cannot negate the rights of others to 
negotiate collectively with their employer. ( ... )A representative for the purposes of negotiation cannot 
be forced upon the employee, be it by the way of majoritarianism or otherwise. In order to represent 
another, one must enjoy a mandate by him to that effect." 
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as defined above352 . Practice has shown that most collective agreements are 
entered into with unions which represent a majority of employees falling in a 
particular bargaining unit, for example non-managerial and non-administrative staff. 
Unless the courts were to accept that the parties may collectively vary the definition 
of a "workplace" for the purpose of collective agreements, section 23 (1) (d) could 
be of limited use. 
It is noteworthy that the LRA 1995 does not specify that the binding force of a 
collective agreement in terms of section 31 is exclusive of the binding force 
conferred by section 23. In other words, section 23 could be used as a means to 
extend a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council to a limited extent, 
without having to resort to the mechanisms provided by section 32 of the LRA 1995. 
Indeed, nothing seems to preclude the conclusion of a collective agreement at 
bargaining council level which provides that such agreement will be binding on all 
employees defined in the agreement, whether unionised or not, provided that the 
union parties to the agreement represent the majority of the employees employed 
by an employer in the workplace353. 
VII EXTENSION TO NON-PARTIES 
Although collective agreements normally only bind the parties to the agreement and 
their members, the LRA 1995 provides for the possibility to extend their binding 
force to employees and employers who have not concluded the agreement and 
were not represented by their respective organisations during the negotiation, but 
fall within the scope of the bargaining counci1354. 
Such a procedure may, however, only be applied to collective agreements 
351 Section 213 of the LRA 1995. 
352 According to D. du Toit et al, op cit., 162, section 23 (1) (d) consequently does not altogether settle 
the problems posed by collective bargaining practice. 
353 In terms of section 31, a collective agreement concluded at bargaining council binds the parties to 
the agreement and their members. In the example contemplated, one could have the situation where 
Employers' Organisations A and B conclude a collective agreement with Trade Unions C and Din 
terms of which all employees (whether unionised or not) performing specific functions will be 
required to work overtime, provided that Trade Unions C and D represent the majority of employees 
in the workforce of a particular employer. By virtue of section 23 (l)(d), Employer A being a member 
of Employers' Organisation A could then enforce such agreements on employees who are members of 
Trade Union F, which is not a party to the agreement. 
354 See SAEWA v GA Motor Winders (East Cape) CC, CCMA EC4379, 10 February 1998; under the 
LRA 1956, see Photocircuit SA v De Klerk No & others, (1991) 12 IL! 289 (A) where it was held that 
an employer would commit an unlawful act constituting of a criminal offence should he accede to his 
employees' demand to grant check off facilities, whilst a collective agreement which has been 
extended prohibits this. 
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concluded in a bargaining or statutory council, and is regulated by section 32 of the 
Act. The non-parties must fall within the registered scope of the council and must be 
identified in the request referred to in section 32. 
A collective agreement may only be extended at the written request of the 
bargaining council. The request for extension must have the support of one or more 
registered trade unions whose members constitute the majority of the members of 
the trade unions that are party to the council, and by the employers' organisations 
whose members employ the majority of the employees employed by the members 
of the employers' organisations party to the council. 
The extension of the binding force of collective agreements is characterised by the 
intervention of the Minister of Labour whose power to grant the extension varies 
according to the level of representivity of the parties to the council. 
Vll.1 Majority representivity 
When the majority of all the employees who will fall within the scope of the 
agreement upon extension thereof are members of the trade unions that are parties 
to the council, and when the members of the employers' organisation that are 
parties to the council will employ the majority of all the employees who fall within the 
scope of the collective agreement upon such extension, then the Minister of Labour 
must grant the extension, provided that the following requirements are met: 
1. The non-parties who will be bound by the agreement must fall within the 
registered scope of the council and must be identified in the request for extension; 
2. the collective agreement must establish or appoint an independent body to grant 
exemptions to non-parties and to determine the terms of those exemptions from the 
provisions of the collective agreement as soon as possible; 
3. the collective agreement must contain criteria that must be applied by the 
independent body when it considers applications for exemptions, which criteria are 
fair and promote the primary objects of the Act, and 
4. the terms of the collective agreement may not discriminate against non-parties. 
The Minister has no discretionary power in extending collective agreements in these 
circumstances. If all the above conditions are met, he must publish a notice in the 
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Government Gazette within 60 days of the request declaring that, from a specified 
date and for a specified period, the collective agreement will be binding on the non-
parties specified in the notice. 
Vll.2 Sufficient representation 
Section 32 (5) of the LRA 1995 allows the Minister of Labour to extend the 
agreement to non-parties, even though the parties to the agreement do not enjoy 
the representation referred to above. In such a case, the Minister must, however, 
ascertain that the parties to the bargaining council are sufficiently representative 
within the registered scope of the council in the area in respect of which the 
extension is sought. 
Although the concept of 'sufficiently representative' is not defined in the Act, the 
Minister does not have to take the whole area for which the council is registered into 
account for the purpose of determining such representivity, but only the area for 
which extension is sought355. Furthermore, the Minister of Labour must be satisfied 
that failure to extend the agreement may undermine collective bargaining at sectoral 
level. 
Notwithstanding that a notice extending the binding force of a collective agreement 
might have been published, the bargaining council remains in control of the 
agreement: the Minister may extend or renew the period of validity of the agreement 
only on request of the bargaining council. The conditions mentioned above must, 
however, be met before the Minister implements the request. 
Furthermore, should the bargaining council request the Minister to cancel all or any 
part of the notice published, the Minister has no discretionary power: he must cancel 
the extension356. 
In addition, should there be any amendment, amplification or replacement of a 
collective agreement in respect of which a notice has been published, the Act 
provides that a new collective agreement has been concluded. Therefore, should 
the parties to the agreement wish the non-parties to be bound by the amendments, 
amplifications or replacement, they will have to request the Minister in writing to 
extend same. Prior to granting the extension, the Minister must ascertain that the 
355 Section 32 (5) (a) of the LRA 1995. 
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above-mentioned conditions have been complied with357. 
VIII BINDING FORCE AND MANDATE OF THE ORGANISATIONS' REPRESENTATIVES 
The LRA 1995 is totally silent about the nature of the relationship between a trade 
union or employers' organisation and its members358• 
The question which consequently arises is the nature of the mandate given by the 
members of such organisations and the extent to which the members could contest 
or repudiate the acts done by their representatives because they were not properly 
authorised359. 
The purpose of the LRA 1995 is to promote collective bargaining, and to this effect, 
it accordingly regulates the binding force of collective agreements. 
In terms of sections 23 and 31 of the LRA 1995, a collective agreement is 
automatically binding on the members of the signatory organisations if such 
agreement regulates terms and conditions of employment, or the conduct of their 
members in relation to their employer or employees, or the relationship between the 
organisation and the members of the other party. 
These sections address the difficulty experienced in explaining the incorporation of 
the provisions of collective agreements into individual contracts of employment in 
terms of the common law. 
"Reliance on the law of agency in which the union acts as the representative of its 
members to negotiate terms and conditions on their behalf, does not take account of 
the reality that frequently specific mandates are not given to the union nor are they 
always possible."360 
356 Section 32 (6) and (7) of the LRA 1995. 
357 Section 32 (8) of the LRA 1995. 
358 It is noteworthy that section 95 of the LRA 1995, which regulates the registration of trade unions 
and employers' organisations, does not require the organisations to provide in their constitution for 
the governing principles of relationships between the organisation and their members. 
359 Regarding the question of the union acting ultra vires its constitution, see Fraser Alexander Bulk 
Materials Handling (Pty) Ltdv CWJU, (1996) 3 BLLR 314 (IC); SA Cleaners Security &Allied 
Workers Union v Masonic Haven (Pretoria), (1996) 17JL.J193 (IC). 
360 D. du Toit et al, The Labour Relations Act of 1995, Butterworths, Durban, 1996, 161; see also D. 
du Toit, "An III Contractual Wind Blowing Collective Good? Collective Representation in Non-
statutory Bargaining and the Limits of Union Authority'', (1994) 14 JL.J 39; D. du Toit, "Statutory 
Collective Bargaining: A duty of Fair Representation?'', (1993) 14 JL.J 1167. Under the LRA 1956, 
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Therefore, if by regulating the binding force of collective agreements, the intention 
of the legislator was to acknowledge the inability of the common law, (and more 
specifically the law of agency), to regulate agreements concluded collectively, it 
could be argued that it should not be possible to escape the binding force of a 
collective agreement by invoking an irregularity or a lack of mandate361 . 
Such interpretation is in line with the purpose of the LRA 1995, which promotes 
collective bargaining and sound industrial relations. It would be extremely prejudicial 
should the members be allowed to claim that they did not give a mandate to 
negotiate certain terms and conditions of employment in order to avoid the binding 
effect of a validly concluded agreement. The LRA 1995 does not provide any 
conditions regulating the validity of a collective agreement, except that it should be 
concluded in writing. In addition, the dispute resolution mechanisms provided in the 
LRA 1995 relate to disputes in the application or interpretation of a collective 
agreement; they do not contemplate disputes arising from a lack of mandate, or an 
allegation to this effect. 
Du Toit is however of the opinion that a collective agreement must clearly be valid in 
order to be binding, although "the act sheds little light on when an agreement will be 
the Industrial Court relied on the theory of mandate to justify the binding effect of a collective 
agreement on the union members. InRamole_sane and another v Andrew Mentis and another (1991) 
12 ILJ 329 (LAC), the appellants argued that the union official had not been authorised to conclude 
an agreement on their behalf. The Industrial Court upheld the employer's plea, ruling that there had 
been "an implied authority and also an ostensible authority" for the official to do so. The Labour 
Appeal Court held that an agreement which goes against the interests of a minority must be 
enforceable against them provided that the agreement is in the interest of the union as a whole and of 
the majority of those persons affected thereby. If one argues that one "has an implied authority to 
conclude an agreement that is beneficial to the union, then the implied authority is not proven until 
evidence of that benefit is given". The court held that there had been no such evidence in this case. 
Nevertheless, it found that the appellants were estopped from relying on an absence of authorisation. 
The official had stipulated in writing that he was duly authorised to conclude the agreement on behalf 
of the applicants. "It is not necessary for the party relying upon estoppel to show that the employee 
authorised each of the acts done by the union representative. What is important is that their course of 
conduct created the impression that the union was acting on their behalf and upon their authority." In 
Gubb & Inggs Ltdv Clothing and Textile Workers Union of South Africa, (1991) 12 ILJ 415 -Arb, 
the arbitrator held that "in concluding the procedural agreement, the union was acting as agent and 
representative of the employees. The workers have accepted the benefits of the collective agreement. 
Consequently, in agency and on stipulatio alteri, the terms of the collective agreement form part of 
the workers individual terms of employment." In Don Products (Pty) Ltd v Monage and others 
(1992) 13 ILJ 900 (LAC) the Labour Appeal Court held that "the onus is upon the employer to 
establish not only that the agreement is enforceable in its terms, but also that the representatives who 
appeared on behalf of the workforce were duly authorised to conclude an agreement in the terms 
stipulated." See also Food & General Workers Union & others v Sundays River Citrus Co-operative 
Co Ltd, NHE 11/2/278 (PE) (IC). 
361 Contra, D. du Toit, see references quoted above. 
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invalid'362 . He stated that "to the extent that the legislature refrained from legitimising 
unauthorised acts by representatives, it is submitted, agreements should be open to 
challenge if such representatives acted in breach of their authority. 363" 
Should the common law of agency or representation apply, the members of a party 
to a collective agreement could escape the binding force of the agreement on the 
basis that the trade union or employers' organisation did not have authority364. The 
difficulty caused by the common law of agency is that it is unable to deal adequately 
with collective phenomena. A trade union acts not only as the agent of its members 
but also as a principal. Often, a trade union does not have a specific mandate from 
its constituents, as its mandate results from membership of the organisation, whose 
constitution empowers it to perform several duties, including negotiating terms and 
conditions of employment that will be binding on its members365. 
However, an employer who faces the argument of a lack of authority in concluding a 
collective agreement could then rely on the theory of estoppel to enforce the 
agreement. In terms of this theory, 
"a person who has not authorised another to conclude a juristic act on his behalf 
may nevertheless in appropriate circumstances be estopped from denying that he 
had authorised the other to act on his behalf. The effect of a successful reliance on 
estoppel is that the person who has been estopped is liable as though he had 
authorised the other to act. 366" 
362 D. du Toit et al, op cit., 109. 
363 D. du Toit, "Statutory collective bargaining: A duty offair representation?", (1993) 14 ILJ 1169 
364 JC De Wet, "Agency and representation", in Joubert, The Law of South Africa, Vol. 1, 
Butterworths, Durban, 1993, 99, par. 102: "If one person concludes a contract on behalf of another 
without authority to do so, the purported principal does not acquire any rights or incur any obligations 
under the contract. However, he can ratify the would-be agent's act." See also at par 112: "In order to 
conclude juristic acts on behalf of another so as to affect that other's legal relationships the 
representative has to have the necessary authority. Where a person acts for another without authority 
the lack of authority may in appropriate circumstances be cured by ratification. The person on whose 
behalf another has acted may also be estopped from denying that the latter had authority to conclude 
the juristic act on his behalf. As one person is not by nature endowed with the power of concluding 
juristic acts on behalf of another the existence of authority will have to be proved by the person who 
alleges that the person concluding a juristic act for another has authority to do so." 
365 See for example the Constitution of the National Petroleum Employers Association which provides 
that the members must endeavour to abide by collective agreements concluded by the Association with 
unions and not to undermine such agreements in any manner. 
366 JC De Wet, "Agency and Representation'', op cit., 129, par. 135; see also PJ Rabie, The law of 
estoppel, Butterworths, Durban, 1992; Joubert, The Law of South Africa, Vol 9, Buttherworths, 
Durban, 1993, 287, par. 453 onwards. 
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The employer who relies on estoppal will have to show that he was misled by the 
members of the trade union, as principals, to believe that the trade union 
representative who ostensibly acted on their behalf had authority to conclude the 
collective agreement367 . This would be the case; for example, where the employees 
accepted certain benefits from the collective agreement, but reject the obligations. 
Another argument which could be used in favour of the application of common law 
principles might be found in section 206 of the LRA 1995, which provides that a 
collective agreement will not be invalidated by a defect in the election of a 
representative to a council368• By providing specifically for this situation, it could be 
argued by analogy that defects occurring in other circumstances will invalidate an 
agreement. The Labour Court and the CCMA will have to construe the necessary 
guidelines in this regard. 
IX COMING INTO FORCE OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
The LRA 1995 does not regulate the coming into force of a collective agreement. It 
is left to the parties to decide when the agreement will become binding, and to 
arrange for communication of the agreement to their members. 
It is interesting to note that the LRA 1995 does not provide for the publication of 
collective agreements in the Government Gazette, save when such agreement is 
concluded in a bargaining council and extended to non-parties. However, section 
54, which is headed "Duty to keep records and provide information to Registrar", 
provides in subsection (3) that every council must provide to the Commission 
(CCMA) certified copies of every collective agreement concluded by the parties to 
the council, within 30 days of the signing of that collective agreement. The purpose 
of such communication is unclear, and no sanction is provided for failure to do so. 
Collective agreements concluded in a bargaining council and which are extended 
are binding from the date specified by the Minister in the notice published in the 
Government Gazette. 
367 Ramolesane & Another v Andrew Mentis & Another, (1991) 12 IL.! 329 (LAC). 
368 Section 75 of the LRA 1956 provided that no irregularity in the election or appointment of any 
representative on an industrial council shall invalidate any agreement ... which, but for that .... 
irregularity ... would be binding in terms of section 48". Commenting on this provision, D. du Toit in 
"Statutory collective bargaining: A duty offair representation?" op cit., 1169, held that "it will be 
noted, however, that the section is concerned with formal defects only and not with the conduct of 
representatives who have been or are deemed to be duly appointed. To the extent that the legislature 
refrained from legitimising unauthorised acts by representatives, it is submitted, agreements should be 
open to challenges if such representatives acted in breach of their authority." 
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X PARTICULAR SITUATIONS 
The LRA 1995 regulates some particular situations which could affect the binding 
effect of collective agreements namely: the transfer of an undertaking, the 
disaffiliation from an organisation, the modification of the scope of a council, the 
dissolution of a representative organisation and the amalgamation of bargaining 
councils. 
X.1 Transfer of undertaking 
This question is dealt with in section 197 of the LRA 1995, which provides that: 
"(2) (a) If a business, trade or undertaking is transferred (as a going concern), 
unless otherwise agreed, all the rights and obligations between the old employer 
and each employee at the time of the transfer continue in force as if they were rights 
and obligations between the new employer and each employee and, anything done 
before the transfer by or in relation to the old employer will be considered to have 
been done by or in relation to the new employer. 
(b) If a business is transferred (as a going concern resulting from the employer 
being insolvent and wound up or sequestrated or to avoid the employer being 
wound up or sequestrate for reasons of insolvency), unless otherwise agreed, the 
contracts of all employees that were in existence immediately before the old 
employer's winding up or sequestration transfer automatically to the new employer, 
but all the rights and obligations between the old employer and each employee at 
the time of the transfer remain rights and obligations between the old employer and 
each employee, and anything done before the transfer by the old employer in 
respect of each employee will be considered to have been done by the old 
employer." 
Consequently, depending on the underlying reason for the transfer, the collective 
agreements369 which were in existence will remain applicable between the new 
employer and the employees370, even though the new employer has not concluded 
369 i.e. the provisions of collective agreements which create rights and obligations between the 
employer and its (unionised) employees. Provisions of collective agreements which regulate the rights 
and obligations between the parties sensus stricto to the agreement, i.e. between the employer and the 
trade union party, are not covered by this section. In the context of organisational rights, for example, 
this would imply that the provisions regulating the right of office-bearers or officials of a trade union 
to enter the workplace, would not be transferred to the new employer. 
370 SACWU v Engen Petroleum Ltd & Colas International (Pty) Ltd, (LC) C240/97. 
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the agreement, nor belongs to the employers' organisation that concluded it. If the 
transfer results from the company being wound up or sequestrated, the new 
employer will not have to comply with the provisions of a collective agreement 
binding on its predecessor, save for the provisions which were incorporated in the 
relevant contracts of employment. 
X.2 Disaffiliation 
In order to prevent that a person, whether an employee or an employer, who is 
dissatisfied with the terms and conditions collectively concluded on his behalf by his 
organisation, resigning from that organisation in order to escape from the 
obligations imposed by a collective agreement, section 23 (2) provides that: 
''A collective agreement binds for the whole period of the collective agreement every 
person bound in terms of subsection (1) (c) who was a member at the time it 
became binding, or who becomes a member after it became binding, whether or not 
that person continues to be a member of the registered trade union or registered 
employers' organisation for the duration of the collective agreement." 
It must be noted that subsection (1) (c) relates only to the provisions which are 
legally binding between the members of the signatory parties of the agreement, and 
which regulate terms and conditions of employment or the conduct of the employers 
in relation to their employees, or vice versa. 
The Act does not regulate the situation where an employee who belongs to a 
registered trade union party to an agreement concluded with a single employer, 
resigns from his organisation in order to escape the terms and conditions of 
employment concluded on his behalf. Section 23 (2) refers only to the persons who 
are bound in terms of subsection (1) (c). In the example contemplated in this 
paragraph, the employee is bound in terms of subsection (1) (b). He could therefore 
easily escape the application of the agreement by resigning from his trade union. 
This omission in the Act could have important implications in the collective 
bargaining process. For instance, the conciliation procedures prior to embarking on 
a strike would no longer be binding on an employee who resigned from the union 
which concluded a collective agreement on strikes. 
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As far as the individual terms and conditions of employment are concerned, the 
above omission has less significance, since section 23 (3) of the LRA 1995 
specifically provides that, where applicable, a collective agreement varies any 
employment contract between an employee and employer who are both bound by 
the collective agreement. Resignation from the union would therefore not affect the 
terms and conditions of employment which were incorporated in the employment 
contract. 
X.3 Modification of the scope of a council 
Although the Act provides for the variation of the registered scope of a bargaining or 
statutory council by the registrar acting independently or in response to an 
application from the council371 , it is silent about the effect of such a variation on the 
binding effect of the collective agreements concluded by that council, in respect of 
the area or activities which has been varied. 
Sections 61 (8) and (9)372 of the LRA 1995 regulate the situation where registration 
of a bargaining council is cancelled. These provide as follows: 
"8) Any collective agreement concluded by parties to a council whose registration 
has been cancelled, whether or not the collective agreement has been extended to 
non-parties by the Minister in terms of section 32, lapses 60 days after the council's 
registration has been cancelled. 
9) Despite subsection (8), the provisions of a collective agreement that regulates 
terms and conditions of employment remain in force for one year after the date that 
the council's registration was cancelled, or until the expiry of the agreement, if 
earlier." 
Perhaps these provisions could be applied by analogy to the variations in the scope 
of registration. These variations could also be dealt with administratively by the 
council or the Minister, in that the variation of the scope could take place after the 
collective agreement has expired or been cancelled. 
371 Section 58 (1) of the LRA 1995. 
372 Section 61 regulates the cancellation of registration of a council. 
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X.4 Dissolution of a representative organisation 
X.4. 1 Through amalgamation 
Should two or more trade unions or employers' organisations decide to amalgamate, 
the collective agreements conclude by them will not be affected. Section 102 (5) (b) 
provides that the amalgamated trade union or employers' organisation succeeds the 
amalgamating organisations in respect of any collective agreement or other 
agreement and membership of any council. 
X.4.2 Through winding-up 
Section 106 (2) and (3) provide that any registered organisation which is wound up 
must have its registration cancelled, with the consequence that all the rights it 
enjoyed as a result of registration will cease. Although the Act is silent about the 
consequences on collective agreements concluded prior to the cancellation, it must 
be deduced that they cease to be applicable to the organisation and its members. 
X.5 Amalgamation of bargaining councils 
The Act contains a provision373 regulating the applicability of collective agreements 
where two or more bargaining councils resolve to amalgamate. In such case, "all the 
collective agreements of the amalgamating bargaining councils, regardless of 
whether or not they were extended in terms of section 32, remain in force for the 
duration of those collective agreements, unless amended or terminated by the 
amalgamated bargaining council." 
The amalgamation of bargaining councils consequently has no effect on the 
collective agreements concluded prior to the amalgamation; they will remain in force 
for their normal duration, unless they are terminated or amended by the new 
bargaining council. 
XI ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS 
Xl.1 Enforcement 
In terms of section 14 of the LRA 1995, a trade union representative has the right to 
monitor the employer's compliance with the workplace-related provisions of this Act, 
· any law regulating terms and conditions of employment and any collective 
373 Section 35 (5) (b) of the LRA 1995. 
140 
agreement binding on the employer, and to report any alleged contravention to-
(i) the employer; 
(ii) the representative trade union, and 
(iii) any responsible authority or agency. 
When the agreement has been extended, section 33 of the LRA 1995 authorises 
the Minister, at the request of the bargaining council, to appoint any person as the 
designated agent of that bargaining council to help it enforce any collective 
agreement concluded in that bargaining council374. 
The intention of the legislator was to provide for a system wherein the social 
partners are responsible for ensuring the enforcement of collective agreements 
through arbitration rather than through the criminal or civil courts. Such system is 
said to accord with the policy of self-regulation which underlies the LRA 1995375. 
It must be stressed that even when the collective agreement contains a dispute 
resolution procedure, "the interests of justice are paramount and, as in any 
arbitration proceedings, a court having jurisdiction may intervene when justice and 
equity calls for it. "376 
According to Thompson, if the parties to collective agreements desire that their 
agreements be properly supervised and enforced, they need to incorporate in it 
appropriate rights and duties and, even more importantly, to extend adequate 
remedial powers (including the power to give urgent relief) to arbitrators. While all 
interpretation and application disputes relating to collective agreements must 
proceed to conciliation and arbitration under section 24, arbitrators can only direct 
what the agreement gives them authority to do.377 In SAEWA v GA Motor Winders 
(East Cape) CC378, Commissioner Le Roux considered whether the CCMA had 
374 See Metal & Electrical Workers of SA v Alpine Electrical Contractors, (1997) 18IL!1430 
(CCMA). 
375 Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team, January 1995, Government 
Gazette, 10 February 1995, No 16259, 123; see also Rainbow Chicken farms (Pty) Ltdv FAWU & 
others, (1997) 18IL!1307 (LC), where Landman held that the Labour Court should strive to promote 
domestic arrangements; North East Cape Forests v SAAPAWU & others, (1997) 18 IL.!129 (LC) 
376 FA WU v Simba, (1997) 4 BLLR 408 (LC). 
377 C. Thompson, "Collective bargaining'' in Current Labour Law, Juta, 1997, 19. 
378 SAEWA v GA Motor Winders (East Cape) cc, CCMA EC4379, 10 February 1998; see also FAWU 
v Country Home Bakery (Pty) Ltd, CCMA KN1389, 12 June 1997 where Commissioner Stone did no 
more than make a declaration that the employer was in breach of the collective agreement; quoted by 
141 
jurisdiction to issue an order requiring compliance with a bargaining council 
agreement. He held that: 
"it is not readily apparent what mechanism is available to an aggrieved party to force 
a recalcitrant employer to heed the provisions of a particular bargaining council 
agreement. It should be borne in mind that the current Labour Relations Act does not 
echo the provisions of Act 28 of 1956 insofar as the latter act criminalises non-
compliance with industrial council agreements (. . .) Presumably a party who has 
obtained an award stipulating that a given employer, employee, class of employer or 
class of employees is bound by a particular collective agreement, would be able to 
enforce that award in the same manner as any other arbitration award, as provided 
for in section 143 of the Act379 ." 
more than make a declaration that the employer was in breach of the collective agreement; quoted by 
C. Thompson in Current labour Law 1997, Juta, 1997, 18. 
379 Section 143 of the LRA 1995 provides that arbitration awards issued by the CCMA may be made an 





CHAPTER I BACKGROUND TO THE REGULATION 
OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Both in Belgium and in South Africa, the development of trade unionism, and 
therefore collective bargaining are closely linked to the process of industrialisation 
which marked the end of the last century and the beginning of the twentieth century. 
It is noteworthy that the Belgian labour movement arose out of a situation of 
economic liberalism marked by violent labour unrest, under the influence of the 
Christian Social doctrine and of Marxism. Although the first collective agreements 
appeared as early as 1906, it was only in 1921 that the freedom of association was 
recognised by Parliament. The Act of 1921 guarantees both positive and negative 
freedom of association, it abolishes the provisions of the Penal Code outlawing 
strikes and provides criminal sanctions for anybody who infringes the freedom of 
association. 
The development and recognition of trade unions seems to have been less 
"conscious" in South Africa. Le Roux and Piron described the development of trade 
unions (catering for white workers) in South Africa as being a result of sentiment 
rather than a need for collective bargaining, because the colonists had been 
members of unions at home and wanted to establish the same type of institutions in 
South Africa. Although early trade unions met with hostility from employers, the law 
itself placed few restrictions on the formation of such bodies. The courts never 
developed common law delictual or criminal principles restricting the existence of 
such bodies, and no statutory restrictions were placed on them. There was however 
a restriction on the right to strike380. 
Whether to end a lock out in the textile industry, or to put an end to industrial unrest 
in the mining industry, there is little doubt that the coming into existence of collective 
agreements took place in rather conflictual situations, with the view to resolving 
labour disputes by way of compromise. 
From the outset, collective bargaining took place at centralised industry level, and 
380 P.AK. Le Roux and J. Piron, "South Africa", in International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations, Kluwer, 1993, 23 
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due to the success encountered by self-regulation, the practice developed very 
quickly across the various industrial sectors. 
It is now a predominant feature of both Belgian and South African industrial 
relations that the determination of most working conditions are made by the social 
partners, through social concertation. 
The problems encountered by the social partners regarding the enforcement of 
these agreements were the same in both countries: there was at the time no labour 
law, independent from the common or civil law of contracts which could tackle the 
particular situation created by the collective negotiation of agreements purported to 
be binding on parties who did not take part to their conclusion. 
Both countries had recourse to the same contractual principles in order to enforce 
these agreements, but unsatisfactorily. Whether it was the theory of mandate or the 
stipulatio a/teri, none of these contractual principles could secure the enforcement 
of, and compliance with, these agreements on "dissident" members. 
The only way to confer a binding effect on these agreements was through the 
intervention of the legislator. 
Such intervention took place in South Africa as early as 1924, with a very 
sophisticated system providing for the conclusion of collective agreements within 
forums established at sectoral level. These forums, composed of representatives of 
labour and of employers, were given the right to negotiate agreements which would 
be made binding on all the parties represented in the forum as well as their 
members, and could even be declared binding upon all the persons active in the 
sector, through their promulgation in the Government Gazette. 
Such legislative intervention only took place in Belgium in 1945. It is interesting to 
note that in both cases, the legislator first regulated the binding force of collective 
agreements concluded within statutory sectoral forums. This could be an indication 
of the legislator's preference for centralised collective bargaining. Collective 
agreements concluded outside these forums were in both countries considered at 
the utmost as gentlemen's agreement381 . 
381 Cass. 20 December 1950, Pas. 1951, I, 267 andNouwens Carpets (Pty) Ltdv National Union of 
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It was only in 1968 in Belgium, and 1995 in South Africa, that the legislator 
regulated collective agreements and their enforceability globally, i.e. acknowledging 
the practice of the social partners to regulate terms and conditions of employment at 
various levels, and the need to sometimes extend the effects of such agreements to 
non-parties. The tardiness of the South African legislator to regulate agreements 
concluded outside the statutory forums, mainly concluded under the influence of 
trade unions catering for black workers, might probably be explained by the political 
situation that prevailed until very recently. 
Such regulation does not, however, infringe the independence of the social partners 
in the determination of working conditions. To the contrary, by setting up a broad 
statutory framework which aims at accommodating and facilitating collective 
bargaining, and by specifying the binding force of collective agreements, the 
respective legislators adopted a very non-interventionist attitude, therefore 
promoting self-regulation of matters of mutual interests between labour and 
business. 
Textile Workers (1989) 10 JLJ 44 (N) 
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CHAPTER II PARTIES TO COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Both countries reserve exclusively the right to enter into collective agreements to 
representative organisations. The concept of representative organisation has 
however totally different meaning in each country. 
Whilst Belgium has opted for a political approach to a definition of a "representative 
organisation", over which trade unions and employers' organisations have very little 
control, South Africa has opted for a more "liberal approach", which is in conformity 
with the principles established by the International Labour Organisation. 
In Belgium only the trade unions affiliated to one of the three federations 
represented at the National Labour Council have been granted the right to conclude 
collective agreements within the meaning of the 1968 Act. If one considers the fact 
that these federations are closely linked to the three political players on the Belgian 
scene, and the fact that trade unions which are refused affiliation to one of the three 
federations have no legal remedy available, and cannot therefore conclude 
collective agreements, one can query about this monopoly over collective 
bargaining. 
It must, however, be said that in as much as approximately 70% of the Belgian 
workforce belong to a trade union which is affiliated to one of the three federations, 
and two of these federations are represented in every single joint committee, this 
characteristic has not been openly criticised nor challenged by the workforce. 
South Africa has opted for a more democratic system of representation, giving total 
freedom to the social partners to decide, through the power play, on the level of 
representivity required to enter into collective bargaining. Save for the fact that the 
organisations need to be registered, a process which is purely administrative, no 
legal requirements are laid down as to the representivity of the parties to collective 
agreements. 
Another difference between Belgium and South Africa is found in the status of the 
parties: whilst the LRA 1995 provides for the conclusion of collective agreements by 
registered "trade unions" and "employers' organisations", the Belgian 1968 Act 
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makes reference to "organisations representative of workers" and "organisations 
representative of employers" ("organisation representative des travailleurs" and 
"organisation representative des employers"). This difference is not purely linguistic 
and bears important consequences. The use of the expression "organisation 
representative of workers" instead of "trade union" (syndicat) allows in practice 
federations of trade unions to conclude collective agreements within the meaning of 
the 1968 Act, and to enjoy the provisions of the law regarding the binding force of 
the agreements so concluded. 
By referring exclusively to "trade unions" and "employers' organisation" in the 
definition section of the LRA 1995, the South African legislator has closed the door 
on the opportunity to permit federations of trade unions and employers' 
organisations to conclude collective agreements with a "national-multi sectoral" 
ambit. Topics such as the implementation of a minimum guaranteed wage 
throughout all the sectors of the economy could hardly be achieved through 
collective bargaining. Should the various federations of trade unions and employers' 
organisations active in South Africa set up a collective bargaining forum for such 
purpose, any agreement reached within such forums would not be considered as a 
collective agreement for the purpose of the LRA 1995. Although the LRA 1995 
considers expressly the concept of "federation", it does not encompass it when 
dealing with the definition, or the binding force of, collective agreements. The Act 
does not allow for federations to be parties to collective agreements. 
However, should it be argued that federations may conclude collective agreements 
within the meaning of the LRA 1995, the binding force of such agreements would be 
very limited, as they would only be enforceable in terms of section 23 of the Act, 
with no possibility of extension towards employers and employees not members of 
the employers' organisations and trade unions affiliated to the federation party to 
the agreement. 
Section 31 of the LRA 1995 could not be referred to in order to extend the binding 
force as it only permits the extension of collective agreements concluded within a 
bargaining (or statutory) council as established in terms of the Act. Bargaining (or 
statutory) councils may only be established by one or more registered trade unions 
and one or more registered employers' organisations (no reference being made to 
"federation"), and with regard to a sector and area, considered as a single sector or 
service, as demarcated by NEDLAC. Although the social partners could adopt a 
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very broad definition of a sector (such as in the chemical industry, which 
encompasses a wide variety of activities such as the pharmaceutical industry, 
pottery, the glass industry and explosives), in no way could they simply include all 
the various sectors of the economy active in the entire country within the scope of a 
council. 
It can therefore be said that by not having included "federations" as potential parties 
to collective agreements, the South African legislator prevents the social partners 
from bargaining efficiently382 over issues of mutual interests which affect the 
economy as a whole, and not a particular sector. 
382 It must, however, be noted that some trace of collective bargaining can be found at NEDLAC. 
However, the "agreements" reached at NEDLAC between the social partners are not collective 
agreements within the meaning of the LRA of 1995, nor are they binding upon the parties. 
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CHAPTER Ill FORUMS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Although both Belgium and South Africa in practice allow collective bargaining to 
take place at a variety of levels and forums, both legislators have only expressly 
provided for centralised forums. Even here, the regulation of statutory centralised 
forums in each case does not prohibit collective bargaining within non-statutory 
collective bargaining forums. In other words, even though both legislators clearly 
favour centralised bargaining, it is apparent that they have not attempted to 
circumscribe the forums within which the social partners must bargain collectively. 
In practice, very little differentiates Belgian joint committees from South African 
bargaining councils. In both countries, centralised-sectoral bargaining is the 
legislator's preferred level of collective bargaining. This preference translates into 
the enactment of provisions regulating the establishment and competencies of 
these centralised forums, and more particularly the possibility of extending the 
binding force of collective agreements concluded therein to all the persons falling 
within the scope of the sector. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the South African legislator has not made provision 
for the establishment of a bargaining forum which could cover all the sectors of the 
economy. As the LRA 1995 currently reads, and even though it openly promotes 
collective bargaining and self-regulation, the social partners have not been 
empowered to conclude collective agreements which would apply across all the 
sectors, and bind all employers and employees, active in the Republic. It is 
submitted that, in practice, this lack could undermine collective bargaining, and 
therefore the purpose of the LRA 1995. Even if all the trade unions and employers' 
organisations present in the country had to establish a bargaining forum for the 
purpose of concluding collective agreements fixing minimum t~rms and conditions of 
employment, the force of such agreements would be undermined by the 
circumstance that they cannot be extended to non-parties (because they are not 
concluded with a bargaining council, within the meaning of the act). 
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CHAPTER IV COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE RESPECTIVE LEGISLATIONS 
As mentioned in the introduction, Belgian labour law applies exclusively to private 
economic sectors. Civil servants and other employees of the State do not fall under 
the scope of labour law, but under administrative law. The Belgian 1968 Act 
regulating collective agreements and joint committees therefore expressly excludes 
all persons employed by the State from its scope of application. 
Save for this exclusion, the legislation in both countries has a very wide scope of 
application and tends to cover nearly every person engaged in an employment 
relationship. Both countries, however, specifically exclude independent contractors 
from their industrial relations legislation. 
It must be noted that the South Africa legislator, contrary to the Belgian one, has not 
deemed it necessary to regulate the application of the LRA 1995 in cases where the 
employment contract is null and void. It is therefore left to the courts to provide and 
construe the necessary guidelines in this regard. 
It is submitted that, as disputes relating to the interpretation and application of 
collective agreements must be arbitrated either according to the parties' own dispute 
resolution procedures, or through the auspices of the CCMA, there is a risk that the 
consequences of the invalidity of an employment contract on the binding force of a 
collective agreement may not be treated on a consistent basis by the CCMA. 
II FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Although expressed in different terms, the concept of a "collective agreemenf' bears 
the same meaning, save for the status of the groupings that may be party to such 
agreements. They are agreements concluded by the social partners for the purpose 
of regulating in an undertaking, a sector, or any other level chosen by the social 
partners, the terms and conditions of employment of their members or any other 
matter of mutual interest, including the rights and obligations of the parties towards 
each other. 
In certain instances, those terms and conditions may even be declared binding upon 
non-members of the contracting parties, thus bringing the true nature of collective 
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agreements into question. However, since the law in both countries now regulates 
the binding force of collective agreements the debate over their contractual or 
statutory nature has been rendered largely academic. It must be accepted that 
collective agreements have a peculiar status, which cannot be explained exclusively 
either by reference to the common law contractual principles or to public law. 
Ill CONTENT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Belgian law refers to "the regulation of individual and collective relations between 
employers and employees and the rights and obligations of the contracting parties", 
whilst South African law refers to "terms and conditions of employment or any other 
matter of mutual interest". 
This difference of terminology bears no consequence, and it can therefore be 
submitted that the content of collective agreements is similar in each country. 
Through the recognition of the right to bargain collectively, both the South African 
and the Belgian legislators have delegated a part of their law-making function to the 
social partners, therefore promoting self-regulation. Even though many areas of 
labour relations - whether individual or collective - are still marked by Government 
intervention, the rules laid down by the social partners in the course of concluding 
collective agreements play a very important role in the shaping of the rules of labour 
law. 
There is virtually no limit to the range of topics which can be bargained collectively, 
and save for statutory restrictions on the autonomy of the social partners which are 
mainly dictated by compliance with the Constitution, public international laws, or 
provisions stipulating minimum standards, collective agreements may regulate all 
aspects of labour relations in their broadest sense. It must be noted that the 
prohibition in Belgium of collective agreements providing for a closed shop or an 
agency shop is based on the constitutional right of freedom of association. 
For the sake of completeness, it must, however, be added that since the 1980's, 
collective bargaining in Belgium has been marked by government intervention which 
has affected the social partners' autonomy. An Act of Parliament allows for the 
government to intervene in collective bargaining on wages, when the 
competitiveness of the country's economy is threatened and after having granted 
the social partners a limited period of time to take the necessary measures 
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themselves. 
Another Act adopted in 1996 provides that wage increases in Belgium may not 
exceed the average increases of Belgium's three major trade partners: Germany, 
France and the Netherlands. Because of the expected wage increases in these 
countries, the maximum margin has been set at 6.1 % for the 1997-1998 period. All 
wage increases negotiated in Belgium at all levels (sectoral, company or individual 
levels) must therefore be below this upper limit, and this for a two-year period. 
It is interesting to note that the question of a social peace obligation has been 
approached differently, - and more efficiently in the writer's view-, in South Africa 
than in Belgium. The Labour Relations Act of 1995 not only regulates the right to 
strike and its conditions of exercise in order to enjoy the protection of the law in 
detail, but also expressly provides in section 65 (3) (a) that no party may take part in 
a strike if that person is bound by a collective agreements that regulates the issue in 
dispute. 
Belgian law, on the other hand, is marked by a total absence of legislative regulation 
of the right to strike. Industrial conflict is characterised by the almost complete 
freedom of the social partners to engage in industrial warfare, as well as the lack of 
legal rules prescribing a particular course of action. 
The right to strike was only formally acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 1981, 
and it was only in 1991 that the employees' right of recourse to industrial action was 
enacted, through the ratification by Belgium of the European Social Charter, signed 
in Turin on 18October1961. 
All of the rules regulating the exercise and the consequences of the right to strike 
are therefore jurisprudential creations. The uncertainty as to whether or not parties 
may strike on matters regulated by a collective agreement, and thus whether there 
is an obligation of social peace, is the direct consequence of the lack of legislative 
intervention on the right to strike, which was dictated by politically powerful trade 
unions who are reluctant to acquire legal personality, which could affect their total 
freedom to resort to industrial actions. 
As a result of the lack of a guarantee that terms and conditions of employment 
negotiated collectively would be complied with, and would not be brought back to 
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the bargaining table during the duration of the agreement, Belgian employers have 
adopted an empirical approach. They include clauses in collective agreements 
whereby bonuses would only be paid to union members if the agreement, and 
particularly the peace obligation, has been respected. This encourages trade unions 
and their members to comply with collective agreements for their duration. 
Until trade unions agree to adopt legal personality, the effect of a collective 
agreement on the right to strike will therefore remain uncertain. 
IV CONDITIONS OF VALIDITY OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Whilst a collective agreement must comply with numerous conditions to be binding 
in Belgium, South African law only requires collective agreements to be entered into 
in writing by registered organisations. 
The requirements laid down by the Belgian legislator which must be complied with 
on pain of invalidity, do not, however, constitute an undue interference in collective 
bargaining and principles of self-regulation. The conditions of validity prescribed by 
Belgian law are mainly dictated by the legislator's preoccupation with protecting the 
interests of workers who do not belong to signatory organisations, but are, however, 
bound by collective agreements. They do not affect the freedom of the social 
partners to regulate matters of mutual interest, but set up a framework within which 
collective agreements must be concluded. 
Although South African law does not provide for the binding effect of collective 
agreement "as extensive" as in Belgium, which may justify a less formalistic 
approach, it is submitted that formal requirements constitute a means to promote 
and secure sound labour relations, by reducing the risk of disputes arising as to the 
existence of a collective agreement, the capacity of the parties who entered into the 
agreement, the date of coming into force, etc. It is furthermore submitted that these 
concerns are reinforced by the relative ease with which groupings of employees 
whose principal purpose is to regulate relations between employees and employers 
may now register as "trade unions" and therefore gain access to the bargaining 
instruments. In the writer's view, there is a risk that small trade unions may emerge 
locally, and enter into collective agreements the application and binding force of 
which could be undermined by reasons linked to formal legal aspects. It is too early, 
however, to establish whether such concerns are well-founded or not, and this will 
only be seen with the passing of time. 
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Another point which deserves comparison is the question of publicity surrounding 
the entering into force of collective agreements. 
Belgian law requires that every collective agreement be deposited with the Minister 
of Labour to become binding, regardless of the forum within which its negotiation 
took place. 
The Department of Labour's only task in the deposition process is to verify that the 
formal requirements have been met, and it has no power whatsoever to determine 
the legality of the contents of agreements which are deposited for registration. 
Compliance with this requirement, without which the agreement does not constitute 
a collective agreement for purposes of the Act, ensures the publication of 
agreements which bind persons who did not take part - directly or indirectly - in 
their negotiation. It also constitutes a means for the government to be kept informed 
as to the directions taken by the social partners. 
The South African legislator entrusted the social partners with the task to 
communicate the content of collective agreements to the workers and employers 
bound by them (except when the collective agreements are concluded in 
bargaining councils and are extended to non-parties). Practice will show whether 
compliance with collective agreements will be undermined by this lack of 
compulsory publication. 
It is submitted that sound industrial relations would be promoted by a system in 
terms of which every collective agreement must be registered with an independent 
body, which could ensure that the binding force of these agreements may not be 
disputed for reasons linked to legal technicalities. With registration taking place in 
the early stages after the conclusion of the agreements, any defect could then be 
easily remedied in a climate free of disputes, which would avoid collective 
bargaining being undermined a posteriori. 
As the LRA 1995 already requires bargaining councils to provide the CCMA with 
copies of all collective agreements they conclude, and the CCMA is further charged 
with the resolution of disputes linked to the application and interpretation of 
collective agreements, it is submitted that the CCMA (which has an established 
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presence throughout the country) could be entrusted with the task of registering 
collective agreements. 
V NULLITY OF THE NORMS CONTRARY TO HIERARCHICALLY SUPERIOR NORMS 
Both countries provide that collective agreements must comply with the Constitution, 
public international law obligations and the object of the legislation. Belgium does so 
through an express provision which prohibits the inclusion in agreements of 
provisions which conflict with hierarchically superior norms, while South Africa does 
so through the interpretation clause inserted in the LRA 1995. 
The Belgian legislator did not, however, limit its intervention to this aspect, but also 
created a hierarchy between the different sources of labour law, and a "sub-
hierarchy" between collective agreements. 
The order of preference provided by the Belgian 1968 Act places centralised - inter-
industry wide bargaining at the top of the hierarchy of collective agreements, with 
centralised - sectoral, centralised - sub-sectoral and company level bargaining {in 
that order) ranking thereafter. 
This choice has the advantage of ensuring that centralised bargaining, - which is the 
legislator and social partners' preferred level of bargaining - is not undermined by 
collective bargaining taking place at other levels. This hierarchy does not affect the 
freedom of the parties to determine the appropriate level of bargaining, as they 
remain free not to bargain collectively at central level. It must, however, be noted 
that the Belgian social partners often bargain concurrently at the various levels. 
South Africa has opted not to create an order of preference between collective 
agreements, leaving this question to be addressed by the social partners on an ad 
hoc basis. It is submitted that this question should be addressed by the legislator as 
many conflicting legal arguments may be adopted to resolve this issue. This would 
create a climate even more favourable to collective bargaining. Should the CCMA 
be left to address this question on a discretionary basis, this would undermine 
collective bargaining to the extent that the parties will have no guarantees as to the 
binding force of agreements concluded collectively at a particular bargaining level. 
This could eventually also affect the social partners' constitutional right of recourse 
to industrial action, as it creates a situation where the answer to the question as to 
whether the issue in dispute is regulated by a collective agreement -which 
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determines whether the industrial action enjoys legal protection or not -may vary 
according to the legal position adopted by the CCMA. 
With regard to the effect of collective agreements on individual employment 
contracts, both countries have opted for a system in terms of which collective 
agreements vary individual employment contracts to the extent that the latter 
contain conflicting rules. South African law refers to such incorporation "where 
applicable" whilst Belgian law refers to provisions which are "contrary". The 
difference in terminology indicates that Belgium opted for a more rigid approach: a 
collective agreement will automatically vary a conflicting provision in an employment 
contract, regardless of whether the conflicting provision is more or less generous 
than the one contained in the collective agreement. 
It could be argued that the South African legislator's references to ''where 
applicable" and "to be treated in a manner that is less favourable" indicate a more 
flexible approach in terms of which a conflicting clause will only be varied when it -
weighed against the whole collective agreement - happens to be less favourable. 
The test would therefore imply the consideration of a "collective compromise" and 
not a "one to one" comparison. This test would not apply with regard to 
remuneration however: an employee may not in any circumstances be paid a 
remuneration which is inferior to the one prescribed by a collective agreement. 
It must finally be underlined that in both countries, the termination of a collective 
agreement does not affect the terms and conditions which were incorporated in the 
employment contract, and which are deemed to vary the employment contract. 
Those remain in force, until amended by a new collective or individual agreement. 
VI PERSONS BOUND BY COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
The mechanism used to bind persons to collective agreements, and therefore the 
persons bound by them, are probably the main differences between South African 
and Belgian law. 
In Belgium, the binding force of a collective agreement on the workforce, regardless 
of its level of conclusion, is determined by the fact that the employer is bound by an 
agreement - either because he is a member of an employers' organisation party to 
an agreement, he is a party to such agreement himself, or because he falls within 
the scope of the joint body which concluded the agreement. 
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In other words, the unionised status of an employee is of little importance in Belgium 
in determining whether or not he or she is bound by a collective agreement. As soon 
as the employer is bound by a collective agreement, all its employees, whether 
unionised or not, and whether members of the union parties to the agreement or 
not, will become bound by this agreement. This guarantees the application of 
uniform terms and conditions of employment on all employees covered at either 
company or centralised level. At centralised level, however, it must be noted that a 
collective agreement which is not extended to non-parties by Royal Decree, only 
has a supplementary binding force on employees and employers who were not 
represented - directly or indirectly - in the joint body concluding the agreement. 
They can however avoid the binding force of the collective agreement by inserting a 
clause to this effect in the employment contract. 
In practice, this system encourages employers to join employers' organisations in 
order to be able to influence collective agreements negotiated within joint bodies. 
At plant level, the application of this principle implies that even in case of a collective 
agreement being concluded with a minority union, its binding force will be extended 
to the entire workforce. 
Various factors may explain the rationale behind this system and the reasons why 
neither employers nor individual employees have challenged the binding force of 
these collective agreements. Belgian trade unions are deemed to be representative 
of all employees in a branch of activity and therefore to act for the entire branch of 
activity. Furthermore, factors such as the high rate of union membership in Belgium 
(approximately 70%), the size of the country and consequently the absence of 
significant disparities between the different regions of the country, the links between 
the three federations of trade unions and the three political parties which have 
shared the power in Belgium since the independence of the country, the fact that 
only these three federations have been given the right to conclude collective 
agreements and often establish common programmes of negotiation which are 
presented jointly to the employers, the fact that 2 of the 3 federations are 
represented in each joint committee, (and are thus omnipresent at sectoral level), 
the fact that collective agreements are adopted unanimously within joint bodies, and 
the circumstance that numerous pieces of legislation regulate employment 
relationships and lay down peremptory minimum standards all have a big influence 
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on the way collective bargaining takes place in Belgium. 
Regarding this last factor, it should be stressed that the extent of labour legislation 
laying down minimum legal standards, may result in collective bargaining only taking 
place to improve these minimum standards. Very few matters of mutual interest 
regarding employment relationships have been left unregulated by the legislator. 
South Africa has adopted an arguably more traditional approach, by linking the 
binding force of a collective agreement to the status of a party to the agreement or 
of members of a contracting party. At plant level, employees who are not members 
of the union parties to the collective agreement may only be bound if these union 
parties represent the majority of the employees employed in the workplace. 
Because of the reference to workplace rather than bargaining unit, it is submitted 
that it may be difficult in practice to extend company level agreements to non-
parties. This means that an employer would possibly be obliged to provide for 
different sets of working conditions, depending on the trade union membership of its 
employees. This will probably not facilitate collective bargaining at company level, 
and could be the source of claims of discrimination. 
The adversarial relationship between the various federations of trade unions in 
South Africa is probably a factor which would make it impossible to transpose the 
principles prevailing in Belgium. Although the writer has been unable to establish 
whether such adversity finds its source in ideological, cultural, political or other 
reasons, it seems impossible at this stage to envisage a system in South Africa 
whereby a minority trade union could, at plant level, enter into an agreement binding 
upon the entire workforce, including the employees belonging to a more 
representative union. South African collective labour law is based on the principle of 
representivity within a sector or a workplace, whilst Belgian law considers it at 
national, inter-industry wide level. 
It is, however, submitted that at centralised level, the South African system could 
take inspiration from the Belgian experience. 
Both countries promote centralised bargaining, but through different mechanisms. In 
South Africa, the primacy of sectoral level bargaining is endorsed in the LRA 
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1995383, but its result is not dictated. 
In Belgium, the supremacy of centralised bargaining is not affirmed in unambiguous 
terms, but the consequences attached by the legislator to collective agreements 
reached at centralised level clearly demonstrate this principle. This supremacy is 
established through Articles 1 O and 11 of the 1968 Act (regulating conflicting 
collective agreements), Article 51 of the 1968 Act (regulating the hierarchy of 
sources of obligations in employment relationships) and through the supplementary 
effect of collective agreements concluded in a joint body, and which have not been 
extended by Royal Decree, conferred by Article 26 of the 1968 Act. 
Although South African law has opted for a system promoting sectoral bargaining, it 
is submitted that, save for the declaration of intent contained in the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995, and the fact that collective bargaining concluded in a 
bargaining council may be extended to non-parties under strict conditions, none of 
its provisions practically promote or encourage centralised bargaining. 
A reading of sections 23 and 31 of the LRA 1995, dealing respectively with the 
binding force of collective agreements and the binding force of collective 
agreements concluded in bargaining councils, shows that the binding force and 
binding mechanism of collective agreements are exactly the same, regardless of 
their level of conclusion. (It is noteworthy that the wording of these two provisions is 
also nearly identical.) 
Without imposing a specific bargaining level on the social partners, and while 
respecting the principle of voluntarism, it is submitted that the promotion of 
centralised bargaining could be better achieved by a system such as the Belgian 
one. The creation of a national, inter-professional bargaining forum, having similar 
competence regarding the conclusion of collective agreements384, and the granting 
of supplementary binding force to collective agreements reached in bargaining 
councils or in this national forum, could prove to be more efficient in promoting 
centralised bargaining than the current system of statutory councils (which have not 
383 See section 1 - purpose of the Act, "to promote collective bargaining at sectoral level", but see also 
the title of the Labour Relations Act 1995 "to promote and facilitate collective bargaining at the 
workplace and at sectoral level"; The Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Legal 
Task Team, Government Gazette, No. 16259, 10 February 1995, stated in unambiguous terms that the 
LRA 1995 aims at promoting "industry-level bargaining and gives the industry-level bargaining 
forums the power to determine the matters which can be bargained at plant level." 
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met the favour of the social partners to date). 
In South Africa, the primacy of sectoral collective bargaining is therefore 
undermined by two factors: 
• the promotion of collective bargaining at sectoral level has not been translated 
into a principle that "its fruits" are superior to those of collective agreements 
concluded at other levels; and 
• sectoral collective agreements are only binding on the parties to the agreement 
and their members, save when the agreement has been extended to non-parties 
by the Minister. Towards non-parties, collective agreements have no binding 
force whatsoever and they do not serve as guidelines for the regulation of terms 
and conditions of employment in a determined sector. 
VII EXTENSION 
Both countries provide for a system of extension to non-parties of collective 
agreements concluded in statutory centralised forums. Once extended, a collective 
agreement becomes binding upon all employers and employees falling within the 
scope of the bargaining forum. A difference exists, however, between Belgium and 
South Africa regarding the possibility of departure from the provisions of a collective 
agreement: South Africa provides for procedures of extension and Belgium does not 
allow for the departure from a collective agreement extended by Royal decree. 
It must however be noted that the Belgian Minister is given wider powers than his 
South African counterpart in extending collective agreements: whilst the South 
African Minister must grant the extension where all the requirements laid down by 
the Act are met, the Belgian Minister retains a discretion to grant or refuse the 
extension. 
VIII BINDING FORCE AND MANDATE OF THE ORGANISATIONS' REPRESENTATIVES 
In order to prevent members of signatory parties to collective agreements from 
escaping their binding force by alleging that they did not give a mandate or that their 
organisation's representative exceeded the terms of its mandate, Belgian law has 
introduced a provision stating that organisation's representatives are irrefutably 
384 Which is not the case of NEDLAC 
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presumed to have the power to conclude collective agreements on behalf of their 
organisation. 
The LRA 1995 does not contain any such provision, therefore leaving open the 
question as to whether the binding force of collective agreements could be affected 
by reasons relating to the mandate of the organisations' representatives. 
It is submitted that the inclusion of a clause in the LRA 1995, providing that the 
parties to a collective agreement are irrefutably presumed to have a mandate from 
their members, would promote and secure collective bargaining. 
Arguments for this submission may be found in the very circumstance that the 
necessity for the legislator to regulate the binding force of collective agreements 
resulted from the inadequacy of the contractual law principles, (and more 
particularly the law of mandate) to address the situation created by the collective 
negotiation of labour agreements. 
IX COMING INTO FORCE OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Whilst the Belgian legislator has regulated the coming into force of collective 
agreements at length, the South African legislator has left this issue to the social 
partners, and has not enacted any provisions dealing with the starting date of the 
binding force of a collective agreement. Although the initial draft to the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995 provided that collective agreements were to become binding 
30 days after signature unless otherwise provided, this provision has been 
abandoned in the final draft. Social partners in South Africa enjoy total freedom 
determining and enforcing their own arrangements. Only time and practice will 
establish whether this empowerment of the social partners in the determination of 
the rules regarding the coming into force of collective agreements will promote legal 
certainty. 
X PARTICULAR SITUATIONS 
Whether with regard to the consequences of a transfer of undertaking, the 
disaffiliation of a member from an organisation party to an agreement, or the 
dissolution of a trade union or employers' organisation, both the South African and 
Belgian legislators have opted for a system protecting and promoting collective 
bargaining. They have expressly provided that such incidents have no influence on 
the binding force of collective agreements, which remain in force for their duration, 
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and until replaced by a new agreement. It must also be added that the provision in 
both acts for the incorporation of individual terms and conditions of employment 
negotiated collectively into individual employment contracts is an important factor in 
ensuring the maintenance of terms and conditions of employment in case of any of 
these particular situations occurring. 
XI ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS 
In order to accord totally with the policy of self-regulation which underlies the LRA 
1995, the South African legislator has opted for a system whereby the social 
partners are required to be responsible for the enforcement of collective 
agreements, and non-compliance with such agreements has been decriminalised. A 
reading of the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA 1995 indicates that another 
reason behind the preference for enforcement by arbitration rather than through the 
criminal courts is financial, and reveals that to recover an average claim of R250, 
the State may spend approximately R3 000. 
Only practice will show whether the decriminalisation of non-compliance with 
collective agreements will affect the effective authority of collective agreements. In 
Belgium, only the infringement of collective agreements which have been extended 
to non-parties by Royal Decree gives rise to criminal sanctions. Although it is only 
on very rare occasions that offenders have been criminally prosecuted, it seems 
that the fear of being held criminally liable acts as an incentive in ensuring 
compliance with collective agreements. 
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CONCLUSION 
A comparative study of Belgian and South African law of collective agreements 
shows that in both countries, the principle of self-regulation by the social partners of 
any matters of mutual interest is a main feature of their collective labour law. 
This principle seems, however, to be even stronger in South Africa, since, save to 
determine who is bound by a collective agreement, and under which conditions a 
collective agreement may be extended, South African law contains very little 
provisions regulating such agreements. 
In her introduction, the writer was referring to the fact that "if reference was still 
being made to the law of agency and stipulatio alteri, a comparative study with the 
Belgian system could surely contribute to the development of South African law." 
There is no doubt that if any contribution to the development of South African law 
can be made, it will not be by stating that collective agreements cannot be 
satisfactorily enforced by relying on the principles of agency or stipulatio a/teri. This 
has been acknowledged and enacted by the legislator in 1995 through the adoption 
of sections 23 and 31 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995, which regulate the 
binding force of collective agreements. 
However, the lack of legislative regulation on aspects such as the nature of the 
mandate held by the social partners to conclude collective agreements, and the 
hierarchy between collective agreements concluded at various levels, could prove 
detrimental to the promotion of collective bargaining. For these particular aspects, it 
is submitted that legislation should be enacted. Whatever position the South African 
legislator adopts regarding the questions as to whether or not there must be an 
irrebuttable presumption that the social partners hold a mandate to negotiate 
collective agreements, or whether sectoral agreements must take precedence over 
agreements concluded at other levels, it is submitted that a clear position should be 
adopted in order to promote legal certainty. 
Another aspect which, it is submitted, could be looked at with a view to promote 
collective bargaining in South Africa relates to the concept of "national inter-industry 
wide collective bargaining". Even though the final decision to bargain or not at this 
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level should be left to the social partners, the Labour Relations Act of 1995, in its 
current form, does not allow the regulation of matter of mutual interest at a level 
higher than sectoral. A reading of the Act, however, does not seem to indicate that 
the legislator had in mind to exclude specifically such bargaining, but rather did not 
"see" the implication of limiting the parties to collective agreements in the definition 
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